



Joint Evaluation of Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue

Mozambique Country Report

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The Case Study Phase has been carried out by a team of four consultants¹ with logistic support from the Danish Embassy, which was the lead coordinating agency in Mozambique. This report presents the findings, conclusions and lessons from the main study phase in Mozambique, which took place from 17 November to 6 December 2011. The report expresses the views of the evaluation team and does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the commissioning donors, nor the interviewed organisations and/or institutions.

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Abbreviations

3F	Danish trade union
ADEC	Human Rights and Democracy organisation, Sofala Province
AMCS	Associação das Mulheres de Comunicação Social
AMME	Associação das Mulheres Moçambicanas na Educação
AMMCJ	Associação de Mulheres Moçambicanas de Careira Jurídica
AMODE	Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento de Democracia
AGIR	Acções para uma Governação Inclusiva e Responsável (Swedish CS support program)
AVIMAS	Association of Widows and Single Mothers
AVVD	Associação de Vitimas de Violência Doméstica
BMF	Budget Monitoring Forum
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCM	Conselho Cristão de Moçambique
CDLs	Local Development Committees
CEA	Centro de Estudos Africanos
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEDE	Centro de Estudos de Democracia e Desenvolvimento
CESC	Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CINSFLU	Censo às Instituições Sem Fins Lucrativos) (Civil Society Index)
CIP	Centro de Integridade Pública
CODE	Canadian Organisation for Development through Education
CONSILMO	Conselho de Sindicatos Independentes de Mocambique (trade union centre)
CS (O)	Civil Society (Organisation)
CTA	Confederação das Associações Económicas de Moçambique (private sector organisation)
CTV	Centro Terra Viva
CVM	Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique
DAI	Direito ao Acesso a Informação (umbrella organisation)
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	Department for International Development
DO	Development Observatory
DP	Development Partner
ERP	Economic Rehabilitation Programme
ETD	District Technical Team
EQ	Evaluation Question
FDC	Fundação de Desenvolvimento Comunitário
Finida	Finnish International Development Agency
FOCADE	Fórum de ONGs de Cabo Delgado
FONGA	Fórum de Organizações Não-governamentais de Gaza
FORASC	Fórum de Associações de Sociedade Civil
FORCOM	Mozambican Community Radio Forum
FM	Fórum Mulher
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (ruling party)
G-15	Group of donors
G-20	Group of civil society actors
GMD	Grupo Moçambicano de Dívidas
GOM	Government of Mozambique

ICSO	International Civil Society Organization
IESE	Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas (National Statistical Institute)
Ibis	Danish ICSO
IPCC	Instituições Participativas de Consulta Comunitária (Participatory Institutions for Community Consultation)
IRPC	Imposto sobre o Rendimento da Pessoa Colectiva (Income Tax for collective entities)
JOINT	National CSO-umbrella
KEPA	Finnish ICSO
LCs	Local Councils
LCCs	Local Consultative Councils
LDH	Liga dos Direitos Humanos
LEMUSICA	Manica-based CSO working with violence prevention and support to victims
LINK	National CSO-umbrella
LOLE	Lei dos Órgãos Locais do Estado (legislation on local government institutions)
MAE	Ministério de Administração Estatal (Ministry of State Administration)
MASC	Mecanismo de Apoio à Sociedade Civil
MF	Ministério de Finanças (Ministry of Finance)
MINEG	Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MISA	Media Institute of Southern Africa
MMAS	Ministério de Mulher e Acção Social (Ministry for Women and Social Affairs)
MPD	Ministério de Planificação e Desenvolvimento (Ministry of Planning and Development)
N'WETI	CSO working on health communication
(I) NGO	(International) Non-Governmental Organisation
OMM	Organização das Mulheres de Moçambique
ONP	Organização Nacional de Professores
ORAM	Associação Rural de Ajuda Mutua
OREC	Organização para Resolução de Conflitos
OSISA	Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
OTM	Organização de Trabalhadores de Moçambique
PARPA	Plano para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta (PRSP)
PEDD	District Development Strategic Plans
PESOD	Economic and Social Plan and District Budget
PES	Plano Económico Social (Economic and social plan – national / district)
PO	Poverty Observatory
PPDF	Program for Decentralized Planning and Finance
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional de Mocambique (main opposition party)
RM	Rádio Moçambique (state owned national radio station)
SASK	Finnish trade union organisation
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
Sida	Swedish Development Cooperation Agency
SNJ	Sindicato Nacional de Journalistas
TCV	Todos Contra Violência
TEIA	National CSO-umbrella
TVM	Televisão de Moçambique (state owned national television station)
UEM	Universidade Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo
UNAC	União Nacional dos Camponeses
UNCDF	United Nation Capital Development Fund

UNICEF	United Nations' Children's Fund
WLSA	Women and Law in Southern Africa
WSG	Water and Sanitation Group
WWF	World Wildlife Foundation

Executive summary

Introduction

1. This Mozambique Country study of Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue has been commissioned by three international development agencies (ADA/Austria, Danida/Denmark and Sida/Sweden) on behalf of a larger group of bilateral development partners (Cida/Canada, Finida/Finland and SDC/Switzerland), who support the evaluation through their participation in a Reference Group.
2. The evaluation focuses on the effectiveness of civil society organisations² (CSOs) in policy dialogue to provide information to Development Partners (DPs) on how best to support Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) across a broad range of countries and sectors. The purpose of the two case studies described in this report is to provide in-depth analysis of how CSOs engage in policy dialogue, what outcomes they have achieved and what factors have contributed to them. This study is one of three reports (the others covering Bangladesh and Uganda). The field work was carried out in two phases during the period September to December 2011 following a scoping study carried out earlier in the same year.

Civil society landscape

3. CSOs in Mozambique comprise three major groups: 1) a small elite of urban-based, intellectual/academic organisations, which are well-functioning and receive donor support. They have no direct constituencies, but are accountable to the public in general; 2) middle sized organisations with limited policy dialogue potential. They are often opportunity driven and related to specific donor prioritised sector topics (gender, health, HIV/AIDS, climate change) with service delivery as the main focus; and 3) community-based organisations (CBOs) and other local organisations with weak capacity and limited resources and visibility, often defined around members' livelihood interests. The evaluation study concentrates on these groups. CS also comprises of groups and movements outside the established CS groups, such as the spontaneous groups reacting to rising prices, the ex-migrants from former German Democratic Republic, as well as the thousands of mutual self-help groups at community level.

Methodology

4. The country study was guided by the overall methodological framework for this evaluation, as given in the TOR, and informed by the conceptual framework for the case studies developed by the team. The study used various sources of information and data collection methods, including document review, interviews, focus group discussions and workshops. Field visits were undertaken in the Southern provinces of Gaza and Maputo. Telephone interviews have helped optimise time and outreach, and analytical tools included Power Cube, time lines and Theory of Change were applied. The analysis of plausible linkages between civil society (CS) strategies and development partners' support strategies, intermediate outcomes and policy changes is based upon the use of Theory of Change.

Enablers and threats across the CSO operating environment

5. The political, legal and socio-economic environment in which CSOs operate consists of enabling and disabling factors. It is influenced by cultural factors and the country's history, including the period of Portuguese colonial rule, the socialist liberation movement, civil war and transition from a one-

² The terms CSO (Civil Society Organisation) and ICSO (International Civil Society Organisation) are used in the report synonymously to NGO (Non-governmental Organisation) and INGO (International Non-governmental Organisation).

party socialist state to a multi-party legal democracy, currently heavily dependent on donor funds in spite of a fast-growing liberal economy.

6. The study has identified three main dimensions of enabling and disabling factors contributing to the CS environment:
 - **Legal freedom** including the constitutional guarantees of rights to association and freedom of expression is broadly established. However, some of the laws (e.g. the Law of Association) are outdated. The legal freedoms also include a progressive Media Law, which establishes the right to information, press freedom, broadcasting rights and the right to reply. In reality, the independent media are facing financial problems in the current economic climate, with limited access to commercial funds. Outreach beyond urban centres is a serious restricting factor. In many districts, the legal procedures are not being observed and intimidation by government officials is a feature.
 - **Political freedom.** The electoral system reinforces the power of the ruling party and weakens the citizens' access to influence through elected representatives at national level. The Government's practice of restricting information and its intimidating attitude towards critical voices are disabling factors, as is the dysfunctional judicial system which provides little or no protection for citizens who have been excluded through accusations of belonging to the opposition.
 - **Financial freedom** for CSOs is available to some extent in Mozambique, but is exercised mainly through access to donor funds. Consequently, CSOs tend to align their activities with donor priorities, and opportunities for implementing their own agendas are relatively limited.
7. The formal institutions required for the full exercise of citizenship are to a large extent in place in Mozambique; there is a legal-constitutional framework for freedom of expression and of association, along with a stated commitment to citizens' engagement in governance. However, these formal elements are confronted by a culture and practice that works counter to the exercise of such freedoms. For example the lack of access to information and knowledge on rights, legislation and procedures with regard to associations is a general problem especially among minor, local-based CSOs.³

Policy dialogue

8. CS has over the last decade gained valuable experience in engaging in policy dialogue through a number of major processes: the Land Campaign in the mid-90s, the formulation of Agenda 2025 in 2001, and the process around the Poverty/Development Observatories, which was started in 2003. Experience on what has worked for CS is drawn from these processes: adherence to common cause, inclusion of a variety of actors, i.e. community and faith based organisations, private sector, trade unions, academics, collaboration with state institutions, support from international non-governmental organisations (ICSOs), strong leadership and use of influential contacts.
9. Over recent years, several invited spaces⁴ have been established, but there is limited decentralisation and central government's efforts to increase engagement and dialogue with CS do not cascade down to local and district level. The invited spaces are often met with scepticism by CSOs, who feel that the invitation to participate is issued only to legitimize decisions already taken. CSOs face problems in engaging in policy dialogue due to lack of adequate technical knowledge on

³ Minor local CBOs are reported to have weak notion of citizenship and therefore difficulties in knowing where and how to access information. Interviews with Fernanda Farinha, CIP, IESE and ICSO.

⁴ *Invited spaces* are fora or platforms established on initiative of Government and/or development partners to which civil society are invited for dialogue, as opposed to *claimed spaces* are for a or platforms established on initiative of civil society. See Annex 9: Conceptual Framework for explanation of the Power Cube.

public finance administration, legislation and anti-corruption, limited access to information and scarce human and financial resources.⁵ Well-established CSOs have a preference for claimed and informal spaces, which are not directly controlled by government.

CSO strategies on policy dialogue

10. Interviews and the literature review revealed a range of CS strategies applied during previous policy dialogue processes, which are confirmed by the case study analysis: cohesion around common causes regardless of the ideological diversity, direct participation of CBOs and religious groups, collaboration with ICSOs, capacity-building, the existence of 'movers and shakers' and charismatic leadership; acceptance of diverse opinions and common principles, production and dissemination of evidence and documentation collaboration with the media.
11. Within the invited and/or claimed spaces, the CSOs chose different strategies to engage in policy dialogue:
 - **Direct and formal policy dialogue** mainly through platforms and networks. CS engagement suffers from fatigue over time, and CS representatives are often co-opted onto Government committees and begin to follow their own agenda, losing contact with the original constituency that they claim to represent. Platforms and networks are, however, still an important strategic choice of CS to form a united voice.
 - **Direct and informal policy dialogue** is the claimed space, where CS coalitions take action and engage in policy dialogue around specific topics of their own agenda. Research and academic CSOs provide evidence and documentation for qualified engagement in policy dialogue.
 - **Indirect contribution to policy dialogue** is provided by organisations related to social communication and media, which play an important role in disseminating information. Community radio stations are important players, which often create spaces for dialogue through investigative journalism and open programmes.

Findings from the two case studies

12. Two policy processes serve as case studies for this evaluation in Mozambique: District Planning and Budget Monitoring and the process leading to adoption of Legislation on Domestic Violence. The two policy processes differ considerably and they provide the evaluation with different experience on CS's engagement in policy dialogue. The District Planning and Budget Monitoring case study provides a series of examples of how influencing can and cannot happen around these critical planning and budgeting processes at different levels. The Legislation on Domestic Violence case study documents a process which started in 2000 and was concluded with the adoption of the law against Domestic Violence in 2009.
13. **District Planning and Budget Monitoring:** The case study found that the invited spaces that government has created for information provision and dialogue have been used by the ruling party to legitimise decisions taken by the government (and consequently to consolidate their power) rather than to genuinely engage with CSOs. The Development Observatories, a donor-supported government initiative to encourage and support national policy dialogue on poverty and development, are controlled by government and are not in reality a space for open and inclusive debate.⁶ Local Consultative Councils suffer from poor representation of local interests and weak linkages between district planning and budgeting processes. Presidential interventions, such as the

⁵ Even CIP has only one person with an education in macro-economic and anti-corruption. Interview with CIP, November 2011.

⁶ Although improvements have been registered in terms of CS engagement and influence at the national level Development Observatory in early 2012 and in the provincial Development Observatories in 2011 in Manica, Nampula and Gaza, the agenda and the timing is still controlled by government.

7 millions and the *Presidencia Aberta e inclusiva*, serve more to undermine local accountability than strengthen it. While the newly formed Local Development Committees offer the prospect of greater grassroots engagement in local governance, they are not formally linked into the district planning process and so their current potential remains limited.

14. Some claimed spaces have demonstrated success in identifying and addressing mismanagement by government, through informal contacts with the ruling party, traditional authorities and religious leaders and through naming and shaming by the independent media. But the main success in CS engagement in and influence over policy has been through more formally organised policy advocacy undertaken by largely national or provincial CSOs that bring research-based evidence into dialogue. This claimed space has been built through consolidation of CSO efforts, the development of shared platforms, and through strategic partnerships with ICSOs.
15. The existing CS-platforms at provincial level play an important role in providing access to information and a space for smaller CBOs to engage, although there is a risk that they will (over the mid-term) start acting as independent organisations rather than representing the interests of their members.
16. The consolidation of thematic working groups within CS platforms in very few provinces has shown that they stimulate a minimum of expertise in specific matters of policy and increase the capacity of CSOs to engage in policy dialogue with the government (e.g. Nampula and Manica).
17. Nonetheless, significant organisational and capacity constraints within these CSOs, platforms and networks continue to undermine progress. The current tendencies for concentration that lead various development partners (DPs) to support fewer and stronger CSOs (such as IESE, CIP, LDH) all based in Maputo do not favour the general strengthening of CS in Mozambique.
18. **Legislation on domestic violence:** The policy dialogue on legislation on domestic violence is recognised by all stakeholders as an initiative taken by CSOs. The space for dialogue was claimed; it happened mainly at national level and it is a completed process, i.e. from the start of the initiative to the adoption of law.
19. It is possible to establish links between strategies and results demonstrating that the adoption of the law was influenced mainly by the women's movement. The fact of a common cause was a strengthening factor for the mobilisation of CS. Strong leadership and the capacity to create coalitions with complementary strategic actions were also key.
20. CS has used diverse strategies including influential individuals and simultaneous campaigns at both the national and local level. But social and cultural norms were and are still a strong negative factor in the process. The law was passed but both rights providers and the majority of the population do not act as expected, influenced by existing social norms and aggravated by - in certain cases - a lack of information and training. There is an obvious need for follow-up and monitoring of law enforcement for the process to lead to lasting policy changes, but donor support for CS engagement beyond policy making has been limited so far.

CSO Effectiveness and process outcomes:

21. The two cases study policy dialogue processes have revealed very distinct features in terms of invited/claimed spaces, government/CS initiative, role of DPs, geographical outreach and time span. However, both processes have faced similar challenges in terms of constraints encountered, enabling and disabling factors, government reactions to confrontation and political control, as well as limited and not always sufficiently professional internal capacity of the CSOs involved. Common features in terms of process outcomes are the recognition of CSOs as dialogue partners, credit for solid evidence and research documentation, strengthened positions as a result of alliances with

other actors, including other CSOs, ICSOs, DP-embassies and the media. Both processes also demonstrate that continued attention from CS is important, as momentum is easily lost.

22. The study has not identified any particular cases where CSOs have chosen not to get involved in policy dialogue. However, the issue of non-involvement is related to the general problem of poverty, which has a negative influence on the engagement of citizens in political issues. Many local level organisations and associations fail to prioritise political debate not related to their specific interest, when they face serious problems of malnutrition and a lack of basic needs among their constituents. Thus, organisations defending economic interests (e.g. the small farmers' associations) are perceived as more relevant to the needs of the communities at the local level.

Lessons on Donor Partner strategies

23. There are three issues of key importance for the relationship between CSOs and DPs when it comes to supporting engagement in policy dialogue: harmonisation, support through intermediaries and need for alignment to CSOs' own agendas. Findings also sustain the need for a re-focus in development in the dialogue between DPs and the Government of Mozambique (GOM) on issues related to CS.
24. Direct support at country level is considered flexible and responsive by most DPs, as it allows for support to new initiatives and provides seed money. However, it involves high transaction costs for donors and there is little or no evidence of its effectiveness. It is recognised by the DPs that this approach is time consuming and requires specialised capacity, which is not always available with reduced budgets.
25. Indirect support via harmonised donor funding mechanisms has been increasingly used. However, such support is still tied to projects and DP priorities, and alignment to CSOs' strategic priorities is limited. The joint mechanisms still suffer from many of the problems known from bilateral support: donor-specific priorities, special reporting and accounting formats and short-term project funding rather than longer-term core funding. Indirect support through ICSOs has been the preferred approach for many years. DPs see an advantage in collaborating with ICSOs (of which the majority based in the donor's own country) as they often possess strong local and decentralized presence and in-depth knowledge.
26. CSOs criticised support where it is often supply-driven and determined by donor priorities (environment, justice, governance etc.). The frequent change of DP policies according to new trends influences the CSOs to change their core activities to match the donor priorities. This may have severe consequences, as intermediaries are forced to close down partnerships, which is unsettling for the people employed by CSOs and undermines their efforts to build solid in-house capacity.
27. DPs policy dialogue on CS issues takes place directly with GOM, but also indirectly, e.g. through ICSO-implemented CS support programmes where local CSOs are supported in their advocacy and policy dialogue endeavours. The fact that DPs have a strong focus on macro-level issues and that the policy dialogue is institutionalised in working groups has supported a tendency of "following the money" with focus on macro-level economics and overall MDG indicators.

Conclusions

28. **CSO effectiveness:** The successful strategies in terms of enhanced effectiveness used by CSOs were: the use of platforms, networks and coalitions; use of informal spaces for obtaining influence; providing evidence; and identification of a common cause.
29. **Enabling and disabling conditions:** The main factors influencing the environment in which CSOs operate are the legal freedoms, freedom of expression, political and financial freedoms. The low human and financial capacity of CSOs, as well as necessary contextual knowledge and barriers

imposed by social and cultural norms are likewise important factors in the environment for CSO engagement in policy dialogue.

30. **DP policies and strategies:** The following factors were identified as crucial for ensuring successful support to CS engagement in policy dialogue: harmonisation of support, efficiency of joint funding mechanisms, alignment to CSOs' own agendas and systems, diversification and maintaining a critical dialogue with government on CS issues.

Lessons learned

31. The lessons learned provide the basis for drawing up recommendations in relation to both the successes of CSO strategies and challenges being faced.
32. **CSO strategies:** For CSOs to be successful in their policy dialogue, the following strategies have yielded positive results: establishment of platforms, networks and coalitions; collaboration with media; providing evidence and documentation; acting upon opportunities; engagement in both direct and informal dialogue; ensuring maximum exposure; establishing international partnerships; strengthening internal capacity and ensuring diversity of activities.
33. **DP strategies:** For DPs to be able to improve their support to CS engagement in policy dialogue, the following issues should be addressed: rethinking the aid architecture and involve a broad and diverse groups of CS actors; ensuring harmonisation to lower transactional costs for CSOs; working through joint funding mechanisms; ensuring strengthened ownership by CSOs; working with a long-term perspective and ensure the establishment of vertical links between regional, national and local organizations.

1. Introduction

This Joint Evaluation of Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue has been commissioned by three international development agencies (ADA/Austria, Danida/Denmark and Sida/Sweden) on behalf of a larger group of bilateral development partners (Cida/Canada, Finida/Finland and SDC/Switzerland), who support the evaluation through their participation in a Reference Group. The evaluation runs from May 2011 to August 2012. The evaluation includes three country studies (Bangladesh, Mozambique and Uganda).

The overall purpose of this evaluation is *lesson learning*, to help Development Partners (DPs) to gain a better understanding of how best to support civil society organisations (CSOs) in the area of policy dialogue. This involves a dual focus on 1) how CSOs engage in policy dialogue and 2) how different DP support strategies may influence CSOs' ability to engage in policy dialogue.⁷ The evaluation has a number of specific objectives: i) to establish understanding of how CSOs engage in policy dialogue and how the enabling environment influences CSOs' choice of approaches, ii) to assess CSOs contribution to policy dialogue (relevance, effectiveness, outcomes), iii) to identify enabling and disabling factors, iv) to discuss strengths and weaknesses of DP support strategies, and v) to identify lessons learned and presentation of recommendations.

The Mozambique country study has been carried out in two phases. A scoping exercise took place in September 2011 which provided the contextual information needed to select policy processes as case studies for the main phase. The scoping study reviewed a number of relevant policy processes where civil society (CS) has engaged in policy dialogue.⁸ Based on five overall selection criteria – relevance to the Mozambican development agenda, degree of CSO involvement, inclusion in decentralised processes, type of policy dialogue and availability of information - two policy areas were selected and proposed by the Evaluation Team; discussed by the Reference Group and finally endorsed by the Evaluation Management Group:⁹ The policy areas are:

1. District Planning and Budget Monitoring
2. Movement for the approval of legislation on Domestic Violence

The purpose of the case studies is to provide an in-depth analysis of how CSOs engage in policy dialogue, what outcomes they have achieved and what factors have contributed to them. The case studies, focussing on selected policy areas, are expected to provide lessons for DPs on how they could better support CSO effectiveness in policy dialogue. The Case Study Phase has been carried out by a team of four consultants¹⁰ with logistical support from the Danish Embassy, which was the lead coordinating agency in Mozambique.

This report presents the findings, conclusions and lessons from the main study phase in Mozambique, which took place from 17 November to 6 December 2011. The report expresses the views of the evaluation team and does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the commissioning donors, nor the interviewed organisations and/or institutions.

2. Methodology and limitations

The country study was guided by the overall methodological framework for this evaluation which has been developed to ensure consistency between the country studies. The two documents that lay out the overall methodology are the Evaluation Framework and the Conceptual Framework (Annex 2 and Annex 9). The Evaluation Framework contains 18 specific evaluation questions (EQs) derived from the Terms of Reference (TOR) for this evaluation. It also specifies the judgment criteria, data sources and data collection methods.

⁷ Tender document: 8 Appendix a: Scope of Services (Terms of Reference), pp. 40-66.

⁸ Joint Evaluation of Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue. Scoping Exercise Mozambique. Final Report, October 2011.

⁹ Evaluation Management Committee meeting 27.10.2011; see Annex 5.

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The Conceptual Framework outlines the approach to case studies,¹¹ the main analytical concepts and tools, such as the Theory of Change and the Power Cube.¹²

2.1. Methodology

The case study process followed the nine steps outlined in the conceptual framework. These include a document review and CSO mapping prior to the field work. In order to secure efficient sharing of information and documents within the team, as well as with the overall team leader and others, Dropbox has been used for sharing of background documents, notes and drafts. The field work was then carried out through the following activities:

Team preparation. In order to secure a common understanding and application of the Conceptual Framework and the analytical tools, a thorough preparation of the team members was undertaken at the start of the field work period. This involved detailed presentations and team discussions of approach and tools. The Conceptual Framework was revisited and discussed at various team meetings throughout the field work period to secure the best possible understanding of approach and methodology.

Analytical tools. The team has applied a number of analytical tools from the Conceptual Framework, albeit with some difficulties derived from changes in the team, as well as language barriers. The *Theory of Change* has been a central tool for the case study analysis, allowing for a structured analysis of the plausible linkages between CSO strategies, intermediate outcomes and policy changes. The construction of a Theory of Change for each of the case studies took place only after data collection; and it is recognised that drafting the Theory of Change upfront would have been more fruitful in terms of providing an analytical framework for data collection and not only serve as an *ex-post* reconstruction. The *Power Cube* in its reduced form was mainly used to provide the terminology for classifying different spaces for policy dialogue. *Timelines* were useful to identify key events in relation to the two cases. This was useful in combination with the Theory of Change, as it helps contextualise the CSO strategies as well as the outcomes and policy changes.

Interviews and focus groups. Interview guidelines following the Evaluation Questions (EQs) and reporting matrices were prepared to secure sharing of information within the team as well as uniformity in collection of information and data.¹³ Interviews were based on principles of *Appreciative Inquiry* and semi-structured to allow for tailoring of the format depending on the situation and resources available. The majority of the approximately 50 interviews were conducted face-to-face, but telephone interviews were also carried out. Some of the information was gathered during focus-group discussions to explore the synergy between informants from different categories (international non-governmental organisations (ICSOs) and DP-representatives). In some cases, the identity of sources has been kept confidential due to concerns of possible political repercussions.

Field visits were undertaken in the Southern provinces of Gaza and Maputo to avoid time consuming travel to Northern Provinces. Stakeholders in other locations were contacted for telephone interviews. It is noted that there are major differences in the experience related to district planning and budget monitoring (case 1) in between Northern and Southern Mozambique, as the main programmes have been implemented in the North (Nampula). The empirical evidence gathered in the South (Gaza and Maputo) may therefore reflect a different situation. The team has counter-balanced this possible bias by applying the team's existing knowledge from previous assignments, supplemented with documented information on Central and Northern Provinces.

¹¹ Two cases were selected by the Management Committee at its meeting on 27th October based on information collected during the Scoping Study in September 2011. For further details, see Annex 5: Rationale and approach for selection of policy areas.

^{12,12} For further details on the analytical tools, please see Annex 9: Conceptual Framework.

¹³ See annex 4.

Selection of interviewees and stakeholders. The selected cases have guided the selection of stakeholders for interviews, i.e. CSOs have been selected based on their engagement and their role in the cases study, as well as their availability to participate in interviews. Interviews with government officials have likewise been determined by their connection to the case studies and served to ensure information from both sides. Additional key informants have been selected due to their specific knowledge of the cases and/or the CS-environment. Representatives from DPs were nominated by the agencies.

Sources of information for triangulation. The evaluation has drawn upon different sources of information in order to allow for triangulation of information. Document review and information from the Scoping Exercise has been the principle source of information. Interviews with key informants from selected CSOs have provided the core information on the cases, but also ICSOs, Government, DPs, individual key informants, websites and the media have provided information. Due to the political nature of the subject matter, the validity and reliability of statements by CS-interviewees may in some cases need to be treated with caution as it may present a biased picture. To address this, the evaluation team has cross-checked and assessed the trustworthiness of statements, and where possible different points of views are given in the text in order to provide a balanced account.

Verification Workshops. Two verification workshops were held to validate preliminary findings. Each workshop was attended by 8-10 participants invited for their specific knowledge on and engagement in the subject. Participants represented a broad range of CSOs, government, academia, DPs and ICSO representatives. The workshops were characterised by lively, engaged discussions and served to test preliminary findings, verify information and consolidate the preliminary arguments.

2.2. Limitations

Limited availability of informants. In-depth interviews involving several members of each CSO were envisaged as an important part of the data-collection. However, CSOs and other interviewees are extremely busy, and late November / early December is the peak season for annual meetings, partner workshops, headquarter-visits and international delegations.¹⁴ Consequently, the team faced difficulties in setting up meetings with CSO informants as many people were not available due to other commitments; and it turned out to be impossible to meet with more than one representative of the selected CSOs. This again made it impossible to conduct focus-group discussions using SWOT and/or force field analysis as envisaged in the Conceptual Framework.¹⁵ The relatively late decision on the selection of policy processes (cases)¹⁶ contributed to the fact that CSOs were selected late and consequently given only short notice. Problems were also faced in terms of access to government officials at central level, where meetings were often cancelled or changed.

Lost in translation. The Conceptual Framework has been carefully discussed and formulations and concepts have been fine-tuned to express exactly what is intended. However, translations from English to Portuguese and later from Portuguese to Changana influenced the level of detail in terms of information. In some cases it was difficult to steer the interview in a certain direction, as respondents tended follow their own line of thought, starting with a chronological report of events, only rarely providing a view on processes or causal linkages.

Outreach and barriers. Contact with organisations and institutions at district level in Mozambique must go through formal channels, which often serve as a filter of information. It is difficult to penetrate the formal, government-controlled level and get beyond the barrier, especially with limited time available. For this

¹⁴ The timing for the Mozambique case study was i.a. set to fit the overall calendar of the three country case studies.

¹⁵ It is important to note that the transactional costs in terms of time spent by the interviewees do not pay back in terms of direct input to their activities in the case of an evaluation at this level. When primary informants ask "What is in it for us?", the answer is that they may not even have access to the report.

¹⁶ The decision on which cases to select was taken by the Management Group on 27th October and the field work started mid-November.

reason, contact to constituents of community-based organisations (CBOs) has been limited to interviews with representatives of network members. Local CSOs and CBOs interviewed have had little or no information on DP strategies, as they often receive support through intermediaries.

3. Key aspects of an enabling environment

The political, legal and socio-economic environment in which CSOs operate consists of enabling and disabling factors, which influence the possibility for CSOs to successfully engage in policy dialogue. This chapter analyses the different historical factors which have influenced the current environment for CS engagement in policy dialogue, and the power relations between CSOs and other actors which now exist.

3.1. The CSO landscape in Mozambique

In order to fully understand the environment in which the Mozambican CSOs operate, it is important to have an appreciation of the key historic and contextual features. Immediately after Independence in 1975, the one-party state led by the ruling party Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Frelimo) established so-called “democratic mass organisations”.¹⁷ The purpose of these organisations was to continue - albeit under different ideology - the patterns of supervision and control used under the Portuguese colonialism system under the cover of “Security of the State”. However, in addition to the state organised initiatives, independent developments took place, some of which dated back to the colonial era; e.g. the establishment of the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM¹⁸), Cáritas de Moçambique and the national peasants’ union *União Nacional dos Camponeses* (UNAC).¹⁹ These CSOs still survive and represent some of the genuine member-based CSOs in the country today. A time line, indicating the most important events in relation to the CSOs political, legal and socio-economic environment is attached as Annex 10.

The Mozambican CSO landscape and the different kinds of CSOs fall roughly into three main categories:²⁰

- A small elite of individual and platform organisations, which are capable of and invited to participate, comment and interact with state institutions. These are mainly based in Maputo city and are typically well-funded, as their level of performance has attracted the attention of donors. They are professional, with the capacity to mobilise funding, they abide by their statutes, and hold more or less regular meetings with their individual or organisational members to which they are accountable. Many of these organisations have, however, no proper constituency, but act “on behalf of” certain groups and defend their causes, e.g. women’s and/or children’s rights, advocating to create awareness of the consequences of extractive industries and (district) budget monitoring etc.
- A considerable group of organisations of middle size, with potential but sometimes with no clear expression in terms of influencing policies and with limited funds. Many of these organisations are demand or opportunity driven, i.e. the funding opportunities offered by the donor community’s changing agendas (gender, HIV/AIDS, and most recently climate change) foster the establishment of these organisations. Often the main objective is service delivery (and employment), but also elements of advocacy and defence of specific rights issues are on their agenda. In spite of certain hands-on

¹⁷ The so-called democratic mass organizations are OMM (women’s organization), OTM (workers’ organization) and OJM (youth organization), as well as the two professional interest organizations ONP (national teachers’ organization) and ONJ (

¹⁸ CCM was established already in 1948.ational journalists’ organization).

¹⁹ José Negrão: “A Propósito das Relações Entre as ONGs do Norte e a Sociedade Civil Moçambicana” (2003), available in http://www.iid.org.mz/Relacoes_entre_ONG_do_Norte_e_Sociedade_Civil_do_Sul.pdf

²⁰ Interview with the NGOs Forum of Gaza, and with the representative of Magariro, the latter organisation based in Chimoio, Manica.

knowledge, these organisations in many cases have no constituency and run the risk of becoming personalised through their leaders who end up acting as one-man-organisations.²¹

- The majority of organisations, however, are small, working only at provincial and district level, with limited capacity, comprising only a small number of staff or associates. They are generally not well known outside their immediate area. They are, however, committed to their members but usually lack the financial resources to meet their basic everyday costs. These organisations often have sector specific scope with either economic or social objectives, e.g. community and farmers' associations, parents' groups, women's associations, sports and youth associations, local councils and community development committees.

Finally, there is an additional category in Mozambican CS, which is outside the organised groups, but is a factor in the CS landscape as clearly described in a recent report from the United Nations Development Programme:²²

Box 1: The fourth civil society category

When assessing civil society in Mozambique, it is imperative to mention the events that occurred in early September 2010. The violent demonstrations, which resulted in 14 deaths, are not only an important sign of the failed model of economic growth without distribution, but also may help us to reflect on the situation of the CS in the country. During the riots, a significant portion of the Mozambican population expressed their outrage against rising costs of living, and made use of violence to force the government to withdraw the announced rises in fuel and food prices. A similar chain of events occurred in early 2008. The absence of interlocutors of this strong movement is an important sign not only of the gap between formal institutions (including donors, the government and its political opposition) and the 'unorganized' expression of civil society, but also of the long journey that the CS still has to make in order to build a pacific, yet strong voice to represent their claims.

This type of civil society action is characterised by spontaneous movements, which receives little or no attention from the established CS or from donors. It is regarded as a potential threat and unconstructive in its means of expressing dissatisfaction. But it is a voice of the CS, which may be stronger or more significant in the coming years.

3.2. Contributing factors

The factors which contribute to CSO effectiveness in engaging in policy dialogue are multiple. It is important to consider not only the enabling factors, but also the disabling factors in order to fully understand the environment in which the CSOs operate. The contributing factors – positive and negative – are analyzed in relation to legal, political and financial freedoms.

3.2.1. Legal freedoms

One of the most important enabling factors of engagement in policy dialogue is the legal right to free association and to information, the freedom of expression and the engagement of citizens and CS in the processes of governance. The rights of association and organisation are broadly guaranteed by the current constitution of 2004 and Law of Association of 1991 (8/91), which means that Mozambique in formal terms has advanced in guaranteeing citizenship rights.²³ It is critical to recognise that the existing law brought a new impetus to the emergence of a large number of non-governmental associations and organisations. However, there are several challenges that hinder the operation and growth of CSOs. The poor performance

²¹ This category of CSOs was polemically designated “James Bond-organizations” referring to the fact that they have no office and everything is governed from the James Bond-like attaché case of the leader!

²² “The Mirror of Narcissus –knowledge and self-conscience for a better development of the Mozambican Civil Society. Lessons learned and recommendations from Mozambique on its experience in implementing CIVICUS Civil Society Index”, UNDP Mozambique, March 2011.

²³ OSISA, 2009.

of justice institutions is one, and the current legislation on Associations not matching the dynamics of the growing CS in term of registration, types of CSOs and taxation is another. CS stakeholders are therefore advocating for a new law to be enacted. A draft proposal was discussed among CSOs during 2010 and presented to Parliament through the Commission of Social Affairs in September 2010 and the Ministry of Justice in November 2010. So far there has been no official reaction to the proposal.

By law, CSOs are required to be linked with a Government organ (line ministry), as Government regards CSOs primarily as service delivery organisations supporting the implementation of government programmes within different sectors. In order to obtain formal registration, CSOs operating in governance issues are increasingly being pressured to be associated with a line ministry or specific sector. It is also a major problem that most of the CSOs, particularly the ones based at provincial and district level far from Maputo City face bureaucratic hurdles in registering with the Government. This has direct implications for the eligibility of CSOs to access funds. Registration requires cumbersome processes of providing documentation, which involves long-distance travel to district or provincial capitals, costs and often delays with possible consequences of disqualification.

Apart from the existence of explicit legislation on foundations and agricultural or farming associations, current legislation on associations does not differentiate between types of CSOs. Self-help (*ajuda mutua*) organisations are lumped together with charitable organisations and those that are dedicated to service delivery, advocacy and politics.²⁴ One interviewee commented that “...the Associations with an economic purpose (agricultural or farming associations) have less requirements and consequently easier access to register. One could question why it has to be the government and not the Judiciary approving the registration of other associations?” Some groups have no clear reasons for the refusal to register their organisations or receive contradictory messages on how they should be run; for example the Mozambique association for sexual minority rights, *Lambda* has for years received no response to its request for registration.

The lack of knowledge on rights, legislation and procedures with regard to associations is a general problem among CSOs and public servants, which constrains CSO operations, and in many districts, the legal procedures are not being observed. Part of the ignorance of the laws is also due to the fact that they are only available in Portuguese and not translated into local languages. The non-compliance and ignorance of the laws is characterised by systematic lack of regard of deadlines for the approval of official documents (*despacho do reconhecimento*), both at national, provincial, district and administrative post levels.²⁵

Access to information is important for active participation in policy dialogue, but there has been no progress in terms of free and easy access to information, especially in relation to public information held by State institutions. In Mozambique, secrecy in public institutions is a prevailing concern, a problem that is further aggravated by the fact that when information becomes public it is often too technical and provided too late to be properly used by CSOs. Several attempts for the Parliament to approve a Law on access to information, submitted by CS in 2005, have failed, apparently because of lack of political interest²⁶ In 2011, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Mozambique chapter²⁷ organised a debate on access to information and constitutional revision but no member of parliament from the ruling party attended.

3.2.2. Political freedoms

CS engagement in policy dialogue is increasingly hampered by a hostile and often intimidating political environment. The exercise of political freedom is strongly limited by the threats made by government authorities, aggravated by the weak performance of justice bodies. Political institutions are regarded by the

²⁴ NGO sustainability Index, USAID 2009; Evaluation of Citizens Voice and Accountability, DFID 2009.

²⁵ Civil society proposal to review the law 8/91, 2010.

²⁶ Ismael Mussa, former member of Parliament for MDM (Movimento Democrático de Mocambique).

²⁷ With the support from the Danish NGO IBIS under the Swedish-funded Access to Information Programme (Programa AGIR). <http://www.misa.org/>

citizens and CS as being intolerant to dialogue and confrontation. The limitation is neither legal nor formal, but consists of constraints and forms of social and psychological intimidation that produce feelings of inhibition, fear of reprisals and emotional unease. The almost total restriction on access to information and the intimidating practices used by government authorities, mainly at the local government level, increase the fears of CS stakeholders to engage in policy dialogue.²⁸

CS actors are often accused of belonging to the opposition and are consequently “outlawed”²⁹. In an environment where the market is dominated by the political elite from the ruling party, alternatives that could provide an escape from marginalisation are rare. Examples of intimidation and shrinking political space were given by the Community Radio Forum (FORCOM) which has been surprised by the often strong confrontation with government in case of critical programmes. Examples were given from radio stations operating in Gaza, Manica and Nampula Provinces, where FORCOM finds it difficult to protect the journalists.³⁰ Examples encountered during the Scoping Exercise also confirm this tendency: In Gaza province, the police showed up at a CS meeting in late 2010 to listen in on was being discussed; as a result the Queen (“rainha”) in Majune District from Niassa Province was interviewed by the police after being critical of the district government.³¹

A particular aspect of the political environment in which CSOs operate relates to press freedom. The Media Law from 1991³² establishes the right to independence of the media in the exercise of the right to information, press freedom, broadcasting rights and the right of reply. The 1990 constitution provides for press freedom but restricts this right according to respect for the constitution, human dignity, the imperatives of foreign policy, and national defence. Reporters continue to face problems accessing official information. The 1991 Media Law, considered one of the more progressive in Africa, was reviewed in 2006 by Gabinfo, the government press office, which suggested possible “improvements” such as provisions for mandatory licenses for working journalists and pointed to the omission of much-needed freedom of information legislation. The private media have enjoyed moderate growth in recent years, and independent daily and weekly newspapers routinely provide scrutiny of the government. However, journalists continue to be at risk of threat or harassment³³ and capital-based publications have little influence on the largely illiterate rural population. The state owns a majority stake in the main national daily, *Noticias*, and the largest broadcast networks, *Rádio Mocambique* (RM) and *Televisão de Mocambique* (TVM), although dozens of private radio and television stations also operate. While state-owned media have displayed greater editorial independence, the opposition still receives inadequate coverage and establishment views are favoured. According to the MISA African Media Barometer, the development of private commercial radio continues to be hampered by the fact that state advertisements are broadcasted exclusively on RM. Instances have also occurred where newspapers have had advertising from state-owned companies withdrawn after publishing unfavourable stories.³⁴

3.2.3. Financial freedoms

Mozambican CSOs are relatively free to raise funds from different sources to pursue their objectives, but in practice they are influenced by international donors’ priorities. The heavy dependence on donor funds may mean that CSOs’ own policies and strategic agendas may not be followed, as their activities are out of

²⁸ MISA 2007; Forquilha 2009 and 2010. Confirmed by the interview held with a journalist from a community radio in Chókwe, and another held with a journalist from the Mozambican state television.

²⁹ Being “outlawed” may result in loss of police protection in case of harassment and attacks, loss of employment and harassment of family members. Statements from interviews with CSO-representatives, whose identity is kept anonymous.

³⁰ Interview with FORCOM 29.11.11. See also www.forcom.org.mz

³¹ Focus group interview with INGOs, September 2011.

³² Media Law 18/91, Article 48 of the Constitution and Article 50 of the statutes of the Higher Council on the Media

³³ A media source which has been guaranteed anonymity stated bluntly that “We are afraid!”

³⁴ Information from www.freedomhouse.org 2007 report on Mozambique.

necessity shaped to suit the donor priorities and availability of funds.³⁵ During interviews, donors recognized that their support to CSO agendas is determined by their own priorities.

CSOs, with the exception of youth associations, do not generally receive funds from the state. The resources allocated by the state for CSOs, and also the coverage and diversity of organisations that really benefit from these resources is almost insignificant - the state contributes 3% of the CSO funds.³⁶ CSOs on the other hand, expressed reluctance to receive state funds (which is currently not available to most organisations), as they would fear influence on policies and strategies. Interestingly enough, there seems to be less reluctance towards receiving foreign states' funds, although this too is recognised as conditional.

In principle associations have tax obligations, i.e. they must have a Tax Identification Number, submit annual returns, and pay Income Tax (IRPC).³⁷ Only the Public Utility Institutions, which need an authorization from the Council of Ministers, are exempted from certain taxes. The IRPC Tax Code provides exemptions for non-Public Utility CSOs, e.g. in terms of VAT. However, to benefit from it, CSOs have to make a formal request. In practice, as CSOs do not have sufficient information on taxes, the bureaucracy limits their access to tax benefits. The CS sector is characterised by the need to compete for funds, which is seen by some as a disabling collaboration, whereas others see this as a stimulus to strengthening capacity and performance.

The study found that many local level organisations and associations do not prioritise issues of political debate, while existing in a state of poverty, with more serious and pressing problems such as a lack of food and clean drinking water.

3.3. Changes over the past thirty years

The environment is dynamic and changes over time. The established time line (Annex 10) has helped to identify some of the key changes to have influenced the CSO environment over the last years. It is necessary to look back further than five years, as some of the important legal framework, as well as joint government and donor initiatives, setting the scene for CSO engagement date as far back as Independence in 1975.

In the period from Independence in 1975 to the signing of the General Peace Agreement ending 16 years of civil war in 1992, economic reforms gradually prepared the transition from a state-controlled socialist economy to a market economy. In 1990, a new multi-party Constitution was adopted, paving the way for the 2004 revision and defining as fundamental civil rights freedom of expression and the right to association.

Decentralisation and the preparation of a legal framework for local government bodies at district and sub-district level took place from 2002-03, leading to the adoption of the law on local government institutions (LOLE) and the establishment of community consultation and participation institutions.

2003 was also the year when the first Poverty Observatory was established at national level as a formal, invited space for government and donors to engage with CS and private sector in monitoring of implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP/PARPA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDG). In 2005, the Poverty Observatories were later rolled out at provincial level and the name was changed to Development Observatories (DO). The establishment of DOs at provincial level led to establishment of CS platforms.

The most significant change over the recent years has been the increased power of the ruling party, which is characterised by most as a re-introduction of a de facto one-party system. The ruling party's economic power has increased considerably, and political and social control mechanisms are in place to secure adherence to party politics at all levels.³⁸

³⁵ INE Census, 2003, showed that about 70% of CSO funds were coming from foreign donors.

³⁶ INE Census 2003.

³⁷ Imposto sobre o Rendimento da Pessoa Colectiva.

³⁸ Presentation by Luis de Brito at Danish Embassy, December 2011; Forquilha (2009); see also www.cip.org.mz.

3.4. Power relations³⁹

The GOM is a constitutionally-presidential system, where the president is elected directly by popular vote obeying the rule of an absolute majority. As for parliamentary elections, members are elected by political parties according to a system of proportional representation. Mozambique follows a closed list system to elect members of parliament, so the citizen votes for a party and not for a specific candidate. Consequently, members of Parliament are loyal to their parties and are not accountable to a specific constituency. This electoral system reinforces the power of the ruling party and weakens the citizens' access to influence through elected representatives at national level.

Knowledge and access to information are key aspects in determining power relations. Many local and minor CSOs do not have the academic capacity to engage in complicated issues like budget monitoring, legal revisions etc. Due to limited human and financial resources they may not have time available for often lengthy dialogue and processes, and the financial resources are often scarce, not allowing for participation in activities involving travel and over-night stays. In addition to this, the low level of citizenship, i.e. the lack of knowledge on rights and duties, legal frameworks and operation of the government institutions is a limiting factor for many CSOs. Information is power, and interviewed district government officials have expressed reluctance towards sharing e.g. budget information with the provincial CSO-platform, as the "information could be misused".⁴⁰

According to interviewees, the fact that people - students, traditional leaders, ordinary citizens etc - are gradually being educated and starting to think for themselves, and are critical of governance issues, is viewed as a major challenge to government. Community committees at district level have been established and people are participating actively and critically. The decentralisation of university institutions to all provinces in the country has given an enormous lift in terms of critical citizens and consequently an input to CS in the provinces – a fact which the government may not have anticipated. It seems that the lower the level of government, the more difficulty they have to deal with a critical constituency.⁴¹

3.5. Key factors influencing policy dialogue

In the context of this evaluation, policy dialogue is understood as direct and indirect ways of influencing policy process. Policy dialogue in Mozambique is strongly influenced by the political environment. In spite of official establishment of structural frame conditions for increased space for CS to act, the co-existence of CS and government is increasingly characterised by difficulties during the last five years. Institutions that appeal for the full exercise of citizenship are in place, there is a legal-constitutional framework of freedom of expression and of association supported by an engagement promoting discourse. However, all these elements are confronted by a practice that imposes barriers for the exercise of such freedoms.

The findings of this evaluation are informed by several sources,⁴² indicating structural enabling factors threatened by a relatively disabling and hostile political environment.

³⁹ The study of power relations is a subject in itself. Within the limitations of the current evaluation, only brief information is included.

⁴⁰ Interview with Provincial Planning Department, Gaza Province, November 2011.

⁴¹ INGO focus group meeting, September 2011. Irae Baptista Lundin, September 2011.

⁴² Francisco & Matter 2007; ACS 2010; Forquilha 2009 and a significant number of interviewees.

Figure 1: Enabling and Disabling Factors

	Enabling factors	Disabling factors
Legal aspects, including media and access to information	<p>Constitutional rights on freedom of association and expression (1991 / 2004)</p> <p>Legislation on press freedom (1991)</p>	<p>Pressure on CSOs to be associated with government organs, to be involved in implementation of government plans and/or associated with ruling party..⁴³</p> <p>Cumbersome bureaucratic mechanisms in registering CSOs.</p> <p>Law of association broadly applied to all types of CSOs without distinction between those oriented to service delivery to that on advocacy and politics.</p> <p>Lack of knowledge on laws and procedures among CSO and public servants.</p> <p>Lack of specific law on access to information undermines the Media and public exercise of press freedom and right to information.</p>
Political aspects, including power relations	<p>Increasing recognition by government, of the role of CSO.</p> <p>Institutions of citizen consultation and participation (such as ODs and IPCCs) help to repair broken links in the minimal representative policy process.</p> <p>Informal relation with political elite has been more efficient in terms of results achieved.</p> <p>The emergency of research & advocacy organisations to provide evidence and information.</p>	<p>Administrative and political institutions influenced in particular ways by historical inheritance that reproduces unstable political culture, low tolerance of a contesting behaviour, and a culture of secrecy</p> <p>Strong control of the space of dialogue by government</p> <p>Hostile and intimidating political environment, including accusations of belonging to the opposition</p> <p>MPs are elected on party lists, with no direct accountability between MPs and a citizen constituency.</p>
Financial aspects and access to funding	<p>The freedom of CSOs to raise funds from different sources.</p> <p>The emergency of new financial mechanisms with the aim to support CSO (MASC & AGIR).</p> <p>More awareness among donors in regard to the need for strengthens CS capacity.</p>	<p>Economic structure dominated by the political and party elites which discourages the active and critical spirit of engagement.</p> <p>High dependency on foreign funding.</p> <p>Non-existence or very weak budget management system and monitoring.</p> <p>Donors' indirect funding conditionality through specific priorities limit the capacity of CSOs to set their own agenda.⁴⁴</p> <p>Lack of information and knowledge by CSOs about taxes, including bureaucracy limits the CSOs to access to tax benefits.</p>

⁴³ Interviews with CSOs in Moamba District and Gaza Province; sustained with earlier information collected by team members in Niassa Province and Magude District.

⁴⁴ Interviews with CSO-platforms and ICSOs.

4. Policy dialogue

In the context of the present evaluation, policy dialogue relates to the involvement of CSOs and their influence on the government's agenda in development and implementation of policies and strategies at national and local level.⁴⁵ It is important to bear in mind that policy dialogue takes place at different levels and with different purposes, as well as the fact that it may include both formal, invited spaces for dialogue and informal ad hoc events and processes. In the present chapter, we discuss how policy dialogue is perceived in the Mozambican context, whether it is effective, transparent and inclusive, and whether there is de facto space for CSO to effectively engage in policy dialogue.

4.1. Policy dialogue in the Mozambican context

In Mozambique, experience has been gained from three processes⁴⁶ which have influenced the current perception and understanding of what policy dialogue is, how CS can strategically make best use of the accumulated experience, and how the current environment reacts: the Land Campaign,⁴⁷ Agenda 2025⁴⁸ and the Poverty Observatory (established in 2003). The experience from the three processes shows that the dialogue spaces were not simply *given* to CS but often result from a long process of negotiation and sometimes struggle.

- From the **Land Campaign**, the following lessons on how to successfully engage in policy dialogue were:
 - i. the adhesion for common causes regardless the ideological diversity;
 - ii. the possibility of direct participation of CBOs – not though an urban association;
 - iii. effective participation of various religious groups – whether Christian, Muslim or local;
 - iv. an opportunity to define strategies compatible with those of the private sector;
 - v. the use of State institutions (from the Legislative for the approval of the law to the Executive to formulate the law) without necessarily seizure of power;
 - vi. participation in equality with international CSOs.

- During the process of formulation of the **Agenda 2025**, new characteristics associated with the public image of CS emerged:
 - i. the inexistence of spearheads or infallible leaderships;
 - ii. the capacity to conscientiously discuss the future of the public affairs by various groups of citizens, once their right to voice recognized;
 - iii. the acceptance of different points of view once discussed and common principles agreed;
 - iv. the sense of commitment with the country, and particularly with the social justice.

- The **Poverty Observatory (PO)**⁴⁹ was a government initiative to engage in dialogue with CS around implementation of the anti-poverty strategy and the achievement of the MDGs. Given the specificities of Mozambique, the PO forum comprises GOM, DPs and CS. It was left to the group of CS to define by

⁴⁵ Tender documents, 8 Appendix A: Scope of Services (Terms of Reference)

⁴⁶ José Negrão: "A Propósito das Relações Entre as ONGs do Norte e a Sociedade Civil Moçambicana" (2003), available in http://www.iid.org.mz/Relacoes_entre_ONG_do_Norte_e_Sociedade_Civil_do_Sul.pdf

⁴⁷ The massive and genuine participation of civil society organisations in the formulation of the Land Law in late 90-ies.

⁴⁸ Agenda 2025 was a government initiative to formulate national vision and strategy in 2001.

⁴⁹ The Poverty Observatory established in 2003 as a government mechanism allocating civil society space to engage in dialogue with government and development partners. The Poverty Observatories were later re-designated as Development Observatories. It has resulted from a long struggle of civil society to engage with the GoM in policy dialogue but the prescription of participation of civil society in formulation of the Policy Strategy Paper – PARPA in Mozambique, where civil society had not fully participated in the process of formulation of the first generation of PRSP (PARPA I) - has catalyzed the new dynamics of participation of civil society in policy dialogue.

whom and how they should be represented in this forum and they decided on a broad CS representation including religious organisations, trade unions, private sector, networks, foundations and research institutions.

Government staff interviewed⁵⁰ stressed the importance of seeing policy dialogue as a non-confrontational interaction between different development stakeholders. However, several other key informants⁵¹ have raised concerns regarding the genuine interest of policy makers and power holders in seeing policy dialogue as an instrument for actual involvement of citizens. The case studies have documented that policy dialogue is an ever-changing process, shaped by the current context as well as historical roots, culture and tradition.

4.2. Types of Space for CS engagement in policy dialogue

Spaces for engagement in policy dialogue are *invited* or *claimed*. Examples of invited spaces are the Development Observatories, the local government committees (IPCCs), and sector working groups, whereas the claimed spaces are exemplified by the Land Campaign, the process leading to legislation on domestic violence, the spontaneous riots, and the *Madjermanes*.⁵²

Various studies demonstrate that formal, invited spaces for policy dialogue did not promote effective participation of CSOs. The quality of participation within the local councils (IPCCs) still constitutes a major challenge, due to an absence of accountability, weaknesses in decision-making processes and the absence of monitoring of district plans and budget implementation. One defining factor has been the role of the paternalistic state itself, which seems to be transforming the local councils into controlled participation spaces.⁵³ Therefore, the invited spaces for dialogue - instead of working as arenas for the strengthening of dialogue and consolidating the role of CSOs - end up becoming instruments of manipulation and co-option of CS.

Thus, the invited spaces are government initiatives and often met by scepticism by CS, feeling that CSOs are only invited to participate in order to legitimise decisions already taken. The more technical and sophisticated the policy dialogue spaces become, the more difficulties CSOs face in engaging in dialogue given their lack of expertise and resources. Lack of timely information and working documents make CSO presence of little or no relevance. Some CSOs expressed their concern for limited circulation of information among CSOs themselves. Furthermore, the existing spaces are often captured by elites with specific interests and thus become partisan spaces. These interest groups are very much aware of the opportunities offered by the GOM under its policy of “approaching governance to the people” and they seize these spaces to their own benefit.

Various actors do not consider institutionalisation as an issue, because at provincial and local levels the dialogue depends on the will of the government officer in charge, i.e. in some places it may happen and in others not, depending on the personality of the person in charge, and it follows different patterns. Another factor that discourages CSOs using the institutionalised policy dialogue spaces is the tendency of institutionalisation of spokesperson from certain organisations (e.g. G-20) in detriment of the voice of the majority. This is reinforced by the fact that the so called representatives of the people in the invited spaces have no constituencies.

Experience has shown that the openness of the Government to dialogue depends on whether the issue is non-controversial or controversial. If non-controversial - the space widens; if controversial - the space

⁵⁰ Interview with Permanent Secretary from Ministry of Planning and development, September 2001. Confirmed by other government officials from MPD.

⁵¹ ICSO focus group interview, December 2011; Irae Baptista Lundin, September 2011; interviews with various CSO-platforms and umbrella-organizations.

⁵² Group of former migrant workers demonstrating year after year every week to claim their pension schemes from former German Democratic Republic

⁵³ Forquilha (2009).

shrinks: A consequence of the 2010-riots was the prompt Government response to make mobile phone registration compulsory.⁵⁴

Because of the above situation, well-established CSOs often prefer to make use of claimed, informal spaces for policy dialogue instead of using the formal spaces. Informal spaces of dialogue are being created, e.g. the process leading to legislation on domestic violence, the informal network on local governance and use of social media. However, the largest groups of people are not represented in any of these mechanisms and there is the perception that the 2010-riots in Maputo were triggered by this sentiment of exclusion from the dialogue – people were not represented, nor did they know where to voice their concerns.

The weaknesses appointed by key informants confirm the findings of the Civil Society Index (2007) which reveals *weak structure characterised by limited financial and human resources*. This is reflected through the physical presence of CSO in policy discussions – working groups, as well as on the quality of their participation in spaces of policy dialogue. The lack of financial and human resources may be a factor of exclusion of those organisations that cannot access resources and a vicious circle: you need resources to get access to the resources, as only a well-formulated project will draw the attention of donors.

But exclusion should not be seen solely from the point of view of lack of resources, but also from the point of view of the sophistication and technicality of the policy discussion fora. The geographical isolation of CSOs is another excluding factor because spaces for policy dialogue tend to be established in the major cities and Maputo is championing this trend, even its suburbia is not an exception to the exclusion. Invited spaces are most often found in big conference centres and hotels, ignoring the periphery.

4.3. Effectiveness of policy dialogue

Over recent years, the political discourse has become more refined, demonstrating government's apparent openness and willingness to enter into dialogue. Several official spaces for invited dialogue have been established: the PO both at national and provincial levels, the establishment of local councils (IPCCs - Participatory Institutions for Community Consultation) at district and sub-district levels, and also the establishment of (sector) working groups. In spite of permissive tendencies, the legal environment seems to be favourable to the involvement of CSOs in advocacy and lobbying activities, and minor changes indicating greater openness and CS engagement in policy dialogue have been registered.⁵⁵ There is, however, limited decentralisation in terms of political space for policy dialogue. The majority of the interviewees stated that central government efforts to increase engagement and dialogue with CS do not cascade down to local / district level, except in the provinces where specific programmes have supported this, e.g. Nampula and Manica. As expressed by interviewees: *"the further from Maputo, the smaller the space for critical dialogue."*

⁵⁴ See text box 1 in Chapter 3.1.

⁵⁵ Afro Barometer 2009 report prepared by OSISA; Civil Society Index report published by FDC, 2007; several key informants interviewed in September and November/December 2011.

5. CSO strategies on policy dialogue

This chapter addresses the different types of CSO strategies on policy dialogue, as well as the legitimacy and accountability of the CSOs. Underlying is the question of the effectiveness of the chosen strategies on their own and in combination to achieve outcomes on policy change, given the enabling and disabling factors in the environment.⁵⁶

5.1. Types of CSO strategies

Interviews and literature review provide a long list of CSO strategies applied during previous policy dialogue processes, which are confirmed by the case study analysis presented in chapter 6 below: *cohesion around common causes regardless the ideological diversity, possibility of direct participation of CBOs, effective participation of various religious groups, participation together with international NGOs, the existence of 'movers and shakers' and charismatic leadership; the acceptance of diverse opinions and common principles.*⁵⁷

Within the invited and/or claimed spaces, the CSOs chose different strategies to engage in policy dialogue – direct and/or indirect, formal and/or informal, or no dialogue at all:

Direct and formal policy dialogue is predominantly undertaken by platforms and networks invited to engage in policy dialogue with government and DPs. The role of CSOs in the dialogue process is generally perceived as dynamic, but main channels of communication or platforms have a tendency to lose momentum over time. Most of the well-known institutions that played an important role in the establishment of the formal dialogue between CSOs and government are losing their prominence – e.g. G-20, as well as coalitions like LINK, TEIA and JOINT.⁵⁸ The case study on district planning and budget monitoring has also demonstrated that formalized spaces for dialogue have a tendency to become co-opted and non-efficient, reinforced by the lack of constituencies (see below chapter 6.1). The more technical and sophisticated the policy dialogue spaces become the more difficult for CSOs to engage in dialogue given their lack of expertise and resources. Limited and untimely access to information is a disabling factor when it comes to transparency and inclusiveness.

Direct and informal policy dialogue has been demonstrated as an efficient way for CS to engage in policy dialogue – often by forming coalitions around specific issues, e.g. legislation on domestic violence or thematic working groups at district level. There is however, a tendency for direct and informal dialogue to take place mainly at national level, e.g. through contacts to influential persons. Recent examples are initiatives from research-based organisations (*Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Economicos (IESE)*, *Centro de Integridade Publica (CIP)*) on emerging issues such as extractive industry and corruption. For the direct and informal policy dialogue to be effective, a high level of capacity and access to information and channels of communication is required from the involved CSOs.

Indirect contribution to policy dialogue is undertaken mainly by organisations related to social communication and media, playing an important role in disseminating information related to human and citizens' rights. Community radios are important players, often taking the responsibility not only of providing access to information, but also by creating space for dialogue through investigative journalism and open programmes, where citizens can speak out directly. Nevertheless, communication and media

⁵⁶ Reference is made to Checklist 1 in the Conceptual Framework, p.3. See Annex 9.

⁵⁷ These strategies correspond wide to lessons learned on strategic approach from previous policy dialogue experiences, i.e. the Land Campaign in mid-1990es and the formulation of Agenda 2025 in 2001.

⁵⁸ Interviews with various CS representatives have stated that the platform-initiatives of LINK, TEIA and JOINT have all suffered the loss of momentum over time. The acronyms are names: LINK – for linking organizations together; TEIA – means network in Portuguese; JOINT – for joint action.

CSOs are still far from responding to the existing needs, and there is a strong urban bias in this field. Some recent initiatives to monitor corruption and budget execution at district level are being launched in 2012.⁵⁹

No dialogue is also the reality for a considerable segment of CS, i.e. the *Madjermanes* or the spontaneous riots that broke out as a response to economic pressure. It is also a fact that the Mozambican CS is still characterised by a large number of informal organisations, which operate in the entire country. With a predominantly rural population, spread over 399,400 km², and where the state faces huge difficulties in meeting basic social and economic needs, citizens still rely on diverse methods of mutual support as their only way of social protection. These mutual support groups constitute the major part of Mozambican CS. They are created spontaneously where there is a need, remain mostly unknown, and survive without external resources.⁶⁰

As noted earlier, most organisations⁶¹ operate with multiple strategies and in various spaces. Some of the most frequent interventions are:

- a) Production of documents and information based on evidence-based research.
- b) Establishment of local organisations and partnerships as vehicles for the strengthening of the citizens' voice.
- c) Internal capacity-building of members of CSOs through the exchange of information and knowledge among members of platforms.
- d) Exposure through publication of documents, reports and statements through media, e-mails, websites, and press briefings).
- e) Workshops, seminars and plays (e.g. the Oppressed Theatre Group).⁶²
- f) Collaboration with media to maximize the information disclosure;

5.2. Legitimacy and accountability

The report of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa – OSISA (2010) indicates that about 71.2% of the CSOs' budgets derive from external support, mainly through international non-governmental organisations (ICSOs). CSOs are therefore accountable to donors rather than to a social constituency. As a consequence they embrace a diverse mandate as a way to ensure their own survival.

CSO accountability is a disputed issue in Mozambique. On the one hand, CSOs accuse government of lack of transparency and demand increased openness from government and accountability to citizens. On the other hand, CSOs themselves are often not too willing to disclose information on budgets and sources of funding.⁶³

In terms of internal governance, the annual meeting is the extent of activity, with members presenting activity and financial reports, and occasional (re)elections. However, there are very few organisations that provide reports on their work for public consumption. Consequently, among donors and ICSOs there is a growing concern to demand the establishment of strong internal governance structures as a condition for funding. A possible negative consequence of a strong focus on internal governance and management capacity is the risk of squeezing out spontaneous, small risk demanding initiatives.⁶⁴

Accountability to communities or constituencies is unusual - accountability is mainly upwards and in relation to donors. Interviews unanimously confirm that a majority of CSOs lack the constituencies that may

⁵⁹ MASC with support from Programa AGIR.

⁶⁰ "The Mirror of Narcissus –knowledge and self-conscience for a better development of the Mozambican Civil Society. Lessons learned and recommendations from Mozambique on its experience in implementing CIVICUS Civil Society Index", UNDP Mozambique, March 2011.

⁶¹ E.g. CIP, the Governance Monitoring Forum, the Budget Monitoring Forum (BMF), FDC, LDH and IESE.

⁶² The Oppressed Theatre Group is an experience mostly being supported by Action Aid.

⁶³ Interviews with the Permanent Secretary, Moamba District, CS-platform FONGA in Gaza Province, and Ministry of Planning and Development in November – December 2011.

⁶⁴ Interview with WWF Civil Society adviser.

ensure their legitimacy. Throughout the last decades numerous organisations have emerged often driven by the funding opportunities that appeared towards the end of the civil war and the country's adherence to the path of assistance and development. The majority of the organisations have had service delivery as their main focus, and organisations devoted to policy dialogue are still very recent and have emerged essentially during the last decade.

However, these are organisations that were established with a clear mandate on policy dialogue, although most of these do not have a social constituency. For instance, the *Liga dos Direitos Humanos* (LDH), one of the first organisations to deal with issues of policy dialogue, more precisely focused on the protection of human rights. The *Centro de Integridade Pública* (CIP) also emerged to act in the space of confrontation and policy dialogue. Since its establishment its focus has always been on issues of transparency and integrity, with an emphasis on corruption. Despite the lack of constituency, these CSOs are still organisations that defend legitimate interests, since in most cases the issues that they discuss coincide with the most critical concerns of society. As a consequence, these organisations are held accountable not by a constituency, but by the general public.

6. Outcomes of policy dialogue (case studies)

The two policy processes selected as cases for the evaluation of CS engagement in policy dialogue in Mozambique are:

1. District Planning and Budget Monitoring
2. Legislation on Domestic Violence

The following selection criteria have been applied when selecting the two cases from an initial long-list of 21 policy processes identified in September 2011: Relevance for the Mozambican development agenda, degree of CSO involvement, inclusion of decentralized policy processes, type of policy dialogue, and availability of information.⁶⁵

The two policy processes differ considerably and they provide the evaluation with different experience on CS's engagement in policy dialogue. The 'District Planning and Budget Monitoring' case study is an on-going process, which involves central, district and sub-district level. The 'Legislation on Domestic Violence' case study is a process which started in 2000 and concluded with the adoption of the law against Domestic Violence in 2009. It was driven by a specific segment of CS and provides a number of lessons. As they are so different in nature, the presentation of the two cases below follows the specific logic of each case.

Table 1: Case Studies

Case 1: District Planning & Budget Monitoring	Case 2: Process leading to approval of Legislation on Domestic Violence
Invited space	Claimed space
Government initiative	Civil society initiative
Strong influence from DPs	Support from DPs
Central and decentralized level	Mainly at national level
An on-going process (2003 -)	A process with a particular and intended result (2000 – 2009)

6.1. Case Study 1: District Planning and Budget Monitoring

6.1.1. Introduction

District Planning and Budget Monitoring are interlinked but distinct processes. District planning is a policy process that runs under LOLE⁶⁶ where participation of local communities is a basic principle in local governance and management of public goods. District planning is a straightforward process in which the local CS is represented through the local consultative councils. The planning process is often a "shopping-list" detached from budget prioritizing, which takes place at central or provincial government level, often *after* the planning has taken place at district level.

Systematic budget monitoring is a recent exercise in Mozambique, although it has been carried out under the auspices of various ICSO-supported projects. It is based on CS's experience in various policy dialogue mechanisms (e.g. Development Observatories (DOs)). The budget monitoring process is a major challenge, where controversial issues may arise. Experience is recent and not yet consolidated, as the systematic budget monitoring was initiated with the establishment of Budget Monitoring Forum (BMF)⁶⁷ in February 2010 with support from the United Nations' Children's Fund (UNICEF) with the aim of promoting

⁶⁵ Details on selection of cases are presented in Annex 5: Rationale and approach for selection of policy areas.

⁶⁶ LOLE (Law on Local State Bodies) Law 8/2003, regulated by Decree 11/2005 led to the establishment of spaces for dialogue at the decentralised level of government.

⁶⁷ The BMF was founded in 2010 and is a consortium of various CSOs involved in applied budget work and analysis. BMF convenes social budgeting and public finance management actors across civil society. For more information see http://www.fordham.edu/academics/programs_at_fordham/international_politi1/unicef_collaboration/international_data/africa/mozambique_profile_76519.asp

government transparency in managing public funds. Its activities are focused on budget monitoring and public expenditure tracking. The BMF is largely comprised of four CSOs: CIP, Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil (CESC), Fundação de Desenvolvimento Comunitário (FDC) and Grupo Moçambicano de Dívidas (GMD). Among CSOs, the need for a new forum was rising as the G-20 which had played an important role in the establishment of the formal dialogue between CSOs and government was losing momentum.⁶⁸

District government officials interviewed have in general confirmed the importance of engaging CS in planning and budget monitoring and recognise their representativeness among the broader population and role as channel of information. Collaboration is, however, not always considered smooth and the district authorities complain about lack of information from CSOs on plans and activity implementation. Interviews stated that local government authorities mainly see the role of CSOs as implementing agents of local development plans and that initiatives on advocacy are seen as a result of CSOs not understanding their role in local development.⁶⁹ In this context it is important to stress that policy dialogue as an interactive mutual process was not found in the visited districts, where engagement of CSOs by local government was rather a question of auscultation.

Within the frame of a Theory of Change established for the case study on district planning and budget monitoring, results achieved by CS engagement in policy dialogue are examined. Furthermore, the nature of strategies applied to achieve policy change is evaluated and the efficiency of different CSO strategies is discussed.

6.1.2. Policy dialogue - spaces and types

Policy dialogue in district planning and budget monitoring takes place in formal, invited spaces created by government. Two invited spaces – both initiated in 2003 and with the common feature of being established by government and supported by DPs - are of crucial importance:

- 1) **Poverty Observatory (PO)**⁷⁰ initiated at national level and later rolled out at provincial level and re-named Development Observatories (see above, chapter 4.1). The PO is by design a government consultation space, where government and development partners are the main actors, and where CS at national level engages through the G-20.⁷¹ It is the responsibility of Government to convene the Development Observatory (DO) on an annual basis. The agenda and timing is the sole responsibility of Government, and a common complaint from other participants is the short notice, the lack of prior information on key documents and the unequal allocation of time, allowing CS and the private sector only limited time to prepare their participation and present their opinions.
- 2) **Local councils**, i.e. Community Participation and Consultation Institutions (IPCCs), from which the Local Consultative Councils (LCCs) emerged. LOLE establishes that the process of planning at local level must involve local communities through representative local councils at different levels (district, administrative post, locality and village). The local councils comprise community representatives and include community authorities, religious leaders and representatives of interest groups. In theory, the selection of local council members should be based on principles of

⁶⁸ According to interviews with key CS-stakeholders, G-20 lost momentum during 2010-11 due to various reasons: it had started acting as an organization of its own, not as a representative body, and the dual position of the lead figure, who was appointed by Government to lead the National Elections Committee (CNE), before he resigned from G-20, created mistrust among the members. G-20 has, however, re-gained some strength since the reorganization in late 2011 and played an important role during the 2012 Poverty Observatory. The change of host-organization from FDC (whose impartiality was questioned) to GMD, which has helped re-shape the profile.

⁶⁹ Interviews with district government officials, Moamba and Guija Districts, November 2011.

⁷⁰ The development observatories comprise in general of members of government institutions, development partners, civil society, the private sector, trade unions and academic and/or research institutions.

⁷¹ Francisco & Matter, 2007. G-20 is an umbrella organisation established to represent civil society vis-à-vis government in PO. Cruzeiro do Sul, a local civil society organisation was very active in the promotion of the initiative to establish the civil society platform to monitor PARPA, which became known as G-20.

representation of the different groups of interest. There are, however, plenty of studies documenting that this does not occur.⁷² The space for consultation established at district level is the LCC, which also includes representatives from district government and is chaired by the District Administrator.

Because of the limitations in the formally established spaces for dialogue, organisations and communities seek alternative channels to deal with the lack of effective policy dialogue. Some of these channels are political initiatives from the government (ruling party); others are initiatives from CS and individual citizens.⁷³ There are different informal mechanisms and types of interventions aimed at influencing political processes. The CS and citizens used them alternatively to those formal spaces, as channels to demand policy issues:

Independent media (radio, television, newspapers) has become an important channel for influencing policy. Some radio stations and television channels have created spaces (claimed space) dedicated to the analysis of political events and policy. Such spaces have shown to be influential in the shifting of policies, partly due to the exposure they give to the issues under discussion.⁷⁴ Many cases of mismanagement at district level and in government and state bodies at central level have been subject to media scrutiny. An example of a media-driven *claimed space*, where naming and shaming tactics were used is presented in the box below: It is a borderline case between policy dialogue and confrontation:⁷⁵

Box 2: Chokwe District - example of spaces created by media

Radio Vembe is a community radio property of Associacao Rural de Ajuda Mutua (ORAM) and established in 2005 with UNESCO funds. It has links with the Centre for the Support of Information and Community Communication, the Community Radios Forum of Mozambique (FORCOM), CIP, and LDH. This radio promotes radio debates on issues of public interest in the district, both through direct phoning in that allow interaction with listeners, as well as debates in public spaces. Representatives of public institutions are often invited to interact with the population on issues of public interest. One among the various issues taken for public debate was the electrification of the 3rd Bairro of central Chókwe district. Because of the vulnerability of the dwellers of the Bairro to attacks at night, the population decided to contribute for the electrification of the Bairro. The money collected was handed over to the electricity utility Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM).

A year elapsed and EDM still had not carried out the electrification of the Bairro. Following unsuccessful follow up with the company the population decided to make public their dissatisfaction with EDM through the radio. The radio decided to organise a public debate with the presence of the Director of EDM in the district. Many attempts to derail the debate were made with the director claiming not to be available. The radio then decided to go to the director's office to collect more details on the case. At the first meeting in his office, the director of EDM did not acknowledge the grievance presented by the population, denying the allegations made by the population to the radio. Thus, the radio invited the director to visit the Bairro in order to face the reality. The director visited the Bairro accompanied by journalists and activists from the radio and met with some residents and representatives from the Bairro who had been waiting for him. At the back-to-back meeting then held the director acknowledged that the Bairro had in fact handed over the amount collected for electrification and accepted the pledge to bring electricity to the Bairro. A few weeks later the Bairro got electricity.

Citizens at a local level also resort to **influential people** to present their grievances. Citizens close to Frelimo request party secretaries to denounce cases of mismanagement in local government or to influence the decisions of government authorities, as party secretaries are believed to have an influence on government

⁷² SAL CDS & Masala 2009; ACS 2010; Forquilha 2009 and 2010.

⁷³ Stated during interviews with local level government officials, CSOs, platforms and individual key informants.

⁷⁴ Interview with FORCOM, November 2011.

⁷⁵ Interview with Radio Vembe, Chokwe District., November 2011.

and government bureaucracy. Other important people used as an entry point to influence changes in the public sphere are, at local community level, the traditional leaders and religious leaders.

At district level, the initiative of **open and inclusive presidency** (*Presidencia Aberta e Inclusiva*) introduced by the current president since 2005, is an important space for the community and citizens to speak out about their problems, including criticising local governments.⁷⁶ Although this mechanism of dialogue has been criticized by DPs, media and CS as being orchestrated, expensive and undermining the local planning system by replacing the role of local institutions,⁷⁷ interviews called attention to the fact that it may have stimulated citizens' participation in dialogue spaces. The citizens speak out about various irregularities during the presidential visits and this has often resulted in the dismissal of corrupt district administrators.

Organisations engaged in policy dialogue are few and mainly urban-based, with relatively high technical capacity and resource mobilisation (e.g. FDC, CIP, IESE, LDH, GMD). The organisations involved in policy confrontation and policy dialogue are characterised by academic background, visibility, and acceptance gained through research-based evidence. At local level, policy dialogue is handled by CSO-platforms or umbrella organizations, as minor CSOs or CBOs have limited resources and capacity.⁷⁸

The prevailing problems of poverty have largely constrained local community organisations in assuming the policy dialogue as a matter of concern. Nevertheless, according to interviewees from CSOs and ICSOs engaged in capacity development of local councils,⁷⁹ there are possibilities of an emerging grassroots CS, provided that support to **Local Development Committees** (CDLs) is prioritised, as these are directly linked to improvement of members' living conditions. The CDLs are largely unrepresented in the local consultative councils. It is therefore more feasible to support such forms of organisation for the promotion of citizens' rights and values.

6.1.3. Theory of Change for district planning and budget monitoring

The Theory of Change provides an analytical frame for establishing the linkages between CSO strategies, intermediate outcomes and policy changes. In the following, we will analyse the experience from district planning and budget monitoring in terms of applied CSO strategies, outcomes and policy change, taking into consideration enabling and disabling factors in the environment.

In budget monitoring, the strategies applied by CSOs to influence policy changes include:

- strengthening information for joint interventions in e.g. thematic working groups, CS platforms, exchange of information among CSOs, and constitution of networks of CSOs focusing on common or specific issues;
- research-based evidence with results disseminated in reports, statements and briefings and massive dissemination of information, through media, website, email, workshops and seminars (to enhance access to information); and
- the establishment of international partnerships to increase access to information and secure support and exposure, as well as provide input for (self) capacity development.

During the last seven years, the **constitution of CS platforms** or forums has helped to consolidate the recognition of CS's role as a partner to government. As a result, at provincial and central level, CS has gained space to participate in the dialogue with the government, in the framework of PRSP, despite the failures to turn them into useful space for debate.⁸⁰ Communities at district level are increasingly called upon to participate through local councils in district planning. As response to criticism about limitation in the consultative process, new guidelines for participation in district planning have been approved in 2009.

⁷⁶ Interviews with district government representatives in Chokwe and Moamba districts, November 2011.

⁷⁷ DIE, 2011.

⁷⁸ Interviews with i.a. FONGA, Gaza Province; LIMUSSICA, Manica Province; FACILIDADE, Nampula Province.

⁷⁹ Helvetas, Concern, Ibis, Action Aid, Magariro, Akilizatho, AMA and others.

⁸⁰ Study conducted by Francisco & Matter 2007, ACS 2010, and UNDP 2011 have reached the same conclusions.

Despite this effort, many stakeholders including technicians from government sectors have claimed that the guidelines have not solved important questions and in practice it has worsened some conditions if compared to the former guidelines approved in 2003.⁸¹ As an example, the government, despite lessons from years of participatory planning, does not have obligation to be accountable to the citizens (taxpayers), and the proximity of members of local councils to the ruling party is strengthened rather than minimized by the new guidelines.⁸² The **research-based evidence**, the adoption of networks and the widespread dissemination of information produced by CSOs were important factors for the effectiveness of CSO involvement in policy dialogue. The emergence of new approaches to intervention that focuses on research-based evidence has influenced changes in how the government perceives CSOs. During the last five years, research-focused organisations have improved the quality of studies and strategies for dissemination of results.

International Partnership with global governance agencies⁸³ is important for CSOs as it strengthens the credibility and confidence in the national organisations, as well as increases the display of results. It also provides security and international support in relation to intervention in policy issues.

The illustration overleaf demonstrates the Theory of Change for the case study which links strategies applied by CS to outcomes and policy changes.

The Intermediate outcomes of the CSO strategies to engage in policy dialogue on budget monitoring are:

- increased recognition by the government of CS's role in the development process, i.e. CSOs are recognized as government partners;
- establishment of an environment that provide for CSO a realistic influence to policymaking process, i.e. through the G-20, thematic working groups and CS-platforms, as well as the local consultative councils;
- improved quality of consultative processes, making the district planning an effective process of participation, i.e. through the improved quality of reports produced and information displayed; and
- increased visibility of policy issues and policy problems, i.e. increased transparency and accountability in the management of public funds through disclosure of information about budget allocation and budget expenditure.


⁸¹ Interviews with MPD officials, November–December 2011.

⁸² The process leading to the revision of the guidelines may be an interesting subject for further analysis, but lies without the scope of the present evaluation.

⁸³ CIP has partnership with Transparency International, the International Budget Partnership and Global Integrity. LDH has partnership with Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International.

Figure 2: Theory of Change for policy dialogue on district planning and budgeting

x or ✓ relates to whether assumption/objective has been at least partially realised
 1 relates to which indicator set in Danida's typology of indicators



6.1.4. CSO influence

DOs and local consultative councils are invited spaces, where participation is weak, mainly due to the fact that the invitation to participate is often selective and therefore exclusive of critical voices. Various factors - the absence of a more critical and open debate, the definition of criteria that are more sensitive to the interests of government institutions strongly influenced by Frelimo party, the poor technical and organisational capacity of the organisations and networks that participate in such spaces – have all contributed to making these spaces less relevant for genuine policy dialogue.

The years 2007 and 2008 were characterised by consolidation of CS platforms, groups and networks.⁸⁴ However, in its recent assessment of the lessons from Mozambique's experience in the implementation of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index, the United Nations Development Programme found that during the last two years, these mechanisms which were initially expected to create major dynamics in CSOs derailed because of weak representation of their membership and the absence of communication among themselves which undermined their interventions. Interviews and initial validation of the findings of the present evaluation concur that established platforms at national level (e.g. G-20) often become fragmented and lose legitimacy, as they start acting as independent organisations instead of representing their constituencies.

The Local Consultative Councils, which at the beginning played the role in planning (the Economic and Social Plan and District Budget - PESOD), have since 2006 ceased to have effective influence in the preparation of PESOD as a result of the President's initiative to allocate district development funds (the so-called *7 millions*).⁸⁵ With the availability of the *7 millions*, the LCC members have become concerned about getting a share of the funds rather than engaging in district development planning on behalf of the community they represent.⁸⁶ Hence, it is important to state that the government has decided that the Consultative Councils should play a core role in decision-making on fund management and in the selection of project proposals. However, the councils have been blamed for not representing the interests of groups at local level and of pleasing the interests of the ruling power.⁸⁷

According to the extensive documentation available on district planning and from the information provided by interviewees, there is an indication that despite the local councils having influence on district governments, they have not been sufficiently effective in the shifting of policies toward improving living conditions. A very clear example of this is disclosed by the 2010 report of the Local Monitoring and Governance Forum,⁸⁸ which assessed the performance of six districts and concluded that the district governments do not implement at least half of the activities prescribed in the PESOD (CIP 2010). This poor performance should be an issue for a debate at the district consultative councils, but there is no indication that this has taken place.

As budget monitoring is a relatively new phenomenon, Mozambican CSOs generally lack skilled human resources to understand and interpret the State Budget. Government authorities' sensitivity in relation to the budget is very high and there is limited openness to provide information. During 2010, CIP made a follow-up of the public expenditure in 15 districts in five provinces (Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Nampula and Niassa). The results were shared with the relevant district and provincial governments, and CIP has since

⁸⁴ UNDP (2011)

⁸⁵ The district development funds, broadly known as the "*7 millions*" (Meticais) are funds allocated directly at district level with very unclear guidelines for application in terms of grant or loan, as well as priorities. A major part of the funds are allocated to economic development by local entrepreneurs which are often synonymous with the local party controlled elite. 7 million Meticais correspond to approximately USD 250,000.

⁸⁶ SAL CDS & Masala (2009) and Forquilha (2009)

⁸⁷ A study commissioned by GTZ on decentralisation and the quality of basic services carried out in 20 districts and 3 municipalities of the provinces of Sofala, Inhambane and Manica, concluded that local councils have strong influence on district governments in district planning, mainly in relation to the allocation of the 7 million funds (GTZ 2011). Worth is to mention that this baseline study focused only on members of consultative councils and government.

⁸⁸ The forum comprises of AMODE, CIP, GMD and LDH.

been invited by provincial governments to present its results in government meetings and at DOs in Nampula and Niassa.

The BMF, despite being established recently, already works in partnership with the Parliamentary Planning and Budget Committee in the sharing of information on budget proposals and the monitoring of budget disbursement. Thanks to the interventions of the organisations that are part of the Forum and mainly with the presence of important persons like Graça Machel from FDC, the Forum has – as mentioned above - from 2010 managed to influence the publication of the budget proposal before it is submitted to Parliament, thus allowing CSOs comment.

When it comes to influence in terms of policy change, CSOs have contributed to some successes:

- Transparency on budget issues. Within the scope of access to information, the Ministry of Planning and Development, as a result of the pressure exercised by the CS on matters of budget transparency (by FDC and CIP), decided in 2010 to start disseminating the draft State Budget before it is submitted to Parliament. This has allowed CS to start publishing its opinions and statements on the budget proposal that are shared with the parliament.
- State oversight institutions make use of the CS-produced reports on budget monitoring. The government has been concerned with the results of the research-based evidence produced by CSOs. The reports are being used by relevant state and government institutions in the evaluation and policy decision-making. For instance, the results of the district budget monitoring and the tracking of public expenditure, produced by CIP and BMF are currently being used by the oversight institutions (such as the Parliament and Administrative Court (*Tribunal Administrativo*)) for the purpose of decision-making on necessary improvements and on accountability.

Box 3: Nampula Province - example of increased involvement of CS and use of evidence in budget monitoring⁸⁹

In Nampula where the CS-platforms presented the report on budget monitoring and public expenditure tracking at the last DO. For the first time in the history of DO, the Provincial Government scheduled for the last 2011 DO-session the presentation of reports on budget monitoring and tracking of public expenditure. The government managers have acknowledged that the CS produced reports provide an opportunity for government to improve performance in the management of public goods.

This changing behaviour in regard to issues previously considered very sensitive by government, encourages the engagement of CSOs in policy dialogue. In the District of Monapo, in Nampula Province, the district administrator used the results to decide on the improvement of the budget management processes and held accountable those officials who had been directly considered as failing in the discharge of their professional obligations. It is important to remember that these experiences are still very isolated throughout the country level.

6.1.5. Effectiveness of CSO strategies in relation to budget monitoring

The political environment, which appears favourable in terms of legislation and freedom of expression, inhibits active CS engagement in policy dialogue: the challenge of access to information, the problem of technical and financial capacity faced by CSOs; the role of DPs who despite their keen interest to support CS end up focusing their support on a reduced number of organisations; problems of interaction within the platforms and the exchange of knowledge and information.

An evaluation of DOs⁹⁰ concluded that these were ineffective. However, a study on governance in Nampula⁹¹ concluded that the DO was starting to show important indications of improving its quality as a result of strategies adopted by CS based on the establishment of thematic groups interacting with

⁸⁹ Interview at CIP with the co-ordinator of the budget monitoring and public expenditure follow-up programme.

⁹⁰ Francisco & Matter (2007)

⁹¹ ACS (2010)

government on specific matters. Another positive factor is the existence of a relatively strong CS with a long tradition of participation in matters of governance. This interaction, together with the availability of a government / CS linking mechanism (the Nampula Integrated Development Co-ordination Unit) allowed that the process in Nampula could be functional. There is no evidence that the elaboration and implementation of District Development Strategic Plans (PEDD) and PESOD involve participation of local council members at different levels, and dialogue is often completely superficial.⁹² These studies further stated that the planning exercise has essentially been a product of the District Technical Teams (ETD).⁹³ In Manica Province, the CSO interviewees claimed that the long-term work on participatory planning and governance issues with the government and the existence of well-structured thematic groups within the CS platform have positively influenced the government in accepting CSOs' proposals to be integrated in the agenda of Provincial Development Observatory. According to interviewees, the Provincial Strategic Plan for the next ten years approved in 2011 was elaborated by the local CSOs. However, interviews in Gaza Province showed that there is still only limited openness for CS to participate in policy dialogue.

CS strategies to strengthen its participation and influence in relation to district planning and budget monitoring have yielded limited results at local level. Despite their participation in spaces for policy dialogue (DOs and LCCs), their influence has in practice been limited. Document review and interviews have revealed that a more effective way for CS to engage in policy dialogue has been the coalitions around specific issues and thematic working groups at district level. Direct and informal dialogue, however, takes place mainly at national level.

The establishment of formal mechanisms of engagement at all levels of governance has been considered by several actors as being an achievement of CS, notwithstanding its relatively poor effectiveness. In recent years, the emergence of a few strong CSOs providing research-based evidence has brought change in the relations between government and CS. Government has started to pay attention to questions raised by CSOs. Two reasons can explain the shift of behaviour of the government in relation to CS: the risk of political cost if government decided to ignore CS-produced evidence; and the fact that it offers a possibility of capitalising on expert knowledge otherwise not accessible to government.

6.1.6. Unexpected results

When the participatory district planning and the establishment of LCCs began in 2003, the intention was to ensure the engagement of communities in governance, but very little was mentioned about transparency and accountability. However, with the introduction of the Open Presidency experience, the scope of local councils' engagement moved its focus to the way in which the management of public decisions was being made. The most visible example is in relation to the management and allocation of the 7 *millions* (district development fund allocated at local level). To a larger extent, communities' scrutiny of the district authorities has increased. Although the policy dialogue continued to be weak, the level of complaints on the way in which the administrators manage the 7 *millions* fund became more frequent during the Open Presidencies. As a result, several district administrators were removed or transferred to other positions.

⁹² Akilizetho (2009); Bakker & Gilissen (2009) quoted by ACS (2010), Forquilha, 2010.

⁹³ ETD is a team constituted by public servants from different district services including district directors.

Box 4: Water and Sanitation Group

In 2009, a Water and Sanitation Group (WSG) was established in Cabo Delgado.⁹⁴ Within the scope of the dialogue⁹⁵ with district governments the WSG was able to define a model for managing procurement, in the tender for the opening of boreholes for several districts. Such a model has contributed to the reduction of costs of construction by about 25%. The model consists of identifying the district leader of the procurement process for hiring public works contractors. After the selection of the winning bidder a contract is signed that includes the construction of a set of infrastructures in the districts parties of the contract. This, on one hand, allows for the provision of a greater financial capability to the contractor and reduces the total costs of the works as a result of economy of scale.

Since its establishment, the BMF initiated informal contacts with the Parliamentary Committee of Planning and Budget with the objective of improving the budget planning and execution through Parliament. Until 2009 the State Budget proposal was not made public before submission to and approval by Parliament. But since 2010 the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD) has publicised the proposed document on its web-page <http://www.mpd.gov.mz>. Although this had been one of the prime objectives of the Forum, and above all a particular effort of CIP and FDC, nobody expected the result to come so quick,⁹⁶ given the normal government practice of secrecy.

The elaboration of the Strategic Plan for Manica Province, which was formally presented in December 2011, was a process conducted completely by the CS, as a result of a statement on the matter, presented by the CS in meetings with the provincial government. In such a process, teams comprising thematic groups of the CS platform assumed the task to develop diagnosis in their areas or focus and define strategies of intervention that led to the drafting of the document. Members of government or government sector officials were also included in the thematic teams to work side-by side with CS. CS-interviewees see this as a unique experience that shows a break with the hostile practices of the past.⁹⁷

6.1.7. Why some CSOs engage or not

An enabling factor of engagement in policy dialogue is certainly the availability of legal tools that allow free association, freedom of expression and the engagement of citizens and CS in the processes of governance. The degree of openness to participation in policy dialogue differs extensively from one place to another. And in general the degree of openness depends on the character of leadership. Most of our interviewees indicated that provincial governors with a strategic perspective of governance and who have experience with CS interaction are more inclined to allow active CS engagement, than those who did not have such experience. Often, the existence of a dynamic local CS participation has been related with a long period of intervention by international organisations (e.g. SNV, Swiss Development Cooperation and Concern in Nampula; and GTZ (now GIZ) and Concern in Manica), providing capacity building and assistance to local CSOs in matters of citizenship, rights and engagement.

The engagement of Maputo-based organisations such as the LDH, CIP, IESE, and FDC in policy dialogue is directly related to the financial support that they receive from donors. A considerable number of development partners focus their financial support to CS on these few organisations. The symbolic, political and intellectual capital that the leaderships of these organisations have play a major role in their credibility with donors: Graça Machel from FDC has a strong political and symbolic capital; Luis de Brito and Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco from IESE are persons of recognise intellectual capital; Marcelo Mosse from CIP has a historic background linked to the assassinated journalist Carlos Cardoso; Alice Mabota from LDH is the face

⁹⁴ This is a replicate of the central WSG, an institution comprising the government, partners, the private sector and NGOs from the water and sanitation sector, with a role to discuss, monitor and evaluate the implementation of sector policies and projects.

⁹⁵ Interview with the Programmes Director and the National Programmes Officer of Helvetas in Mozambique.

⁹⁶ Interview with the Co-ordinator of the Budget Monitoring and Public Expenditure Follow-up, CIP.

⁹⁷ Interview with Manica-based CSOs, November-December 2011.

of advocacy on human rights in Mozambique). The partnerships that these organisations have with strategic international institutions are also a factor of engagement in the forefront of policy confrontation and dialogue. But a particularly critical aspect, which renders more credibility to their intervention relates to the nature of their evidence based intervention in research and monitoring.

Meanwhile, as already mentioned, the many CSOs do not engage in policy dialogue, not only because they fear pressure from the power elite⁹⁸, but also because CS at local level lacks the encouragement to engage in policy dialogue. As pointed out by several interviewees, the prevailing poverty still means that people are mainly concerned about their basic needs and have little time to engage in policy dialogue. According to the results of the last population census conducted by INE⁹⁹ 2007, 60.5% of the population cannot read, and 72.2% living in rural areas are illiterate. Under these circumstances promoting the values of citizenship in an environment of poverty becomes extremely difficult.

6.1.8. Main enabling and disabling factors

In terms of internal factors influencing CSOs possibilities for engagement in policy dialogue, some of the most important enabling factors are the existence of organizations with capacity to provide evidence and documentation. Openness and strong leadership demonstrated by individual figures in the CSO-environment also enables policy dialogue due to general acceptance by CSOs as well as government. When it comes to local level, the weak capacity and notion of citizenship, as well as the low level of education hamper engagement in policy dialogue. The political environment is not conducive of critical dialogue and censorship and auto-censorship is often practised.

The figure below presents an overview of external and internal enabling and disabling factors.

Figure 3: Summary of enabling and disabling factors

	INTERNAL FACTORS	EXTERNAL FACTORS
Enabling Factors	Existence of RAOs Leadership character (openness) National level - internal capacity of CSOs (technical and financial)	Efforts of central government to engage CS through invited spaces Open & Inclusive Presidency campaigns
Disabling factors	Local level - weak technical capacity Cooptation of community leaders and diluted legitimacy Censorship and auto-censorship Weak notion of citizenship General low level of education	Threats on exercise of freedoms Poor performance of justice system Limited access to information Government controlled publicity market Limited donor support to independent media

External factors influence strongly on the possibility for successful engagement in policy dialogue concerning district planning and budget monitoring. Most interviewees stated that the efforts of the central government to engage CS through establishment of mechanisms to improve policy dialogue is not replicated at local level. However, the open and inclusive presidency (*Presidencia Aberta e Inclusiva*) is mentioned as an enabling factor that has contributed to collective awareness for the participation of citizens in policy issues.

The exercise of freedoms is strongly limited by threats made by government authorities, which are aggravated by the poor performance of institutions of justice. The way in which institutions operate and the perceptions that the citizens and CS actors have in relation to lack of tolerance by government authorities

⁹⁸ Information from various interviewees

⁹⁹ See in the website of the National Statistics Institute (INE): www.ine.gov.mz

gives rise to fear and as a result, the absence of incentives for the exercise of citizenship creates an inhibiting behaviour for engagement in the debate and policy dialogue. Thus far, dialogue spaces instead of working as spaces for the reinforcement of dialogue and consolidation of the role of CSOs, end up becoming instruments of manipulation and co-option of CS.

A critical disabling factor in the policy dialogue is limited access to information. Although the Constitution of the Republic provides for freedom of expression, the country has seen little progress in terms of access to information, especially to public information held by Government institutions.¹⁰⁰ In Mozambique secrecy in public institutions is a long prevailing concern.

Another challenge is related to the access of independent media to the publicity market, which is government or party controlled. Donor support to independent media is currently very weak although there is recognition that in Mozambique media has played a critical role in the promotion of transparency and accountability among public entities. Media is an important partner to CS in the promotion of the values of citizenship.

The effectiveness of spaces for policy dialogue almost all over the country is hampered by the low level of education, the absence of skills, the low level of civic responsibility and citizenship, and the political co-opting of members of LCs and community authorities by the government.¹⁰¹ The lack of information on the LC-budget is also a limiting factor for members' participation in this formal space for policy dialogue at district level.

6.1.9. Conclusions from Case Study 1

- In terms of arrangements related to district planning and budget monitoring, the formal institutions required for the exercise of citizenship are to a large extent in place in Mozambique; there is a legal-constitutional framework for freedom of expression and of association, along with a stated commitment to citizens' engagement in governance. However, evidence from the case study shows that these formal elements are weakened by a culture and practice that works counter to the exercise of such freedoms.
- The invited spaces created by government for information provision and dialogue have become co-opted spaces managed by the ruling party, to legitimise decisions taken by the government and consequently to consolidate their power. At national and provincial level, the DOs, a government initiative to encourage and support national policy dialogue of poverty and development, are controlled by government and are not in reality a space for open and inclusive debate. LCCs suffer from poor representation of local interests and weak linkages between district planning and budgeting processes. Presidential interventions, such as the *7 millions* and the *Presidencia Aberta e inclusiva*, serve more to undermine local accountability than strengthen it. While the newly-formed LDCs offer the prospect of greater grassroots engagement in local governance, they are not formally linked into the district planning process and so their current potential remains limited.
- In order to ensure engagement in district planning and budget monitoring in an environment where created spaces are characterised by limitations, organizations and communities seek alternative, often informal channels for influence: independent media, lobby through influential people, advocacy through documentation and evidence provision, as well as the much disputed Open Presidency initiative. Some claimed spaces have demonstrated success in identifying and addressing mismanagement by government, through informal contacts with the ruling party, traditional authorities and religious leaders and through naming and shaming by the independent media.

¹⁰⁰ MISA (2007). Annual Report on the State of Press Freedom in Mozambique in 2007.

¹⁰¹ Interview with the platform of NGOs in Gaza, and telephone interviews with NGO representatives in Manica.

- The main success in CS engagement in, and influence over policy has been through the more formally-organised policy advocacy undertaken by largely national or provincial CSOs that bring research-based evidence into dialogue. This claimed space has been built through consolidation of CSO efforts, the development of shared platforms, and through strategic partnerships with ICOSOs. The BMF has succeeded in working with the Parliamentary Planning and Budgeting Committee, and state oversight institutions make use of CS-produced reports on budget monitoring.
- The existing CS-platforms at provincial level play an important role in providing access to information and a space for smaller CBOs to engage in budget monitoring, although there is a risk that they will – in a mid-term perspective – start acting as separate organisations rather than representing the interests of their members.
- Provinces where district development programmes have been active for longer periods have benefitted considerable in terms of a strengthened CS, which is able to engage in budget monitoring and policy dialogue. Evidence from the field visit in the Southern Provinces demonstrates a different picture than document review and previous team experience from the Northern Provinces. The consolidation of thematic working groups within CS platforms in very few provinces has shown that they stimulate a minimum of expertise in specific matters of policy and it increases the capacity of CSOs to engage in policy dialogue with the government (e.g. Nampula and Manica).
- Nonetheless, significant organisational and capacity constraints within these CSOs, platforms and networks continue to undermine progress and engagement in budget monitoring. Prevailing poverty and weak notion of citizenship in general are other disabling factors that limit the active engagement in budget monitoring at local level.
- The current tendencies for concentration that lead various development partners to support fewer and stronger CSOs (such as IESE, CIP, LDH) all based in Maputo do not necessarily favour the general strengthening of the CS in Mozambique, as weaker CSOs are not included. The majority of organisations do not work on the basis of their own agenda. CS support is resource demanding and the changing donor priorities and the rigid application is an inhibiting factor for long-term engagement in CS development.

6.2. Case Study 2: Legislation on Domestic Violence

6.2.1. Introduction

Box 5: A definition of domestic violence

“Domestic violence is the abuse of one person by another where they are involved in an intimate relationship. The abuse can range from physical, emotional, verbal and psychological abuse, economic abuse, intimidation, harassment and stalking. Intimate partner relationship can mean a married couple or dating couples. What distinguishes domestic violence from other forms of violence is that it happens in the home and usually, it takes place over a long period. The use of the term “domestic violence” has ensured that this form of violence is treated as a private matter and removed from the public arena. This results in law-enforcement agents shirking their responsibility to protect women by referring to it as a “private matter”. Ultimately, this reinforces the unequal power relationship between the man and woman, and the woman continues to be subjected to violence without any recourse to the law.” IPS, 2009

Violence against women (VAW) in general and domestic violence against women in particular, is a global challenge. In Mozambique, it is a widespread and unfortunately widely accepted practice based on strong traditional gender roles. This is testified by research studies and documented cases undertaken by CSOs (i.e. WLSA, LEMUSICA), and statistics from the public casualty desks (*Gabinetes de Atendimento*) for women

victims of violence.¹⁰² Nevertheless, the cases of domestic violence against women were seen as belonging to the domestic (private) sphere and as such not a public issue and until recently no legal framework existed.

Box 6: Research into domestic violence

A research conducted by the Ministry for Women and Social Affairs (MMAS) in 2004 showed that 34% of interviewed women had been subject to physical or sexual violence at least once in their lives (referred in Tvedten et.al. 2004).

Qualitative studies, particularly carried out by WLSA Mozambique, confirm that the domestic violence against women is a serious problem and is widespread in Mozambique (Arthur 2006, 2007; WLSA 2008)

As a response to the gender based violence identified and to the lack of a legislation concerning domestic violence against women, a group of CSOs, working in the area of women’s rights, in 2000-01 pioneered a process to draft and advocate for a law. This process culminated with Parliament’s adoption of a first bill on domestic violence against women on June 30, 2009.

The timeline shows the major events in the process which led to the adoption of the Domestic Violence Law in 2009:

- ✓ 1995-feminist movement started campaign `All Against Violence (TCV)
- ✓ 2000- World March of Women-, CSOs working in the area of women rights committed themselves to work on law on domestic violence against women.
- ✓ 2000/1- A multidisciplinary Civil society group established with two agendas: 1) to contribute on family law revision and 2) to draft a law on domestic violence for women
- ✓ 2001-2003 the multidisciplinary group was much more concentrated on family law- relatively ‘soft phase’, mainly research and lobby with parliamentarian women.
- ✓ 2003- the multidisciplinary group re-start the work on domestic violence
- ✓ 2004-5 -1^o draft discussed at National level (regional meetings) among CS, community leaders and Judges.
- ✓ 19th of December 2006- CS national meeting for the adoption of the proposal
- ✓ 2006-submission the first draft of the bill to the women’s office at parliament
- ✓ 2006-2009 –phase two-strong advocacy campaign, multi-approach strategy
- ✓ August 2007 –formally established the CS movement to pass the law domestic violence against women
- ✓ 2008 –National Plan on prevention and fight against violence against women approved by the council of Ministers.
- ✓ 2009, June 30- 1^o - approval of the law (29/2009) in generality
- ✓ 2009-, July 21- passed the second and final reading of a bill on domestic violence against women

6.2.2. The policy dialogue – spaces and types

Policy dialogue as direct and indirect ways of influencing policy process has different meanings for different stakeholders. In this case study, as a way of influencing the process that led to the adoption of the bill on Domestic Violence against Women. The policy dialogue is analysed in terms of space, types of strategies and level of dialogue.¹⁰³

¹⁰² MINT, 2008.

¹⁰³ See Annex 9: Conceptual Framework for details on concepts of space and Chapter 5: CSO strategies on policy dialogue on types of strategies and level of dialogue.


- ✓ *The process was a claimed space by CS with gradual acceptance of the state institutions*
- ✓ *The annual campaign '16 days against domestic violence' suggests a continuous claim for space from CS activists*
- ✓ *The types of dialogue vary from direct and informal dialogue to indirect contribution to the dialogue, such as lobby at parliament, evidence base studies, public campaigns, protests and demonstrations were used by the CS movement to pressure to pass the bill*
- ✓ *The policy dialogue took place mainly at national level, while local level partners were critical in collecting cases of domestic violence*

Research conducted since 1989 by women’s rights CSOs, indicated that cases of VAW in Mozambique were widespread and that it was the manifestation of the structural phenomenon of historically unequal power relations between women and men, which led to male domination, discrimination against women and the interposition of obstacles against their full development.¹⁰⁴ Driven by this reality, not least because of the lack of a legal framework and informed by international conventions such as the CEDAW (Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women) and the Maputo Protocol (Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa), the women’s rights CSOs, decided to draft a law to prevent, criminalize and punish domestic violence against women by defining the offence as a public, not private matter.

Thus the women’s rights organisations championed the problem definition and the agenda setting. They were successful to bring the issue of domestic violence against women, to the public domain and gradually recognized and addressed by parliament and government, when the law was adopted.¹⁰⁵

The women’s rights movement used a range of supplementary strategies for policy dialogue from direct and informal dialogue to indirect contribution to the dialogue that reinforced each other to achieve the outcomes. Examples of strategies used are shown on the figure below:

Figure 4: CSO strategies for Policy Dialogue



In terms of physical spaces it was found that the policy dialogue took place mainly at national level, between the pioneer CSOs, personalities involved in the campaign and the parliamentarians. The woman’s

¹⁰⁴ Ximena, 2009.

¹⁰⁵ The campaign was championed by Fórum Mulher, WLSA, N'weti - Comunicação para a Saúde, MULEIDE, AMMCJ, ASSOMUDE, KUAYA, OMM, AMCS, FORCOM, AVIMAS, AVVD, NUGENA, NAFEZA, ADEC, AMUDEIA, FOCODE, MUCHEFA, LEMUSICA, OXFAM GB.

rights groups at local level also provided an important indirect contribution to the dialogue particularly in documenting cases of violence and also disseminating the bill among their peers.


While not the specific object of this evaluation, it is important to note that the acceptance of domestic violence as a public problem is still a recurrent issue. After the adoption of the law, the CSOs involved in the process, took a mixed approach from indirect contribution to dialogue and no dialogue. On the one hand, they are engaged to influence the implementation of the law, by providing capacity building to state institutions such as the police and the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs, on the other hand they are implementing community mobilisation campaigns to disseminate the law and raise awareness on the importance of complaint / denunciation and to penalize the domestic violence against women. At this stage, perhaps because the law is very recent, very few CS monitoring and evaluation initiatives are taking place.

6.2.3. Theory of change - how change happened¹⁰⁶

For the case study on the process leading to the adoption of legislation against domestic violence, the Theory of Change has served as an instrument to establish the linkages between involved actors, applied strategies, intermediate outcomes and influence on policy change. In the specific case, the adoption of the law against Domestic Violence is considered a policy change, albeit it is recognized that the process of changing practices is still a major challenge.

¹⁰⁶ The team did prepare a Theory of Change for this policy area which we did not include in this report. The process of change is better described as a historical process.

Figure 5: Theory of Change for policy dialogue on domestic violence



A diverse but complementary group of women's rights organisations joined forces to draft the bill on domestic violence against women and campaign for its approval. The group comprised organisations with the following strengths and competences:

- advocacy competences and experience (Forum Mulher, Muleide, N'weti)
- connection to local women's groups (Fórum Mulher, Muleide, Organização das Mulheres de Moçambique (OMM), LDH, Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique (CVM))
- research, provision of evidence and case documentation (WLSA, Associação de Mulheres Moçambicanas de Careira Jurídica (AMMCJ))
- communication and dissemination of information (N'Weti, FORCOM)
- community mobilization and documentation of cases of domestic violence (organisations at Provincial and District level)

The group took advantage of the main strengths of each organisation and made clear their respective responsibilities and activities. The advocacy plan and activities defined the movement, reinforced each other and aimed to influence the adoption of the bill. Two main factors shaped the way the movement was structured and maintained steady in its objectives: a strong leadership and strong research and advocacy capacity within the group.

The organisations used a range of strategies (see figure 5 above), which have resulted in three main intermediate outcomes, which were strongly influenced by the intensification and diversified, mutually-reinforcing advocacy strategies, including documented cases disseminated in the media:

- 1) Public services established to attend victims of domestic violence - by public duty bearers, but also by CSOs.
- 2) Public debate generated - since 2008-09 the issue of domestic violence is referred in the main newspapers, radio.
- 3) Gradual acceptance of domestic violence as a public domain problem.

One year before the adoption of the law on domestic violence, the government passed a National Action Plan to prevent and fight VAW, which was indirectly influenced by the growing recognition of the problem.

The intermediate results and also the direct lobby with Parliament, using influential persons, such as Graça Machel¹⁰⁷, played a significant role in the successful adoption of the law. The proximity of 2009 legislative and presidential elections created an opportunity, which CSOs used well.

The DPs and ICSOs, government, the media and the Parliament are included in the illustration above to show their role as active players in the process. For example the media shaped significantly the public debate around the domestic violence at the time and also the final reading of bill approved by the parliament. The funds provided by DPs directly or via ICSOs, the modalities and their agenda also positively influenced the process. The government, by passing the National Plan of Action, can also claim a role in the process. When the politicians, for example realised that the proposed law was not consensual, they wisely adjusted the final reading bill to what the *Pambazuca* news said "...with a clause tacked onto the end to placate the howls of rage from some male quarters that the bill was "unconstitutional" because it "discriminated against men".¹⁰⁸

It was said previously that the main constraint was the broad resistance to accept gender based violence as a problem and in particular as a public problem – a fact that is directly connected with social norms and socially constructed gender roles. This socio-cultural resistance also influenced the final bill adopted and still influences the implementation of the law.

¹⁰⁷ Widow of the former Mozambican president Samora Machel and founder of FDC.

¹⁰⁸ Pambazuca news, 2009, July 30

6.2.4. CSO Influence

In pursuit of the recommendations of the 4th Women's Forum held in 1995 in Beijing, a group of Mozambican CSOs, including Fórum Mulher, AMMCJ, AMME, CEA, Muleide, MMAS, OMM, Kulaya, started an "All Against Violence"¹⁰⁹ campaign, which aimed at eradicating domestic violence, in particular against women. At that time, the issue of gender based domestic violence was not recognized as a public problem, nor was it a criminal offence, even though incidence was high. No legal framework existed, and consequently there was a need to elaborate a law to deal with it.

In 2000-01, a multidisciplinary group was established with a dual agenda: to contribute on Family Law revision, and to draft a proposal of Law on Domestic Violence Against Women. The draft law resulted from a division of activities and responsibilities between the different CSOs involved in the process. For instance, Women in law in Southern Africa (WLSA) and the Department of Women and Gender of Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA)/Universidade Eduardo Modlane (UEM) was responsible for research and provision of evidence; and AMMCJ, MULEIDE and OMM focused on collection of legal information and its dissemination as well as judicial counselling and sponsorship.

The process was interrupted between 2001-2003 to give room for lobbying and advocacy for approval of the Family Law. The activities were resumed in May 2003 with finalisation of the draft consultation meetings with various stakeholders throughout the country, including religious leaders and CBOs, as well as exchanges with other countries. According to WLSA¹¹⁰ this process has highlighted the immense diversity of opinions of equality between women and men at the level of CSOs and activists fighting for gender equality. Finally, on 19 December 2006, a national meeting for the adoption of proposal was held prior to submission of the proposal to Parliament. The choice for a direct submission to Parliament via the Parliamentary Women's Office¹¹¹ stemmed from fears of the draft otherwise being ignored, particularly as attention might be diverted to the agricultural reform draft which was submitted by the Ministry of Agriculture at the same time.

However, the draft was not discussed nor approved during four parliamentary sessions, despite the pressure of lobbying and campaign with the Parliamentary Women's Office and Commission on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Rule of Law, and Commission on Social Affairs, Gender and Environment. Although on the agenda, other issues were constantly given priority, and the discussion of the proposal was postponed and rescheduled several times.

2009 was a year for presidential and parliamentary elections, and the women's CS movement intensified lobbying for the law to be approved within the actual term of office in order to avoid losing the battles won and the networking already established through intensive lobbying. Between June and July of 2009, the Parliament passed the first and the second reading of a bill on domestic violence against women. The adoption of the law happened in the last weeks of the Parliament's last session of the mandate. The Parliament made some changes from first to second reading of the bill on domestic violence against women thus accommodating the complaints from certain groups that the bill was gender-biased and did not cater for protection of male victims of domestic violence.

Law 29/2009, a CSO initiative, has not been unanimously accepted by Mozambican society. A participant at the verification workshop noted that "*It seems that the commitment was to pass a law*", i.e. that at the end attention was not paid to the exact wording and its implication, as long as the law was adopted. For some men, women and also the media, the first reading of the bill was "unconstitutional" because it "discriminated against men". When the bill passed in the parliament, the weekly newspaper "*Savana*" ran a front page headline claiming, "*the Parliament is demonizing men*". On the same week, the Sunday paper "*Domingo*" carried an editorial accusing the Parliament of "*mulherismo*" - an entirely new word in the

¹⁰⁹ Todos Contra Violência

¹¹⁰ WLSA Anteproyecto de lei contra violência doméstica (http://www.wlsa.org.mz/?_target_=violencia)

¹¹¹ There are various channels of submission of a law proposal in Mozambique.

Portuguese language, and which could roughly be translated as “female chauvinism”.¹¹²

For feminist groups, the changes made not only resulted in a lack of harmonization in the document but also largely distorted the Civil Society proposal, which aimed to promote a legal framework to prevent and punish gender-based violence. Law 29/2009, does not effectively combat gender-based violence, but only represses some aggression in the domestic sphere, since it does not recognize that the domestic violence against women is a result of unequal power between men and women in the family. This in turn, has implications for effective programmes for prevention of violence.¹¹³ Interviews have clearly sustained this concern, indicating that women often refrain from reporting incidents of domestic violence with reference to their vulnerable economic situation should the aggressor (husband) be sentenced to jail.

It is widely recognised that even with all the omissions, distortions, short-comings and even silences, law 29/2009, is a legal instrument considered to be a benefit to Mozambican society and resulted from a process initiated and driven by CS.

6.2.5. Effectiveness of CSO strategies in relation to Legislation on Domestic Violence

The process that culminated with the adoption of the law on domestic violence against women was in the first instance perceived as a struggle by a small urban-based elite group of women. However, it yielded several outcomes to benefit broader society. It spawned serious debate in society and gradually people are becoming sensitized and verbal about the problem of domestic violence. The documented cases presented during the campaign were very crucial in sensitizing the state institutions and the public at large about the importance and magnitude of the problem. As a consequence, domestic violence was recognized as a public issue and moved from the private to the public sphere. During the process, the first institutions to attend victims of domestic violence were established by the police, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs and the CSOs.

Over time, the critics from media have reduced and their involvement is increasing. After the adoption of the law, various newspapers are reporting cases of domestic violence and discussing the matter. WLSA has been asked by some media houses to provide training on how to deal with and report on domestic violence cases.

Interviews have highlighted the following key strategies for influence and success of this process:

- A clear focus.
- Visible leadership.
- Social and political connections and support from individuals with strong political influence.
- Complementarity among those CSOs involved.
- Strong links to women's groups at the base.
- The application of diverse and reinforcing strategies.

The political context of the country was conducive, since elections were up coming. Nevertheless, it was the capacity of the movement to take advantage of the momentum that was key to the success.

6.2.6. Unexpected Results

An unexpected result of the policy dialogue process was the approval of a national action plan to prevent and fight violence against women 2008-2012, approved by the Government one year before the Parliament adopted the bill on domestic violence against women.

¹¹² Internet news paper Pambazuka -www.pambazuka.org/en/category/wgender/58077.

¹¹³ Artur, 2009.

6.2.7. Why some CSOs engage or not

The process that culminated with the approval of domestic violence law, as mentioned before, was lead by CSOs working in the area of women’s rights; it was initiated by national-level organisations, with the later involvement of women’s civic groups at provincial and district levels.

Given the nature of the issue - ‘domestic violence’ - the process would had benefitted from the inputs and involvement of other CSOs outside the women’s rights movement working in close or complementary areas, such as research and advocacy groups. These groups were not involved upfront because there were not invited as the main stakeholders did not at the time recognise the importance of their involvement because it was generally perceived exclusively as a women’s issue/fight.¹¹⁴ The women’s right CS movement only mobilised women’s groups through choice. Other civic groups, organisations and networks working in close thematic areas or with added-value speciality (for example research institutions) were not involved. Interviews have also underlined the fact that religious communities and traditional family conflict mediation institutions (*padrinhos*, family councils) have not been sufficiently considered in the law.

6.2.8. Main enabling and disabling factors

The success of the policy process was influenced by internal factors within the movement as well external factors from the legal, social and political environment. Figure 5 below summarises the internal and external enabling and disabling factors.

Figure 5: Women’s Rights - Enabling and Disabling Factors in Policy Dialogue

	INTERNAL	EXTERNAL
ENABLING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Strong leadership ✓ Persons with influence ✓ Coalition formed by a summation of forces and clear division of responsibilities ✓ Strong Research and Advocacy capacity ✓ Availability of evidence (documented cases) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ International instruments informed the initiative, which Mozambique ratify most of them ✓ Consultation between CSOs working on women’s rights ✓ Partnerships with international CSOs-some organisations such as Oxfam were part of the civil society movement and they contribute with funds and some activities but the coordination and initiative was mainly driven by Mozambican CSOs ✓ Existence of strong leadership in government in the last stage of the process ✓ The elections in 2009 and fear from ruling party to lose women’s votes
DISABLING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Duplication of efforts among CSOs post-law approved with potential for competition ✓ Low involvement of other key civil society actors that could add value to the process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Non-recognition of the problem, as gender based and public ✓ Resistance based on cultural norms and gender roles ✓ Access to public information, ✓ Low awareness of rights and duties of citizens ✓ Male dominance perspective (against the bill) in media ✓ Joint action after the approval of the law-unsystematic, not yet concentrated on monitoring of the implementation ✓ Stiff (interpretation) of the priorities of donors- after the approval of the law, some CSOs interviewed faced difficulties to get funds because the activities they have presented were not clearly stated ‘domestic violence’ ✓ Weak links between MPs and constituencies- The MPs (are) were, particularly the ones dealing with women’s affairs were not preoccupied with an issue raised by women’s civic groups at various levels (national and local) and at first instance did not give importance.

While the weight of the single factor is difficult to assess, the sum of enabling factors counterbalanced the disabling factors and resulted in the adoption of the bill. However, the main disabling factor still persists among duty bearers and the population in general, i.e. the resistance to accept gender based violence as a

¹¹⁴ Interviews with WLSA in November 2011 and at Verification Workshop, December 2011.

problem in general and a public problem in particular, which is directly connected with social norms and socially constructed gender roles. As expressed by one interviewee: *“While the approved bill serve to punish violators, the prevention of domestic violence cases is a long walk, since it is about changing social norms”*. Other interviewees among public servants attending victims of violence revealed strong personal opinions against the *“interference in domestic matters”*, which the law represents.

6.2.9. Conclusions on Case Study 2

- This policy dialogue process is recognised by all stakeholders interviewed as an initiative taken by CSOs. The space for dialogue was claimed; it happened mainly at national level and it is a complete process, i.e. from the start of initiative to the adoption of law.
- Links of contribution between strategies and results can be established, which demonstrate that the adoption of the law was mainly influenced by the women’s movement. Meanwhile critical changes were made to the final wording of the bill, which distorted the main cause of the proposal. Nevertheless, *“the law is a useful legal instrument in the fight for women’s rights, thus an important battle won by the civil society”* said one of the participants at validation workshop.
- The following strategies have proven effective:
 - A common cause (children’s and women’s rights, improved education) supports CS mobilisation; where the focus area is clear so is the advocacy.
 - Strong leadership and the capacity to join coalitions with complementary strategic actions are also key (e.g. Family Law legislation).
 - CSOs have with success brought innovative ways of influencing policies by lobbying through informal spaces, applying diverse strategies including involving influential individuals and simultaneously campaigning at national and local level
- Social and cultural norms were and are still a strong negative factor in the process. The law was passed but both rights providers and the majority of the population do not act as expected, influenced by existing social norms and aggravated by - in certain cases - the lack of information and training. As an example, a police officer interviewed in Gaza province stated that *“Women use the law as a mean of revenge against their husbands...”*
- In terms of strategy, value could have been added to this process if other CSO outside the women’s rights movement working in close or complementary areas had been engaged. The contribution, among others, would range from mobilising the wider CS to do specific additional research.

7. Lessons on Donor Partner Strategies

The Inception Report presented a preliminary analysis of Donor Partner (DPs) strategies and funding data¹¹⁵, which clearly documented the strong commitment by Nordic donors to support civil society as an autonomous actor and to strengthen capacity. Austrian and Swiss policy documents stress the support to be provided through ICOSOs. Donor policies differ in the extent to which they recognize and support the role of CSO for policy change. Sida's policy recognizes the role of civil society as proposers of ideas, watchdogs of those in power and a counterweight to and force for democratizations vis-à-vis the state it includes a commitment to "promote representative, legitimate and independent civil society actors who contribute to poverty reduction, based on their role as collective voices and organizers of services". SDC's policy places emphasis on role of NGOs as "implementer". It is not clear with regard to the role of local civil society and/or role that international CSOs should play to strengthen local civil society. ADC's policy describes the role of NGOs from partner countries as to provide services and empower civil populations. Only Danida's and Finland's policy explicitly refer to CSO role on advocacy. Danida's role includes advocacy as strategic goals: "promotion of capacity development, advocacy work and networking opportunities". Finland's policy includes advocacy as priority.

In this Country Report, findings on DP strategies are mainly based on document review, interviews with DPs, ICOSOs and major Mozambican CSO. Interviews with minor CSOs and CBOs in particular have yielded limited information, as they have little knowledge about DP strategies because they are not directly exposed to them, but usually receive funds through intermediaries. Interviews with government officials have also not provided much information related to DPs' specific strategy for support to CSOs, as they tend to focus on the CSOs rather than on the DPs support strategies. Linear linkages between the two case studies and the DPs support strategies is not easily established, especially for case 2, as the policy process has been terminated. In relation to case 1, more substantial evidence has been available.

The Scoping study¹¹⁶ identified three issues of key importance in the relationship between CSOs and DPs when it comes to supporting CSOs engagement in policy dialogue:

- the need to strengthen harmonisation
- having a critical view on support through intermediaries, and
- alignment with CSOs' own agendas.

Furthermore, findings from the case study support the need for a re-focus in DPs policy dialogue with the Mozambican government on issues related to CS.

7.1. Harmonization and funding mechanisms

*"The worse that can happen is that donors support completely uncoordinated programs."*¹¹⁷

The Accra Agenda for Action (2009), recent bilateral CS strategies,¹¹⁸ and a Nordic+ paper from 2010 emphasize DPs' recognition of and commitment to good donorship through principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation and coordination, as well as management for results and accountability. Interviews have confirmed that Nordic+ donors are perceived as flexible and with an in-depth contextual

¹¹⁵ Joint Evaluation of Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue, Inception Report, October 2011, Annex 8.

¹¹⁶ Joint Evaluation of Support to Civil Society engagement in Policy Dialogue. Scoping Exercise Mozambique, final report, ITAD, October 2011, pp.31-32. Based on interviews with CSOs and DPs, as well as analysis of DPs' strategy documents.

¹¹⁷ Interview with HELVETAS, 28.11.2011.

¹¹⁸ Denmark, Sweden.

knowledge and they are recognized for their policy commitment to harmonise and align with national CSO agendas.¹¹⁹

When it comes to support to CS in practice, DPs make use of a variety of strategies, modalities and mechanisms: through ICSOs, direct support at country level, coordinated funding mechanisms, and/or through dialogue.¹²⁰ Experience from the case studies has demonstrated that the support can be direct or indirect.

Direct support at country level. Although some of the interviewed DPs no longer operate with local grant mechanisms, several still administer direct funding at country level.¹²¹ This modality is considered flexible and responsive by the DPs themselves, as it allows for supporting upcoming initiatives and provides seed money.¹²² The support can be either core funding, e.g. to major CSOs capable of administering funds; funding to specific projects or programmes; and funding of small initiatives. It is recognized by the most of the interviewed DPs that this modality implies high transaction costs as it is time consuming and requires specialized capacity, which is not always available with shrinking budgets.¹²³ In some cases, direct support to CSOs is provided as part of an overall sector programme support, e.g. CSOs receiving funds from the Danish Justice Sector Support Programme¹²⁴. Among the interviewed CSOs there is a clear perception that only the “elite” among national CSOs qualify to receive funds directly from the donors. There is a tendency to support the same organisations, which have once and for all demonstrated their ability to administer funds and are considered “donor darlings” (CIP, IESE, FDC etc.).

Indirect support to coordinated funding mechanisms at country level (basket-funding). The policy tendency is to move from bilateral to joint support and funding arrangements. However the move is gradual, as DPs are hesitant and timid to embark upon joint funding mechanisms, of which a number have been established during recent years (e.g. *Mecanismo de Apoio à Sociedade Civil* (MASC), *Programa Acções para uma Governação Inclusiva e Responsável* (AGIR), *Facilidade*). There is limited overall coordination among donors when setting up joint mechanisms, e.g. with sector, thematic or geographical focus, and there is a risk of overlap and competition when it comes to identification of beneficiary CSOs.¹²⁵ GOM and CSOs share this recognition and stress the need for better coordination. In reality, much support is still tied to projects and DP priorities, and alignment to CSO’s strategic priorities limited.¹²⁶ The joint mechanisms still suffer from many of the problems known from bilateral support: donor-specific priorities, special reporting and accounting formats, and short-term project funding. Interviewed CSOs gave examples of having to report by different formats to 5-6 different DPs. It is also a common complaint that the CSOs’ strategic plans are used as a “shopping list” by DPs to select specific projects to be supported. Core funding is still the exception rather than the rule. Interviewed CSOs have clearly indicated their preference for basket-funding arrangements, which can allow them to fulfil their own strategic priorities, obtain core funding and optimise reporting requirements.¹²⁷

The Swedish funding mechanism *Programa AGIR* channels funds through intermediary ICSOs responsible for fund management – Diakonia, Ibis, Oxfam NOVIB and Swedish Cooperative Centre are responsible for the administration and implementation of the four funding windows of *Programa AGIR*. From the point of view of the DPs, working through funding mechanisms or pool-funds carries the advantage of delegated management and responsibility for results, as well as capitalisation on ICSO capacity to identify partners

¹¹⁹ Interviews with CSOs, November-December 2011.

¹²⁰ The categories of funding mechanisms were used in the Inception Report.

¹²¹ Finland and Canada no longer operate local grant mechanisms, and Denmark is gradually downscaling, interviews with DPs, December 2011.

¹²² Especially Austria and Switzerland are advocating for the direct funding of CSOs.

¹²³ Interviews with DP representatives, December 2011.

¹²⁴ AMMCJ, LDH and CEPAJI.

¹²⁵ Interview with MASC, December 2011; supplemented by information from previous studies undertaken by team members.

¹²⁶ Interviews with CSOs, November-December 2011.

¹²⁷ Interviews with MULEIDE, 22.11.2011; FONGA, 23.11.2011; FORCOM, 29.11.2011

and engage in partnership. Sida, however, recognises that the establishment of the funding mechanism has brought new challenges and that time has not necessarily been freed up for substantive dialogue.¹²⁸ CSOs have raised the critique that the support is often supply-driven and determined by donor priorities (environment, justice, governance etc.).

Cost efficiency should also be considered when setting up funding mechanisms through intermediaries, as the “value chain” is often very long. Chains with 5-6 links from back-donor to beneficiaries are not unusual. An example is the support provided to Community Radio stations through the Swedish funded *Programa AGIR*: SIDA → Swedish Embassy in Maputo → Ibis → FORCOM → ORAM → Radio Vembe in Chokwe.¹²⁹

7.2. Role of ICSOs

ICSOs are often funded directly from the DP headquarters and operate independent country programmes in addition to specific funding from in-country DP delegations. DPs see an advantage in collaborating with the ICSOs (of which the majority are hinterland CSOs¹³⁰) as they often represent strong local and decentralized presence and in-depth knowledge. SDC is an exception to this as they prefer to work without the use of intermediaries, allowing for more hands-on and interactive support to local CSOs, allowing for identification of organizations that may have the potential for influencing policy dialogue, in particular at decentralised level.¹³¹

The CSOs interviewed recognize an added value from working with the ICSOs: access to international advocacy and information, mentoring and partnership, tailor made capacity building, solidarity, credibility and protection.¹³² The ICSOs are perceived as “soft donors”, i.e. they have a stronger focus on capacity building and partnership, and recognize the need for a gradual transition to strict adherence to rules and regulations. Several interviewees emphasized this and saw it as a thorough understanding of the context in which CS operate, i.e. low level of literacy, non-functioning private sector in remote areas etc.

It was recognized that the presence of ICSOs over long time and with consistent engagement with local CS strengthens the local CSOs and facilitates space¹³³. Provincial presence is generally valued by local CSOs, and a number of the ICSOs (e.g. Jugend eine Welt, Concern Universal and KEPA) have offices at provincial level. KEPA, however, is closing its delegation in Cabo Delgado as from 2012.

However, informants among the ICSOs questioned their own role and the added value, as national CSOs may in some cases have stronger administrative capacity than the intermediary. It was also recognized that the ICSOs may in some cases undermine the legitimacy of local CSOs.¹³⁴ A negative effect of operating through international intermediaries is that they act like a buffer between the Mozambican CSOs and GOM, protecting the CSOs from GOM requirements and exposure and thus impeding them from becoming independent and sustainable. As expressed by SDC: *“If donors are too present, they can delegitimise the non-state actors.”*

7.3. Alignment to CSOs’ own agendas

DPs – and even the established funding mechanisms - are reluctant to provide core funding for CSOs, and there is still much funding tied to specific activities (project approach) with measurement of detailed

¹²⁸ Interview with Swedish Embassy, December 2011.

¹²⁹ It is outside the scope of the present evaluation to undertake concrete cost-efficiency analysis. The example serves to illustrate the many links, assuming that each link benefits from certain administrative costs.

¹³⁰ For example: Helvetas/SDC; Ibis/ Danida; SCC and Diakonia/Sweden; KEPA/Finland; Jugend eine Welt/Austria; COCAMO/Canada etc.

¹³¹ Interview with SDC, December 2011.

¹³² Community Radio station, 24.11.2011

¹³³ Examples were given: SNV and Oxfam in Nampula; SCC and Concern Universal in Niassa.

¹³⁴ Interview with ADELMA, 28.11.2011;

expected results. Alignment to local CSO agendas is also a question of tailoring the support.¹³⁵ DPs and support mechanisms must be able to accommodate these needs as well, although the volume does not add up to much.¹³⁶

DPs are not apolitical entities, but pursue their own strategic and political agendas. There is a general perception among CSOs and some government officials that DPs have a tendency to change priorities very fast with little perseverance and endurance when it comes to supporting CSOs.¹³⁷ The frequent change of DP policies according to new trends (gender, HIV/AIDS, climate change etc.) influences CSOs to change their core activities to match the donor priorities and funding opportunities. This may have severe consequences, as intermediaries are forced to close down partnerships, which again creates chaos for the people employed by CSOs.¹³⁸ CSOs are also not able to build solid in-house capacity, if focus is changed frequently. Long-term support is considered essential to allow for planning and stability. Examples were given on short-term project support to research on domestic violence¹³⁹. Repetitive funding secured the build-up of considerable knowledge and evidence over time, but once the focus was changed by the CSO to deal with initiation rites (considered an important aspect to understand intra-family power relations), the donor withdrew its support, and only after reformulating the project proposal, was it possible to obtain continued funding.¹⁴⁰

Within the area of District Planning and Budget Monitoring, two main DP support strategies are prevailing: 1) building and strengthening organisational and technical capacity; and 2) improving access to information through provision of evidence and documentation. Capacity building was encountered at decentralized level and supported either through funding mechanisms (e.g. MASC and Programa AGIR) or through programmes implemented by ICSOs. Support to access to information is mainly through national level CSOs or funding mechanisms. Support to e.g. community radios (free and independent media) is provided through locally administered funds or as part of other channels for support, but not as a specific priority.

7.4. Dialogue with Government of Mozambique

There is no clear entry point for DPs to a policy dialogue platform on CS, as the responsibility for CS is scattered among various GOM institutions: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINEG) is the main partner for some DPs (e.g. the European Union), others deal with MPD, Ministry of State Administration (MAE), Ministry of Finance (MF) or sector line ministries (health, environment, education etc.), and at provincial level, the Provincial Government is the main entry point to coordination and policy dialogue on CS.

DPs policy dialogue on CS issues takes place directly with GOM, but also through indirect channels, e.g. through ICSO-implemented CS support programmes where local CSOs are supported in their advocacy and policy dialogue endeavours. Furthermore, ICSOs may be more open and direct in their policy dialogue, albeit they are also increasingly being cautious, as too critical voices may influence on e.g. their possibilities of having their operations license renewed.

The fact that DPs have a strong focus on macro-level issues and that the policy dialogue is institutionalised in working groups following a set *modus operandi* has supported a tendency of “following the money” with a focus on macro-level economics and overall MDG indicators draws the attention from decentralized development, which in practice gets very limited attention from DPs. An example mentioned by various sources is the limited dialogue on the application and administration of the district development funds (7

¹³⁵ Examples were given during interviews of small CBOs' modest needs in terms of financial support (e.g. a local CBO in Tete, working on community mobilization).

¹³⁶ Interview w WWF CS adviser, 06.12.2011.

¹³⁷ Interview with Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning and Development, September 2011; interviews with CSOs, November-December 2011.

¹³⁸ Focus group interview with ICSOs in September 2011.

¹³⁹ Interviews with WLSA, Fórum Mulher and FORCOM, November-December 2011.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Fórum Mulher, 22.11.2011

millions), which only represent approx. 1% of overall development funds. But the strategic use of district development funds by the ruling political party to create a local elite and co-opt local leaders is an issue which deserves attention through policy dialogue.

8. Overall conclusions

In the present chapter, conclusions related to CSO effectiveness, enabling and disabling conditions and DP policies and strategies are presented. The chapter is deliberately kept short and reference is made to argumentation and analysis in previous chapters.

8.1. CSO effectiveness

It is important to recognize that policy processes change over time and CSOs have to be prepared to and experienced in applying a diversity of strategies. The two cases have revealed various strategies for engagement in policy dialogue:

The case study on **domestic violence legislation** has demonstrated specific choices, changing over time to adapt to the political environment. It has included strategic changes in activities, alliances and partnerships, and means of communication.

The case study on engagement in **district planning and budget monitoring** has, on the other hand, demonstrated little variety when it comes to choice of activities and means of influence, as the capacity to engage at local level is limited. The most successful strategic choice has been in relation to engagement through thematic groups at provincial level to strengthen technical capacity. At national level, the engagement is concentrated on providing evidence through research and documentation, as well as presentation of statements.

The successful strategies in terms of enhanced effectiveness used by CSOs in policy dialogue include:

- **Using platforms, networks and coalitions.** CS platforms at provincial level play an important role in providing access to information and provides a space for smaller CBOs to engage in dialogue with local authorities. The establishing of networks of CBOs and CSOs and platforms where they can meet officials meant a higher profile and hence visibility on the importance of CSOs and has influenced the government attitude to CSOs which for many years were regarded as hostile to government. The emergence within the platforms of thematic groups in provinces as Manica and Nampula has meant a move toward specialisation on issues and strengthened the capacity of CSOs to engage in a qualified dialogue with government. The capacity of CSOs with different agendas to join coalitions with complementary strategic actions was also key for example in the Domestic Violence legislation.
- **Use of informal spaces.** Working through and/or in alliance with politically accepted and influential individuals are strategically applied by CSOs at all levels to get access to influence and policy dialogue. Likewise, strong leadership has in many cases shown to be of crucial importance, as it increases the CSOs' visibility and likelihood to gain attention. Claimed spaces may change over time and become formalised, once the dialogue is established and accepted by government.
- **Providing evidence.** Research and advocacy organisations, mainly in Maputo, have consistently engaged in preparing evidence, which has served as a strong knowledge base for the policy dialogue and advocacy undertaken by CSOs. Examples are documentation on incidents of domestic violence, as well as documentation on (district) budget expenditures and implementation.
- **Identifying common cause** (e.g. small farmers' economic interests, children's and women's rights, improved education) is a strengthening factor for mobilisation of CS, where the focus area is clear. In the Domestic Violence legislation case, value could have been added to this process if other CSOs outside the women's rights movement working in complementary areas had been engaged.

The two case studies of policy dialogue processes have revealed very distinct features in terms of invited/claimed spaces, government/CS initiative, role of DPs, geographical outreach and time span. However, both processes have faced similar challenges in terms of constraints encountered, enabling and disabling factors, government reactions to confrontation and political control, as well as limited and not always sufficiently professional internal capacity of the CSOs involved. Common features in terms of process outcome are the recognition of CSOs as dialogue partners, credit for solid evidence and research documentation, strengthened position as a result of alliances with other actors, including other CSOs, ICOSOs, DP-embassies and media. Both processes also demonstrate that continued attention from CS is important, as momentum is easily lost. The case on Domestic Violence-legislation is illustrative, as there is still an alarming need for follow-up and monitoring of law enforcement for the process to lead to lasting policy changes.

The study has not identified any particular cases, where CSOs have chosen not to get involved in policy dialogue. However, the issue of non-involvement is related to the general problem of poverty, which influences negatively on the engagement of citizens in political issues. Many local level organisations and associations fail to prioritise political debate not related to their specific interest, when they face serious problems of malnutrition and other deprivations. Consequently, organisations defending economic interests e.g. the small farmers' associations are perceived as more relevant as other forms of organisations at local level.

8.2. Enabling and disabling conditions

The environment in which CS operates in Mozambique has three distinct dimensions important for creating an enabling environment: Legal, political and financial freedoms. Each of these dimensions is, however, characterised by enabling and disabling factors, and also other factors are of importance.

- **Legal freedoms.** The legal rights to association, freedom of expression and the engagement of citizens and CS in governance are formally secured through legislation. However, there are several challenges that hinder the operation of CSOs such as the poor performance of the justice institutions, the legislation on associations, which does not match the current dynamics of the growing CS in terms of registration, types of CSOs and the taxation system. CSOs are for instance required to link to a line ministry and are hence primarily regarded as service delivery mechanisms, rather than independent policy-oriented organisations. Furthermore, organisations outside the urban centres face serious bureaucratic hurdles to register, involving long-distance travel to district or provincial capitals, costs and often delays with disqualifying consequences.
- **Freedom of expression** is secured through the constitution and the media law. However, journalists continue to be at risk of harassment and threats, which again is a disabling factor in relation to providing unbiased and accurate information and a hindrance for covering presumably government critical activities as often associated with CSOs. Community radios have played an important role in dissemination of information in both case studies, and have in some cases also served to raise critical debate and promote dialogue with government. Work through community radios is further an efficient means to address the need for increased access to information, necessary for solid engagement in policy dialogue at local level.
- **Political freedoms.** Policy dialogue in Mozambique is influenced by the disabling factors emerging from the political environment. The formal multi-party constitution of Mozambique allows for political freedom, and there are several institutions designated to enhance policy dialogue and involvement of citizens, demonstrating Government's official willingness to enter into dialogue. However, the political legacy and the gradual regression towards a de facto one-party system points in the opposite direction and is a serious disabling factor for CSOs to critically engage in policy dialogue. Several examples of intimidation and shrinking political space were identified during the study just as studies have documented that formal, invited spaces for dialogue have yielded very little

results. This is however also partly due to lack of capacity, fact-based policies and professionalism among CSOs to engage in policy dialogue on a qualified level.

- **Financial freedoms.** CSOs are quite free to raise funds from different sources to pursue their objectives. In practice however, they are restricted to seek foreign funding and hence constrained by international donor agencies' strategic priorities, which may be rapidly changing due to prevailing political fashions in the home country. This can make it hard for CSOs to maintain their strategic choices, as they need to accommodate to such changes to secure continued funding. At the individual level, organisations and their members – especially outside the urban centres – struggle with poverty so that many CBOs fail to embrace issues of political importance, as their members face problems of lack of food and drinking water, malnutrition and other deprivations.
- **Low human and financial capacity** is a common impediment on CSOs ability to engage in policy dialogue. Many organisations do not have the academic capacity to engage in complicated issues (e.g. budget monitoring, legislation) or they may not have time available for the often lengthy dialogue events and processes as their financial resources are often scarce, not allowing for participation in activities that involve e.g. travel. CSOs have recently tried to mitigate the lack of technical capacity to engage in policy dialogue, e.g. through technical working groups / networks at provincial level.
- **Contextual knowledge** is of crucial importance to understand the specific conditions under which CS engage in policy dialogue takes place.
- **Social and cultural norms** can still play a strong negative role, as demonstrated in the case study on the process of enforcement and acceptance of the domestic violence law. Although the law was passed both duty bearers and the majority of the population do not act as expected, influenced by existing social norms and aggravated by - in certain cases - the lack of information and training¹⁴¹ For CSOs it is important to strike a balance between promoting overall rights such as demonstrated in the domestic violence legislation and not offending local social norms as this will undermine the authority of the organisations which may be seen as stooges for foreign norms or even interests.

8.3. DP policies and strategies

The study has identified a number of key issues relating to DP support which are crucial for the successful support to CS engagement in policy dialogue.

- **Harmonisation of support.** In spite of the intentions of various international and bilateral CS strategies and principles of good donorship, the study has flagged that harmonisation is still not explored to its full potential. This is particularly the case when it comes to establishing mechanisms for CS support among international donors. Several bilateral initiatives and funding modalities, as well as a number of parallel multi-donor funding mechanisms can be found in Mozambique¹⁴² and CSOs highlight the heavy transactional costs related to elaboration of applications, reports and accounts following different donors' formats and requirements.
- **Efficiency¹⁴³ of joint funding mechanisms.** Funding mechanisms are often managed by intermediaries – either ICSOs or private consultants. Although this may mean added value in terms of delegated responsibility and professionalization, cost efficiency should be a concern when operating through intermediaries, as the “value chain” can be very long from back-donor, through ICSO's to

¹⁴¹ As an example, a police officer interviewed in Gaza province stated that “Women use the law as a mean of “revenge” against their husbands..

¹⁴² It is a fact that DPs are hesitant to join funding mechanisms established by others or to let new DPs in. For instance has MASC, which was established by DFID and Irish Aid, only recently opened for additional DPs (USAID) to join; Danida has been hesitant to get involved with MASC; Programa AGIR is to a certain extent overlapping with MASC in support to democracy and governance; in the field of HIV/AIDS, several funding arrangements exists. Etc.

¹⁴³ It is still very early to expect results related to effectiveness of joint funding mechanisms.

national CSOs or CBOs before they finally reach its end beneficiaries. **Alignment to CSOs own agenda and systems.** DPs are often hesitant to provide core funding to CSOs; support is short-term and there are demands for specific reporting and accounting which do not aligning to existing systems. The lack of core funding makes it difficult for CSOs to adhere to their own strategic priorities and to retain staff, which is also a consequence of short-term funding. The specific reporting requirements of each DP imply high transaction costs for the CSOs in terms of time spent. Supporting CSOs own agenda's will allow for CS to take lead in policy dialogue with government and counterbalance the risk of dominance by either DPs or ICSOs. Alignment is further important in terms of allowing local CS and not DP priorities to set the agenda.

- **Diversification.** While harmonization and alignment is important, diversification has also been identified as an important element in DPs support strategies. This includes e.g. seed money for identification of new initiatives and up-coming CSOs, new issues of importance (e.g. extractive industries), targeted geographical support to ensure a decentralized focus, as well as funds for CSOs in specific sectors where also government is supported..
- **Critical policy dialogue with GOM on CS issues.** DPs are perceived as being too soft and conflict-avoiding when engaging in policy dialogue with GOM. It is also a concern raised by CS that the recent years' focus on macro-economic support has diverted donors' attention for example on the district development funds, which in numeric values are insignificant compared to GBS and SBS, but in relative terms impact directly on citizens' lives and opportunities for engagement in governance issues. DPs are accused of gradually having lost grip with reality outside Maputo, and consequently, dialogue with GOM does not address issues of direct importance for CS.

9. Lessons learned

9.1. CSO strategies

CSOs apply different strategies over time and are aware of the need to diversify to reach out to different segments and targets in the government structure, as well as to society in general. CSO strategies are direct or indirect, as well as formal and/or informal.

The main lessons learned on effective and operational strategies are:

- **Establishment of platforms, networks and coalitions**, which secure a diversity of capacities, have shown good results, as they ensure a diversified approach, drawing upon different actors' capacities.. There is, however, an inbuilt risk of "petrification" (i.e. the platforms stop being a dynamic forum with active participation of its members) and co-opting of the leaders once the platforms/networks/coalitions become formal and well-consolidated.
- **Collaboration with media** is of specific importance. State, government and party controlled media is often not the best partner for CSOs, whereas community radio stations and the independent written media have been responsive and often taken a proactive role in creating space for CS to engage in dialogue (and confrontation).
- **Providing evidence and documentation.** Research, documentation, publications, seminars, events etc. are all important elements of the CSO strategy of enhancing access to information, creating transparency and providing basis for decision-making by government.
- **"Carpe diem".** It has shown to be of major importance that CSOs themselves are aware of the contextual dynamic and know not only how but also WHEN to react to make the best possible results. The Domestic Violence legislation case has provided evidence on this, where the coalition on several occasions acted tactically to make the best of the given political moment.
- **Engagement in direct and informal policy dialogue** (lobby) is an instrument used mainly by urban-based research and advocacy organisations, which have a substantial evidence base, as well as an extended network among influential individuals within the government (and party) structure, Parliament and media. However, also local level influential leaders and personalities are addressed by local CSOs to obtain influence.
- **Maximum exposure.** The political environment in Mozambique is deteriorating and critical voices increasingly experience intimidation and threats. Public exposure – either through linkages to selected influential individuals or pro-CSO representatives of the ruling party – has however yielded good results.
- **International partnerships** is a dimension of exposure (and protection), but is also a strategic approach to strengthen the credibility and confidence of the national CSO. Many CSOs see international partnerships as an important channel for access to information.
- **Strengthening internal capacity** through training and exchange is an important strategic choice of many CSOs, acknowledging the limitations that low capacity imposes on their ability to effectively engage in policy dialogue. This is an area where ICSO's can play an important role to support CSOs.
- **Diversity in activities.** The use of different activities to advocate for a cause or disseminate information is a useful way of assuring a broad scope for a specific cause. In addition to the activities mentioned above (research, documentation etc.), also community mobilization, marches and protests, theatre etc. are used by CSOs to engage in policy dialogue.

9.2. DP support strategies

The findings of the present evaluation call attention to the need for DPs and ICSOs to rethink and refocus their support to CS engagement in policy dialogue by addressing some of the structural impediments. The main lessons and recommendations on DP support to CSOs engagement in policy dialogue are:

- **A Rethink of the aid architecture** is strongly needed when it comes to efficient support to CS policy dialogue. There is a need for a joint broad and in-depth vision for CS in Mozambique, as well as for understanding the diverse roles of different segments of CS.¹⁴⁴ DPs need to be risk willing and support innovation in terms of modalities and CS actors. Innovation in outreach might include more funding for non-traditional CSOs, including movements, minor ad hoc initiatives and groups, professional bodies, diaspora groups, trade unions etc. Innovation is also required in investigating the application of new technologies by CSOs and in CS support.¹⁴⁵
- **Harmonisation** of DP support to CS - in terms of choice of modalities and coordination of efforts- is strongly needed. Bilateral and joint strategies support this in principle, but there is also a need for a joint, broad and in-depth understanding of CS development. The absence of a shared vision hampers long-term strategic action by both CS itself and DPs.
- **Joint funding mechanisms** are important efforts in harmonised support to CS. However, attention must be paid to secure cost efficiency (avoiding long “value chains”). It is recommended that research on cost-efficiency of joint mechanisms is undertaken. Support through ICSOs as intermediaries represents added value in terms of exposure, protection and capacity building and is an important vehicle to enhance outreach at decentralized level.
- **Strengthening ownership** also means providing long-term core funding will allow the CSOs to plan and develop their own programmes and develop their organisations within a reasonable time horizon. For the major national CSOs, basket-funding arrangements and donor coordination and use of joint formats among the various DPs.
- **Long-term perspective:** Support to CS suffers from project thinking and short term perspectives. Long-term engagement is required to secure true impact and development of independent CS agendas. Long-term support should be flexible in terms of follow-up on previous DP-priorities and avoid abandonment, once the issue is no longer a first priority.
- **Vertical links to regional and local organisations.** The tendency to focus support on a limited number of high-performing, often urban-based CSOs may cause a distorted development of CS. It is important to recognize networks and umbrella organisations as representatives of their member organisations and pay attention to the importance of vertical links between grass-root level organisations and CBOs and national level advocacy organisations if strong national advocacy and policy dialogue is to be developed and supported.

¹⁴⁴ The need for a joint vision for CS in Mozambique has been brought forward by both DPs and ICSOs during interviews. It is understood not as a need for a master plan, but for a shared understanding of characteristics, challenges and strengths of the Mozambican CS.

¹⁴⁵ An interesting example of new initiatives in the field of CS-support is the recent MASC support to budget monitoring at sub-district level by use of mobile phones. With the use of new technologies, citizens are directly engaged.

Annexes

Annex 1. Terms of Reference for country study

Background

For information regarding the general background to the evaluation of Civil Society engagement in Policy Dialogue, reference is made to Inception Report (draft 12.10.2011) and overall TOR for the evaluation.

The present TOR are specifically made to guide the team for the case study in Mozambique.

The three annexes are important instruments for guidance of the team's work and for understanding the assignment:

Annex 1: Evaluation Framework (revised November 2011), which lists the questions to be answered by the study as well as the evidence and sources required. The evaluation framework is as a standard tool for study design which is useful for two reasons:

it provides an effective way of structuring issues, questions, indicators and methods in a comprehensive way

it is also useful as a tool to present the issues and questions to be covered by this evaluation to stakeholders, thus enabling informed discussion around focus and potential gaps.

Elaboration of the evaluation framework is an iterative process to increase focus and clarity through a consultative approach. It serves as the backbone orientation for the country team. The evaluation framework contains questions, comments for clarification and discussion as well as proposed indicators and methods.

Annex 2: Conceptual framework for case study analysis,¹⁴⁶ which provides the guidance for case study analysis, as well as an overview of key concepts and linkages for the evaluation and clarifies key concepts related to policy dialogue. The conceptual framework includes a step-by-step overview of the case study phase.

Annex 3: Report outline provides the structure for the case study report and links the different issues with the Evaluation Questions. It also contains indications on length of chapters and annexes to be included.

Objective

The purpose of the case studies is to provide an in-depth analysis of how CSOs engage in policy dialogue, what outcomes they have achieved and what factors have contributed to them.

Scope

The main focus of the evaluation is **the effectiveness of CSOs in policy dialogue**. More specifically, the evaluation focuses on three key issues:

- **CSO effectiveness:** What are the ways in which CSO engagement in (country) policy dialogue is most effective - and what does this mean for how this can be facilitated in the future?¹⁴⁷
- **Enabling and disabling conditions:** What are the enablers and barriers to CSO engagement (at country level) - and how could they be addressed?
- **DP policies and strategies:** How can DPs most effectively support and facilitate (directly and indirectly) increased CS engagement at country level?

Based on the identification of a long-list of policy processes and discussions during the Scoping Exercise in Mozambique, two policy processes have been selected by the Evaluation Management Group¹⁴⁸ for the

¹⁴⁶ Latest version from 15.11.11.

¹⁴⁷ The term "CSO effectiveness" emphasises the effectiveness of CSOs as development actors (see OECD 2010, Civil society effectiveness).

¹⁴⁸ Evaluation Management Group meeting on 27.10.2011.

case study: 1) District Planning & Budget Monitoring, and 2) Legislation on Domestic Violence (Access to Justice)..

Sources of information and approach

The two policy processes cover a broad range of direct & formalized/invited spaces, direct and informal dialogue and indirect contribution to dialogue. The cases will include data collection at national/central, provincial and local level to ensure that a decentralized focus is included. The District Planning & Budget Monitoring policy process is an on-going and repetitive process, whereas the Legislation on Domestic Violence (Access to Justice) is a campaign, which was concluded by the adoption of the law in 2009. Challenges now include dissemination of knowledge about the law and monitoring of law enforcement.

The matrix below is a first overview of possible stakeholders and informants to be interviewed. One of the first tasks of the team will be to identify interviewees from the two policy processes:

Policy processes	District planning & budget monitoring	Access to Justice / Domestic Violence legislation
a) Stakeholder to be consulted		
CSOs	<p><u>Central level:</u> CIP, Sociedade Aberta, Cruziero Azul, AMODE, GMD</p> <p><u>Local level:</u> local CBOs and networks/umbrellas, community members engaged in IPCCs, community radios, local traditional authorities Facilidade, Nampula; Margarido, Chimoio</p>	<p><u>Central level:</u> WLSA, AMMCJ, LDH, Forum Mulher, N’weti, MULEIDE</p> <p><u>Local level:</u> formal and informal women’s groups, local CBOs and networks/umbrellas, community members engaged in IPCCs, community radios, local traditional authorities</p>
Others	<p><u>Government sector:</u> MPD, MAE, Provincial Government departments, District Administration, Provincial Secretariat; provincial planning unit</p> <p><u>Parliament:</u> commissions on local government, MPs from different political parties engaged in specific working groups</p> <p><u>Academia:</u> CEA,</p> <p><u>Key informants:</u> individual consultants with specific knowledge (IESE/Castelo-Branco; Annie Nielsen, Masala Lda....)</p> <p><u>Media:</u> TVM and RM – selected journalists, screening of specific programs (e.g. “Ver Mocambique”, “Polo de Desenvolvimento”);</p> <p><u>ICSOs:</u> Programa AGIR (Sweden), MASC (DFID CS-funding mechanism), Helvetas, Ibis</p> <p><u>DPs:</u> joint working group on decentralisation, UNCDF, UNDP, WB, EU, SDC, GIZ etc.</p>	<p><u>Government sector:</u> MMAS, MJ, Provincial Government departments, District Administration, District Courts and police authorities</p> <p><u>Parliament:</u> commissions on local government, MPs from different political parties engaged in women’s issues</p> <p><u>Academia:</u> CEA</p> <p><u>Key informants:</u> individual consultants with specific knowledge (Alicia Calane.....)</p> <p><u>Media:</u> TVM, RM - selected journalists, screening of specific programs (e.g. “Lei & Ordem” / TVM; “Agora sao elas” / Miramar); cultural groups / theater groups</p> <p><u>ICSOs:</u> MASC (DFID CS-funding mechanism)</p> <p><u>DPs:</u> joint working group on gender, UN Women etc.</p>

b) Other information (documents etc)	Evaluation reports, studies, articles etc from organisations and agencies involved in district planning support	Evaluation reports, studies, articles etc from organisations and agencies involved in women's programs Data from courts on domestic violence cases, study reports, articles Statistics from INE
c) Cross checking	Verification workshop with key stakeholders at central level Systematic tracing of acquired information to follow-up on new information	
d) Practicalities: how this can be done within the available time and resource	Division of work within the team (Padil responsible for District Planning & Budget Monitoring; Paula & Sandra responsible for Domestic Violence Legislation (Access to Justice)) Telephone interviews with informants from Central and Northern Provinces to secure a broader range of informants than the field visits to Southern provinces allow for Rapid interview matrix based on Evaluation Framework (key questions cum report format) Frequent team meetings to follow-up, cross-check and decide on new tracks to follow Report formats and frequent team meetings will secure that collected information is registered and shared within the team.	

Activities and responsibilities

Within the overall process for the case study (see annex 3, figure 3), the team will take the following **steps**:

- Preparation and document review; (document findings on results in template provided)
- Select key stakeholders and informants to be interviewed (Step 3)
- Individual interviews - based on Evaluation Framework, interview guidelines and reporting matrices (Step 4)
- Field visit to Maputo, Gaza and/or Inhambane provinces to conduct interviews
- Verification workshops with CSOs involved in the two selected policy processes (Step 5 and 8)
- Team reflections and analysis (Steps 6-7)
- Debriefing with involved DPs (Step 9)

The division of tasks and responsibilities within the team will be as follows:

Team leader (Bente)	Overall coordination and guidance of team; initiatives on discussions and team meetings; secure consistency with evaluation framework and conceptual framework; presentation of draft findings at verification workshop; compilation of draft report.
Team member (Padil)	Responsible for District Planning & Budget Monitoring policy process; undertake interviews, participate in field visit, team meetings, verification workshops and debriefings; provide written input to draft report.
Team member (Paula)	Responsible for Access to Justice & legislation of Domestic Violence policy process; undertake interviews, participate in field visit, team meetings, verification workshops and debriefings; provide written input to draft report.
Team assistant (Sandra)	Assist in undertaking interviews, participate in field visits and team meetings; responsible for writing up summaries.

For each of the policy processes, the team members will:

- Conduct documents review and preparatory interviews, to identify policy changes and key actors
- Identify CSOs for case studies
- Identify additional stakeholders and informants from among government, INGOs, media, academia, individual key informants etc.
- Join team meeting to tentatively formulate the specific theory of change (rationale) which has guided the different actors in engaging in policy dialogue
- With point of departure in Evaluation Framework for the Case Study Phase (Annex 1) undertake interviews, focus groups and collect information / data related to the policy processes
- Conduct community and/or institutional visits to crosscheck information, as feasible and appropriate
- Join team meetings to analyze the available information and data by applying the instruments presented in the toolbox below
- Organize verification workshop which includes a wider group of stakeholders (e.g. INGOs, media, academia, parliamentarians, donors, individual key informants)
- Join final debriefing/presentation with participating donors

Team

The Mozambique case study team consists of the following members:

- **Bente Topsøe-Jensen** – team leader
- **Paula Monjane** – team member
- **Padil Salimo** – team member
- **Sandra Manuel** – team assistant
- **Maya Lima** – logistic support (AustralCOWI)

Regarding the practical arrangements:

- The arrangements regarding the input from Maya Lima will be discussed with COWI/AUstralCOWI.
- Due to unforeseen unavailability of Paula Monjane from 14-26th November, Sandra Manuel will undertake the first part of the assignment under the supervision of the team leader and with frequent contact to Paula. Mechanisms will be established to secure that all information is captured, registered and later shared with Paula: interview summary formats and frequent team discussions. Paula will participate in the last part of the field work from 26th November and be responsible for deliverables on the Legislation on Domestic Violence policy process.
- Field visit to 1-2 provinces (Maputo, Gaza and/or Inhambane) will be carried out by Bente, Padil and Sandra.
- The country team will work in close coordination with the lead donor in Mozambique (Danish Embassy).
- A division of tasks will be applied, albeit the team will work in close dialogue throughout the case study period:
 - District planning and budget monitoring / Padil Salimo
 - Legislation on domestic violence / access to justice / Paula Monjane
 - Interviews and field visit / Sandra Manuel

Timing and time input

The Mozambique country case studies will take place in the period of 14.11 to 7.12.2011. A debriefing meeting with involved development partners is scheduled for 5.12.2011 in Maputo.

The country team leader will be in Mozambique from 16.11 – 6.12.2011. The overall team leader for the evaluation, Johanna Pennarz will join the Mozambique team in Maputo in the period of 28.11- 2.12.2011.

Time input per team member is planned as follows:

TASK	Bente	Paula/Sandra	Padil
Preparation – elaboration of TOR, selection of CSOs and policy processes, detailed planning, participation in MG meeting and video conference	5		
Preparation – including understanding of approach & methodology, and setting up meetings with selected CSOs and other key informants. <i>Paula should be lead on setting up meetings, interviews and visits.</i>		1	1
Field work – interviews with selected informants, team analysis and discussions, preparation of notes. Field work may include a couple of days in Maputo, Gaza and/or Inhambane Provinces (<i>to be decided</i>).	10	10	10
Team analysis and discussions	2	2	2
Report writing – providing written input to team leader as per agreed schedules		5	5
Compilation of country case studies report	10		
TOTAL time input	27	18	18

▪ Work calendar

Date	Task / activity	Comments / responsible	
14.11	Preparation	Paula, Padil and Maya. <i>Detailed information and guidance from Bente will follow.</i>	
15.11			
16.11		Bente arrival Maputo	
17.11	09.00 – 12.00 Team kick-off meeting	Venue: AustralCOWI	
	14.00 – 15.30 Kick-off meeting with involved DPs	Venue: Danish Embassy	
	15.30 – 17.00 Team detailed planning		
18.11	Mobilization; identification of sources; detailed planning; first interviews in Maputo		
19.11			
20.11			
21.11	Interviews in Maputo; telephone interviews; data collection		
22.11	Team discussions (later afternoon)		
23.11	Field visit to provinces	Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane – still being planned in detail	
24.11			
25.11			
26.11			Return from field trip
27.11			
28.11	Interviews in Maputo; telephone interviews; data collection	Johanna to work with DPs	Johanna arrives in Maputo
29.11	Team analysis		Gitte arrives in Maputo

	Late afternoon/Evening – Gitte, Johanna & Bente catch-up		
30.11	Team analysis and discussions Gitte & Johanna to join in afternoon session of team discussions		Gitte to meet with Danish Embassy (and other DPs?)
1.12	Verification workshops with CSOs involved in the two policy processes: 09.00 – 12.00 District planning and budget monitoring 13.30 – 16.30 Legislation on domestic violence / Access to justice		Venue: Danish Embassy
2.12	Additional interviews in Maputo; telephone interviews; data collection Team analysis		Johanna departure
3.12			
4.12			
5.12	10.00 – 12.30 Debriefing with involved DPs		Venue: Danish Embassy
6.12	Team meeting – synthesis discussion & division of tasks		Bente departure from Maputo (late afternoon)
7.12	Paula and Padil writing input for draft report		
8.12	Bente writing draft report		
9.12			
10.12			
11.12			
12.12			
13.12	Final deadline for written input from Paula and Padil		
14.12	Bente writing draft report		
15.12			
16.12			
17.12			
18.12			
19.12	Submission of draft report from Bente to Johanna		
20.12	QA by ITAD and peer review by TLs from Uganda and Bangladesh		
21.12			
22.12			
23.12.	Feedback to Bente from ITAD		
4.1.	Final draft report to ITAD		
9.1.	Case country report to be submitted to Danida		

Outputs

The team will produce the following outputs:

- Debriefing presentation to development partners in Maputo by the end of the field work; tentatively scheduled for 5.12.2011
- Country team members written input to draft country report no later than 13.12.2011
- Draft country report according to proposed outline; submission scheduled for 20.12.2011
- Final draft country report based on comments from ITAD team leader and QA; submission scheduled for 5.1.2012

The final draft country report will be submitted to Danida by 9.1.2012.

Report outline is enclosed as Annex 3.

Annex 2. Evaluation of Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue - Evaluation Framework (revised Nov 2011)

Evaluation questions	Indicators (specific evidence required)	Data sources and methods for data collection	Reporting format
<p>2. Enabling environment for CSO engagement in policy dialogue and key changes over the past five years within case study countries?</p> <p>2.1. The legal, political and financial freedoms of CSOs and how they have changed over the last 5 years</p> <p>2.2. The relationship between government and civil society in practice – including the power dynamics at play and how this has changed over the last 5 years</p> <p>2.3. Key issues determining the enabling environment</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of factors that contribute to CSO effectiveness in the country context • Changes of the last 5 years • Analysis of power relations and how these affect the space for policy dialogue • Use Checklist 3! 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country documents describing the legal and political framework for CSOs. • Existing analysis of enabling framework (from DPs, think tanks, CSOs) • CSO feedback on enablers and constraints 	Country report (revised from scoping study)
Level 3 (Case studies) – CSO effectiveness			
<p>CSO strategies:</p> <p>6. How do the CSOs (selected for case studies) engage in policy dialogue (within the chosen policy areas)?</p> <p>6.1. What strategies are used by CSOs to achieve their objectives on policy dialogue?</p> <p>6.2. What is the scope of policy dialogue? What does it cover?</p> <p>6.3. To what extent do CSO use networking or cooperation with other CSO as part of their strategies? Is there an advantage in having joint NGO platforms or does this rather dilute their impact on agenda setting?</p> <p>6.3. What is the intervention logic behind the CSO strategies/approach? What do they want to achieve and how?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Types of CSO strategies (see Q4) (Use Checklist 1!) • Theories of change for case study CSOs (Phase 2) • Analysis of policy dialogue space as part of the case study (Phase 2) • Whether NGO networks and platforms are effective for policy dialogue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSO strategy documents • CSO focus group discussions 	Country report
<p>Accountability and Legitimacy:</p> <p>7. To what extent is CSO engagement in policy dialogue supported</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whether the CSOs’ mandate supports engagement in policy dialogue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSO mission statements • CSO institutional visits and 	Country report

Evaluation questions	Indicators (specific evidence required)	Data sources and methods for data collection	Reporting format
<p>by their mandate?</p> <p>7.1. Whose interests do CSO engaged in policy dialogue represent? How do they obtain legitimacy?</p> <p>7.2. To what extent are CSOs engaging in policy dialogue accountable to their constituencies? How transparent are CSO procedures and operations? What are the feedback mechanisms?</p> <p>7.3. How do CSOs obtain legitimacy to speak for the people they claim to serve or represent? To what extent are CSOs' political demands supported by "numbers" (size of constituencies)?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whether there the CSOs are accountable to their constituencies on their engagement in policy dialogue • Whether the CSOs have established feedback mechanisms with their constituencies • Whether CSOs have the "critical mass" to support their political demands • Whether CSOs present the interests of poor and marginal groups 	<p>interviews</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crosschecking through interviews with groups representing CSO constituencies • Crosschecking through interviews with independent thirds (e.g. think tanks, parliamentarians) 	
<p>Results (Process outcomes and policy changes):</p> <p>11. How effective are the CSOs in asserting influence on government (at national and local level) through policy dialogue? How effective are CSOs in influencing policy change? How effective in holding government accountable for policy the implementation?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extent to which policies changes occurred in selected policy areas • Evidence that CSOs have been substantially engaged in policy dialogue • Evidence that CSOs contributed to policy change in selected policy areas • Evidence that CSOs are holding government to account for the implementation of policies • Use Checklist 2! 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of policy outcomes documented by CSO • Review of available analysis of policy processes (DP sources and evaluations; independent research and studies; media) • Stakeholder workshop (including government representatives, think tanks, parliamentarians, other relevant organisations etc.) to review policy change and contributions 	<p>Country report</p> <p>Separate documentation of process outcomes and policy changes (with evidence)</p> <p>Documentation of CSO workshop</p> <p>Documentation of stakeholder workshop</p>
<p>Results:</p> <p>12. How effective are the CSOs in achieving their own specific policy objectives?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that CSOs achieve their stated policy objectives • Cases where CSOs failed to achieve 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of results documented by CSOs • CSO focus groups (workshops), using process 	<p>Country report</p> <p>Documentation of CSO</p>

Evaluation questions	Indicators (specific evidence required)	Data sources and methods for data collection	Reporting format
	their objectives (and why)	analysis, theory of change. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crosscheck findings through stakeholder interviews/ workshop 	workshop Documentation of stakeholder workshop
Results: 13. What were the unexpected results of policy dialogue?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that CSOs have achieved results beyond their stated policy objectives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Same as Q11 	Same as above
Enabling and disabling factors: 14. What are the factors influencing whether CSOs engage in policy processes or not? Why are some CSOs who – given their constituency and profile could engage in policy work – not doing so?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key factors (drivers, breakers) influencing CSO engagement in policy processes • Practices that have enabled CSO outcomes in policy dialogue 	CSO workshops using tools such as - power cube - SWOT analysis - Force field analysis Synthesis of key factors determining outcomes of CSO engagement	Country report Documentation of CSO workshop
Enabling and disabling factors: 15. What are the main enabling and disabling factors that affect the relevance and effectiveness of CSOs in policy dialogue, both in general and in relation to CSOs own goals and objectives? (e.g. what role do aspects of the enabling environment, CSO capacity, resource constraints and degree of networking play?)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of enabling and constraining factors affecting CSO strategies and results • Use Checklist 4! 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Same as Q 15</i> 	Country report Using separate template on enabling factors (from scoping study)
Level 4 - DP support on policy dialogue (country level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 		
DP support: 17. How responsive are DP strategies to the priorities of the CSOs and what role did this play in the effectiveness of CSOs?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lessons (and examples) on responsive support; Lessons (and examples) on responsive support: what worked and what didn't? 	Feedback from CSOs and other stakeholders (Country web survey)	Country report (Feedback form/survey for synthesis)
DP support:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whether DP strategies support 	Feedback from CSOs and other	Country report

Evaluation questions	Indicators (specific evidence required)	Data sources and methods for data collection	Reporting format
<p>18. What value do specific support strategies add? In particular, what value does support provided through different channels (Northern CSOs, local CSOs) add? What value does DP engagement in policy dialogue add?</p>	<p>diversity of CSOs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whether DP strategies support learning, innovation and focus on results • Whether partnerships with Northern CSOs provide opportunities for networking, dialogue and information sharing? 	<p>stakeholders (Country web survey)</p>	<p>(Feedback form/survey for synthesis)</p>
<p>DP support:</p> <p>8. What is the relevance of DP support vis-à-vis CSO priorities on policy dialogue?</p> <p>8.1. What do DP perceive as the main needs of CSOs, particularly in relation to policy dialogue?</p> <p>8.2. To what extent has DP support been driven by CSO demands?</p> <p>8.3. To what extent does DP support respond to changing conditions for policy dialogue? To what extent is DP support informed by sound contextual analysis?</p> <p>8.4. To what extent do DPs pursue their priorities through support of CSO engagement in policy dialogue (whose agenda)? Or where relevant: do what extent do Northern CSOs pursue their agenda through cooperation with local partners (who sets the agenda)?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whether DP support is aligned to CSO priorities (priorities evidenced through CSO internal strategies, planning and communication) • Whether DPs are responsive to CSOs demands • Evidence of DP analysis and response to changing framework conditions • Cases where CSO priorities changed in response to DP support • Whether DPs (or Northern CSOs) pursue their strategic priorities through CSO support in policy dialogue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DP and CSO interviews • (Country web survey) 	<p>Country report</p> <p>(Feedback form/survey for synthesis)</p>
<p>DP support:</p> <p>16. To what extent have DP support strategies addressed the enabling and constraining factors that CSO face?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that DP strategies have addressed those enabling and constraining factors 	<p>Feedback from CSOs and other stakeholders (Country web survey)</p>	<p>Country report</p> <p>(Feedback form/survey for synthesis)</p>

Annex 3. Itinerary

Date	Task / activity	Comments / responsible
14.11	Preparation	Paula, Padil and Maya. <i>Detailed information and guidance from Bente will follow.</i>
15.11		
16.11		Bente arrival Maputo
17.11	09.00 – 12.00 Team kick-off meeting	Venue: AustralCOWI
	14.00 – 15.30 Kick-off meeting with involved DPs	Venue: Danish Embassy
	15.30 – 17.00 Team detailed planning	
18.11	Mobilization; identification of sources; detailed planning	
19.11	09H00 – Teresinha da Silva, WLSA (SM+BTJ)	
	12H30 – Maj-Lis Foller, University of Gothenburg (BTJ)	
20.11		
21.11	11H00 ACREMO (PS)	14H00 MMAS (SM+BTJ)
	15H00 Sociedade Aberta (PS)	17H00 Alicia Calane (SM+BTJ)
22.11	08H30 AMODE (PS)	11H00 MULEIDE (SM)
	10H00 Ibis (PS)	14H00 Fórum Mulher (SM+BTJ)
	14H00 Sociedade Aberta (PS)	16H00 UN Women (SM)
23.11	<u>Xai-Xai, Gaza Province (BTJ, PS, SM)</u> DPPF Planning Unit DPSMAS Comando da Policia / Gabinete de Atendimento FONGA	Accommodation in Chokwe 2 nights
24.11	<u>Guija District (BTJ, PS, SM):</u> District Permanent Secretary SDSMAS – Médico Chefe CCD CBOs INGOs Comando da Policia – Gabinete de Atendimento	<u>Chokwe district (BTJ, PS, SM):</u> Radio Vembe NGO platform
25.11	<u>Moamba District (BTJ, PS, SM):</u> District Permanent Secretary SDSMAS CCD ACREMO Cruz Vermelha de Mocambique Comando de Policia	

26.11	15H30 Catch-up Paula, Sandra & Bente		
27.11	18H30 Johanna & Bente – up-date		
28.11	09H00 John Barnes /Nautilus (BTJ) 09H00 Albachir Macassare, Ministerio de Justica (PM) 11H00 Paulo Assuguje, GELA (PM) 11H30 Fernanda Farinha / Cafe Acacia (BTJ) 14H00 Custodio Duma Vasco / RDE (BTJ) 14H00 N’weti (PM) Helvetas (PS) CIP (PS) ADELNA Chimoio (telephone PS) MAGARIRO Chimoio (telephone PS)	Johanna to work with DPs	28.11 Johanna arrives in Maputo
29.11	10.00 – 12.00 INGO focus group verification at AustralCOWI (BTJ) 16H00 Ana Loforte / Jardim dos Namorados (BTJ) 17H00 Paula & Bente catch-up 19H00 – Johanna & Bente catch-up LIMUSICA Chimoio (telephone PM)		
30.11	07H00 – Inez Hackenberg NOVIB (BTJ) 09H00 - Team analysis and discussions 14H30 Paula joins Johanna to join in afternoon session of team discussions		
1.12	Verification workshops with CSOs involved in the two policy processes: 09.00 – 12.00 District planning and budget monitoring 13.30 – 16.30 Legislation on domestic violence / Access to justice		Venue: Danish Embassy
2.12	Additional interviews in Maputo; telephone interviews; data collection Team analysis		Johanna departure
3.12			
4.12	09H00 – 12H00 Team discussions and summary		
5.12	08H00 – 09H00 – MASC interview (PS + BTJ) 10.00 – 12.30 Debriefing with involved DPs Afternoon – team balance and summary		Venue: Danish Embassy
6.12	09H00 – 10H30 – WWF (BTJ) 10H30 – 11H30 – Decentralisation Working Group (BTJ)		Bente departure from Maputo (late afternoon)

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Annex 5. Rationale and approach for selection of policy areas

The initial long-list of key policy processes has been discussed extensively during all interviews and focus group discussions. The list has expanded and later been narrowed down to a prioritised short list (see *chapter 1.3 Methodology* above). At the debriefing meeting with involved DPs, the prioritised long-list included 21 policy processes of which 9 were subject for further analysis (in bold):

1. African Peer Review Mechanism
2. **PRSP/PARP formulation**
3. Sector working groups
4. **District planning and budget monitoring / LOLE / decentralisation/deconcentration**
5. Revision of the Constitution
6. **Formulation of National Rural Development Strategy**
7. Education policy
8. **Land legislation & land management**
9. **Legislation on mega-projects / Extractive industries / Corporate Social Responsibility**
10. Legislation on anti-corruption
11. **Access to justice/ Human rights (Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights; nutrition) / Legislation on domestic violence / women's and children's rights / Family Law**
12. **Labour market legislation**
13. **Legislation on access to information**
14. Legislation on radio and television
15. Penal code auscultation
16. Revision of the electoral package
17. **Formulation of agricultural policies**
18. CS initiative for revision of NGO-legislation
19. International trade discussions
20. Social protection / social protection within regional integration
21. Social / spontaneous movements

Further analysis applying a decision matrix tool (see below) was based on specific and simple selection criteria:

Selection criteria:

- Relevance for the Mozambican development agenda. This included considerations on which policy processes had been important during the past five years, but with strong emphasis on areas, which are expected to be of key political interest in the coming years.
- Degree of CSO involvement in the policy process. Based on the classification of CSOs, it has been important to ensure that different kind of CS-actors are involved, i.e. the research and media organisations, sector specific advocacy groups, implementing service delivery organisations, CBOs and if possible, also INGOs.
- Inclusion of decentralized policy processes. Acknowledging the urban and capita bias of the Scoping Exercise, it has been important to look for policy processes, which have taken place and/or involved decentralized CS-actors.
- Type of policy dialogue. Invited space or civil society initiative.

- Availability of documentation is a pragmatic concern, which is nevertheless of importance, considering the limited time available for the field study.

Based on the short listing process, selection criteria and discussions with key informants and within the team, the **decision matrix** below was used to analyze the eligibility of a number of policy processes:

	Policy process	Relevance for Mozambican development agenda (national / local level)	Degree of CSO involvement (list involved CSOs)	Decentralisation	Which kind of space?	Availability of documentation of the process? (documents/reports/evaluations, key informants)
1	Development Observatories (PRSP/PARP formulation and PES implementation)	Pivot for the overall development agenda Annual planning cycle	<u>National level:</u> G-20, FDC, GMD, MEPT, CTA, Fórum Mulher, Abiodes, Cruzeiro de Sul..... <u>Provincial level:</u> FONGA (Gaza), Sociedade Aberta (Maputo), FORASC (Niassa)..... MPD, Provincial and district governments	Provincial Development Observatories	Invited space on initiative of GOM; influenced by donor agenda.	Several evaluations PQG PARP (indicators, M&E) Sector plans
2	District planning and budget monitoring	Annual planning cycle	CIP, Sociedade Aberta, MASC, Programa AGIR, Facilidade, PASC, CESC, District Platforms IPCCs, Cruzeiro do Sul Identification of specific actors depends on the local context (district) MPD, District Administration / Government	IPCC in all provinces and districts involving local CBOs	Invited space on initiative of GOM; influenced by donor agenda.	District Development Strategy, PESOD
3	Land legislation & land management	Land legislation in place, but the law enforcement is weak. Strong economic interests in accumulation of land property. Land administration is not facilitating registration of community property.	UNAC, ORAM, Cruzeiro do Sul, Centro de Formacao Juridica & Judiciaria, SCC – study in Niassa MCA – support, CCM Rede das Mulheres Rurais.....	UNAC has a national outreach and Farmers' Associations at district level engaged.	Strong CSO drive in the providing access to information and secure law enforcement.	Land policy, Land Law, Regulation of the Land Law, Urban Soil Regulations, Research Reports

			MINAG (Terras & Florestas)			
4	Access to justice / legislation on domestic violence	Access to justice may include different aspects related to Human rights	WLSA, AMMCJ, LDH, Forum Mulher	Outreach through provincial NGO platforms	Strong civil society initiative on auscultation process and involvement of CSOs.	Legislation on Family Law, Domestic Violence, Penas Alternativas, Inheritance Law
5	Legislation on mega-projects and extractive industries	Legislation on mega-projects under revision Economic and environmental development, including community level EITI – approval process – increased transparency / ant-corruption	IESE, CIP, Justica Ambiental, GMD, G-20, CTV, Livaningo, LDH, G-20 MICOA, MRN, MPD	Any examples of provincial/district organisations?	Top-driven process by “elite CSOs”.	The legal framework EITI report (2011) IESE research report A very recent process, which may not provide much basis for lesson learning.
6	Legislation on access to information	Expression of freedom – access to information	SNJ, MISA, Coligacao DAI Concelho Superior de Comunicacao Social, Parliament	Provincial NGO platforms	Top-driven process by “elite CSOs”.	Proposal of Law on Freedom of Information/Access to Information. A very recent process, which may not provide much basis for lesson learning.
7	Labor market legislation	Policy of access to employment	OTM, CONSILMO, SINTIA, CTA, MITRAB, Youth Associations		Limited CSO scope.	Law of Labor Employment and Professional Training Strategy
8	Legislation on agricultural policies	Support to agriculture as a priority sector of the	ROSA, ABIODES, ORAM, UNAC,		Not implemented.	Agrarian policy; rural development strategy.

		<i>economy</i>	<i>CCM, UEM</i>			<i>Too recent a process.</i>
9	<i>Formulation of National Rural Development Strategy</i>	<i>Pivotal for Development as 60% of population are in rural areas</i>	<i>UNAC, ORAM, G-20, AMODE, ABIODES, Cruzeiro do Sul</i>		<i>Not implemented.</i>	<i>Estratégia de Desenvolvimento Rural.</i>

Annex 6. Case study process and tools

Case 1: Summary of enabling and constraining factors

	INTERNAL	EXTERNAL
ENABLING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existence of Reserach and Advocacy Organizations (RAOs) ✓ Leadership character(openess) ✓ Internal capacity of CSOs (technical and financial) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existing legislation (spaces for dialogue) ✓ National leadership (discourse) ✓ Pressure from CSOs and national NGOs ✓ The role of independent media ✓ Open Presidency
CONSTRAINING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Weak technical capacity ✓ Cooptation of community leaders and diluted legitimacy ✓ Censorship and auto-censorship ✓ Weak notion of citizenship ✓ Low level of education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Leadership culture (the legacy) ✓ Political environment ✓ Changing donor priorities ✓ INGO visibility vs. local NGOs' legitimacy ✓ Limited access to information ✓ Lack of decision capacity at district level → low level of participation

Documentation of results (for each policy area) (please use Checklist 2 in the Concept Paper!)

Indicators	Evidence found	Data sources
<p>Process outcomes: How CSOs became more effective in policy dialogue e.g.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened organisational capacity • Strengthened alliances • Strengthened base of support 	<p>Platforms of CS in few provinces are structured in thematic groups with the objective to strengthen the capacity of the understanding and interpretation policy issues.</p> <p>Single organization like IESE, FDC, CIP, LDH have developed there organizational capacity due to direct support on their agenda by donors.</p> <p>Linkages with international organizations (CIP and LDH), and partnership between local organization (CIP with local organization at provincial level), also the well structured platforms.</p> <p>There's no much evidence of base support to civil society in Mozambique. Although the recognition that most of their intervention are in line with the preoccupation of the society.</p>	<p>Reports (ACS 2010, OSISA 2010, Francisco & Matter 2007), telephone interviews with members of NGOs in Manica and Nampula</p>
<p>Inputs into policy dialogue:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct inputs • Indirect inputs 	<p>Media intervention</p> <p>Research studies on budget monitoring and public expenditure tracking</p> <p>Support from DPs in the issues of governance</p>	<p>Reports and interviews</p>
<p>Change outcomes: What CSOs achieved as a result:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy changes • Shifts in norms and perceptions 	<p>Elaboration of the Strategic Plan for Development of Manica Province.</p> <p>Aproval of the Local Law and the IPCCs Guideline (Ministerial Diploma 67/2009).</p> <p>The approval of the methodology for management of the Fundo de Desenvolvimento Distrital (7 millions) the Ministry of Planning and Development.</p> <p>Improved the understanding of civil society as partners by the government instead of being considered as</p>	<p>Interview with Director of Magariro and ADELMA, Coordinator of Facilidade, Forquila (2010)</p> <p>ACS (2010)</p> <p>Verification Meeting (held in 01.12.2011)</p>

	<p>acting as opposition.</p> <p>The documents produced within the scope of budget monitoring both by CIP and by the Budget Monitoring Forum are being considered as important document for both the Administrative Tribunal and Assembly of the Republic.</p> <p>The designing of the Strategic Plan for Manica Province, which was formally presented in December 2011, was a process completely conducted by the civil society, as a result of the pressure by civil society in their expressed need to develop it.</p> <p>Members of government or government sector officials have been working in the scope of the civil society platforms side-by side with civil society teams. This was a unique experience that shows a break with the hostile practices of the past.</p>	
<p>Other results:</p>	<p>Government has become more concerned on the issues of anticorruption as a result of massive debate promoted by civil society mostly by CIP</p> <p>Government more concerned on the problematic of mineral resources and the need to review contracts with mega projects, issues raised frequently by IESE</p>	<p>Interview with Salvador Forquilha, from SDC; and Armando Ali from FACILIDADE</p>

Documentation of results – Domestic Violence Draft

Indicators	Evidence found	Data sources
<p>Process outcomes: How CSOs became more effective in policy dialogue e.g.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened alliances • Diverse activities (research evidence, media and communication, legal expertise, events etc) 	<p>The combination of the organizations that generated a unique and strong alliance, from research organizations, advocacy, community mobilization and communication. This same group is now concentrated to advocate for a law on the rights of women to abortion</p>	<p>Individual interviews with CSOs, government institutions, community representatives and key informants</p> <p>Documents and websites</p>
<p>Inputs into policy dialogue:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct inputs • Contacts with MPs and influential individuals 	<p>The women’s movement drafted the law that was later approved in parliament. There some changes in the law approved, but the draft was a civil society proposal</p>	<p>individual interviews with CSOs, government institutions, community representatives and key informants</p> <p>Verification workshop with selected key informants from CSOs, government, academia and Parliament</p>
<p>Change outcomes: What CSOs achieved as a result:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ law on domestic violence approved by the parliament in 2009 ▪ National Plan to prevent and fight domestic violence against women approved by the council of Ministers in 2008 	<p>The Law was approved and published in the <i>Boletim da República</i></p> <p><i>The National was approved by the council Ministers in 2008</i></p>	<p>BR nr.38, de 29 de Setembro de 2009, 2º suplemento</p> <p>Individual interviews with CSOs, government institutions, community representatives and key informants</p> <p>Verification workshop with selected key informants from CSOs, government, academia and Parliament</p>
<p>Other results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • public awareness raised • cases of domestic violence documented • Domestic violence recognized as a problem of the 'public sphere' • Established institutions / spaces to assist the victims (PRM, MMAS, Health, OSC) 	<p>-the campaign to pass the violence generated public debate in the country</p> <p>- there is an increase (progressive) involvement of the media (ex: news papers, media asking for capacity building)</p> <p>-institutions that assist victims were visited</p> <p>There is still a wide spread scepticism against the law, which is seen as indifferent to cultural and socio-economic practices</p>	<p>individual interviews , verification workshops, direct observation</p>

Enabling and disabling conditions for CSO engagement in policy dialogue – Checklist for review

What has helped or hindered CSO success in the past?	What are the enabling factors	What are the constraining factors	What has helped or hindered CSO success in the past?
<p>Legal and judicial system (assurance to settle conflicts involving CSOs)</p>	<p>The civil society after the independency emerged as part of the ruling party.</p> <p>The approval of the multiparty constitution in 1990 and the law of association in 1991 stimulated the emergency of CSOs.</p> <p>Lack of trust on CSOs undermined their success to intervene in the policy arena</p>	<p>Existence of a specific legislation for civil society association (right for free association)</p> <p>The existence of press freedom and Media Law (Law 18/91).</p>	<p>Pressure on CSOs to be associated with government organs.</p> <p>Harmful bureaucratic mechanisms in registering CSOs.</p> <p>Law of association broadly applied to all types of CSOs without distinction between those oriented to service delivery to that on advocacy and politics.</p> <p>Lack of knowledge on laws and procedures among CSO, and public servants.</p> <p>Lack of specific law on access to information undermines the Media and public exercise of press freedom and right to information.</p>
<p>Democratic parliamentary system and opportunities for CSO to build alliances with members of parliament</p>	<p>There were no experiences of alliance between parliament and civil society in the past. Political system was closed itself to party decision-making.</p>	<p>The new democratic system is open to civil society participation.</p> <p>The emergency of research advocacy organization together with the role of donors in support to civil society.</p>	<p>Barriers from political system of patronage and the historical path dependency of the one party system.</p> <p>Lack of political socialization.</p> <p>Weak civil society</p>
<p>Measures to promote philanthropy and corporate social responsibility</p>	<p>The philanthropy nature of civil society organization is still weak and corporate social responsibility is not a matter of</p>	<p>Informal civil society organizations in the community level have link on philanthropy nature of intervention.</p>	<p>CSOs lack of constituency</p>

	<p>concern.</p> <p>Organisations emerged often encouraged by the opportunities for funding.</p>		
<p><i>Power relations and power dynamics between government and CSOs</i></p>	<p>Government structure unable to deal with a critical constituency at lower level influenced intervention of NGOs focused on service delivery.</p> <p>Government relation with civil society based on distrust. Civil society accused to undermine government program or seen as opposition.</p>	<p>Institutions of citizen consultation and participation (such as ODs and IPCCs) help to repair broken links in the minimal representative policy process.</p> <p>Informal relation with political elite has been more efficient in terms of results achieved.</p> <p>Increasing recognition by government, of the role of civil society organization.</p>	<p>Administrative and political institutions influenced in particular ways by historical inheritance that reproduces unstable political culture and low tolerance of a contesting behavior.</p> <p>Strong control of the space of dialogue by government</p>
<p><i>Promotion and protection of human rights (including freedom of association, freedom of expression and access to information)</i></p>	<p>Low technical capacity of intervention on the human right issues by CSOs, and the lack of substantive number of NGOs intervening in this arena of policies.</p> <p>Very limited tolerance of the government to NGOs working on human rights issues</p>	<p>The increasing of CSOs working in advocacy and policy dialogue.</p> <p>Pressure by civil society organization working with human rights issues</p> <p>Quality of the report and campaign about human rights</p>	<p>Limitation of citizens and civil society organization to be involved in political issues, due to constraints of social and psychological intimidation.</p> <p>Strong limitations in access to information.</p> <p>Culture of secrecy within State bodies and public servants.</p>
<p><i>CSO specific legislation and taxation regulations</i></p>			<p>Lack of information and knowledge by CSOs about taxes.</p> <p>Bureaucracy limits the CSOs to access to</p>

			tax benefits.
<i>Regulations and norms promoting CSO transparency and accountability to their constituencies</i>	No specific regulation or norms focused on transparency and accountability of the CSO to their constituency	Donors effort to support CSOs in the base of its internal governance mechanisms	Emergency of CSOs based on existence of funding opportunity. Origin of CSOs non based on philanthropy nature.
<i>Access to funding (and role of donors)</i>	INGOs and donors have since funded local civil society organizations.	The emergency of new financial mechanisms with the aim to support civil society organization (MASC & AGIR). More awareness among donors in regard to the need for strengthens civil society capacity. The freedom of CSOs to raise funds from different sources.	High dependency on foreign funding. Non-existence or very weak budget management system and monitoring. Donors funding conditionality limit the capacity of CSOs to set their own agenda.

Enabling and disabling conditions for CSO engagement in policy dialogue – Domestic Violence Process

	What has helped or hindered CSO success in the past?	What are the enabling factors	What are the constraining factors
<i>Legal and judicial system (assurance to settle conflicts involving CSOs)</i>	- <u>Inexistence of a legal framework</u> until the approval of law in 2009 -	<u>International instruments informed the initiative</u> , which Mozambique ratify most of them	- <u>Domestic violence against women not seen as problem</u> and seen as private domain issue within the public sphere, media, parliament and government -
<i>Democratic parliamentary system and opportunities for CSO to build alliances with members of parliament</i>	- The Government of Mozambique is constitutionally a presidential system, where the president is directly elected by popular vote obeying the rule of an absolute majority. In addition to the president, there is also a National Assembly where the members are	- <u>Charismatic and influential leaders associated in the movement</u> -in the process of lobbying for law on domestic violence against women, the women’s movement, approached the commission dealing with women affairs in parliament to have them as allies. They use,	- <u>social norms as major constraint</u> - women in parliament, at first instance, did not agree with the proposal from civil society. This was very influenced by social norms, that put women - <u>weak links between MPs and</u>

	elected by political parties obey the system of Proportional Representation. Mozambique follows a closed list system to elect members of parliament, so the citizen votes in a party and not know the applicant of his constituency. This contributes to the fact that Members of Parliament are more loyal to their parties and with little connection to their constituencies-	charismatic and influential leaders such as Graça Machel (former Education Minister and widow of Samora Machel) to lobby and link with women in parliament	<u>constituencies</u> : links did not come from the potential link between MPs and their constituencies
<i>Measures to promote philanthropy and corporate social responsibility</i>		
<i>Power relations and power dynamics between government and CSOs</i>			
<i>Promotion and protection of human rights (including freedom of association, freedom of expression and access to information)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The current association´s legislation (Lei 8/91) does not match the dynamics of the growing civil society in term of registration, types of CSOs and taxation. - Despite the fact that the right to information is guaranteed in the Constitution, Mozambique does not have a specific legislation on access to information. 	-	<u>Citizens and CS Access to public information</u> is a major problem in Mozambique,
<i>CSO specific legislation and taxation regulations</i>			
<i>Regulations and norms promoting CSO transparency and accountability to their constituencies</i>	CSO don´t have a code of conduct or a self-regulation instrument mechanism to promote its own transparency and accountability		
<i>Access to funding (and role of donors)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -very concentrated in large NGOs -project funding perspective - 	-sufficient donors that supported the CS initiative	<u>Changing donor priorities and the rigid application</u> is an inhibiting factor for long-term engagement in CS development (ex. Approval of law

			important, but implementation is the issue!)
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Presentation 1 District Planning and Budget Monitoring 1 December 2011

<p style="text-align: center;">Avaliação do Engajamento da Sociedade Civil em Diálogo de Política</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Seminário de Verificação 01.12.2011</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><small>www.benteconsulting.dk</small></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Objectivo da Avaliação</p> <p>Objectivo geral da avaliação é obter um melhor entendimento sobre:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Como as OSCs se engajam no diálogo sobre políticas – Como melhor dar apoio eficaz nesta área <p>Objectivos específicos - entender melhor:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Estratégias e abordagens das OSCs 2. Contribuição das OSCs 3. Factores favoráveis e inibidores 4. Pontes fortes e fracos de estratégias de apoio de diferentes doadores 5. Lições aprendidas + recomendações <p style="text-align: center;"><small>www.benteconsulting.dk</small></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Quém, aonde e quando?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 doadores: Áustria, Canadá, Dinamarca, Finlândia, Suécia, Suíça • Bangladesh, Moçambique, Uganda • Maio 2011 – Agosto 2012 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Exercício de Escopo – Setembro 2011 – Fase do Estudo de Caso– Novembro-Dezembro 2011 – Relatório do Estudo de Caso – Janeiro 2012 <p style="text-align: center;"><small>www.benteconsulting.dk</small></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">2 Processos políticos</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p>I. Planificação distrital e monitoria orçamental</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Espaço convidado – Iniciativa do Governo – Descentralizado – Influenciado pelos doadores – Um processo em curso </div> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p>II. Processo para aprovação da Lei contra a Violência Doméstica</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Espaço conquistado – Iniciativa da OSCs – Nível nacional – Um processo confinado </div> </div> <p style="text-align: center;"><small>www.benteconsulting.dk</small></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Entrevistas</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p>50+ entrevistas</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – OSC e ONGs nacionais – Redes e plataformas – ONGs internacionais – Instituições do governo – nível nacional, provincial e distrital – Instituições de comunicação social – Académicos – Representantes de órgãos locais de comunidade – Parceiros de cooperação – Informantes chaves </div> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p>Entrevistas cara-à-cara:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Maputo – Xai-Xai – Chokwe – Guija – Moamba <p>Entrevistas telefónicas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Nampula – Chimoio – xxx </div> </div> <p style="text-align: center;"><small>www.benteconsulting.dk</small></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Objectivo do Seminário de Verificação</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Apresentar as constatações preliminares ➤ Abrir um espaço para reflexão conjunta ➤ Assegurar a recolha de opiniões qualificadas ➤ Eliminar dúvidas e mis-interpretações ➤ Verificar a informação recolhida e a sua interpretação <p style="text-align: center;"><i>.....sempre respeitando o pluralismo de opiniões</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><small>www.benteconsulting.dk</small></p>

As constatações – 3 assuntos

1. Factores do ambiente
2. Diálogo político
3. Ligando as estratégias aos resultados

www.benteconsulting.dk

1. FACTORES DO AMBIENTE

	INTERNOS	EXTERNOS
FAVORÉFEM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existência de Organizações de Pesquisa e Advocacia ✓ Carácter da liderança ✓ Capacidade interna das OSC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existência de legislação (espaços de diálogo) ✓ Liderança nacional ✓ Pressão das OSC ✓ Papel da media independente ✓ Presidência aberta
INIURIOFEM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Fraca capacidade técnica e habilidades ✓ Cooptação das lideranças comunitárias e diluição da legitimidade ✓ Auto-censura ✓ Cidadania frágil ✓ Baixa escolarização 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Cultura de liderança ✓ Ambiente político ✓ Mudança nas prioridades dos doadores ✓ Visibilidade de ONGI vs. legitimidade das ONGI locais ✓ Limitado acesso a informação ✓ Descrença em relação a participação Falta de capacidade decisória do distrito em relação orçamento


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2.a DIÁLOGO POLÍTICO

LOCAL

Nacional

Local




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2b. Diálogo Político

- Diferentes espaços
 - Formais e informais
 - Espaços paralelos
 - Consulta (por convite)
 - Por reclamação
 - Canais de influência (recurso a actores locais influentes p.e. líderes religiosos e outros)
 - Observatório de Desenvolvimento (adversidades)
 - Abertura da liderança local
 - Capitalização da capacidade existente nas OSC monitoria de assuntos específicos, informa o OD (Nampula, Manica)
 - Diálogo é preparado previamente
 - Espaços de diálogo
 - Por convite (ODs e CCLs)
 - Por reclamados (Media: Rádios comunitárias)

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3. LIGANDO AS ESTRATÉGIAS AOS RESULTADOS



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Presentation 2 Domestic Violence 1 December 2011

<p style="text-align: center;">Avaliação do Engajamento da Sociedade Civil em Diálogo de Política</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Seminário de Verificação 01.12.2011</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><small>www.benteconsulting.dk</small></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Objectivo da Avaliação</p> <p>Objectivo geral da avaliação é obter um melhor entendimento sobre:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Como as OSCs se engajam no diálogo sobre políticas – Como melhor dar apoio eficaz nesta área <p>Objectivos específicos - entender melhor:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Estratégias e abordagens das OSCs 2. Contribuição das OSCs 3. Factores favoráveis e inibidores 4. Pontes fortes e fracos de estratégias de apoio de diferentes doadores 5. Lições aprendidas + recomendações <p style="text-align: center;"><small>www.benteconsulting.dk</small></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Quém, aonde e quando?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 doadores: Áustria, Canadá, Dinamarca, Finlândia, Suécia, Suíça • Bangladesh, Moçambique, Uganda • Maio 2011 – Agosto 2012 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Exercício de Escopo – Setembro 2011 – Fase do Estudo de Caso – Novembro-Dezembro 2011 – Relatório do Estudo de Caso – Janeiro 2012 <p style="text-align: center;"><small>www.benteconsulting.dk</small></p>
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As constatações – 3 assuntos

1. Factores do ambiente
2. Diálogo de política
3. Ligando as Estratégias aos Resultados


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1. FACTORES DO AMBIENTE

	INTERNOS	EXTERNOS
FACILITADORES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Forte de liderança ✓ Personalidades com influência ✓ Coligação formada por um somatório de forças e com clara divisão de responsabilidades ✓ Fortes Org. de Pesquisa e Advocacia ✓ Disponibilidade de evidências 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Processo de consulta amplo entre OSC de Género ✓ Parcerias com ONGIs ✓ Existência de liderança forte no governo na ultima fase do processo ✓ Cedaw ?
INIBIDORES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Competição entre as OSC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ não reconhecimento do problema ✓ resistência baseada nas normas culturais e papel de género ✓ Acesso a informação ✓ Baixo conhecimento dos direitos e deveres do cidadão ✓ media com grande influencia masculina ✓ acções conjuntas pós aprovação da lei- não sistemáticas-regulação, monitoria ✓ Rigidez na (interpretação) das prioridades dos doadores

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2a. DIÁLOGO POLÍTICO




2b. DIÁLOGO POLÍTICO

1. Espaço reclamado - aceitação gradual → formal. Conquista contínua de espaço. Ex: campanha anual dos 16 dias contra violência doméstica (marcha, media, etc.)
2. Diálogo político acontece em Maputo, enquanto ao nível local acontece mais implementação
3. Contestações foram/são visíveis no espaço público
4. Pós-Lei. OSC responsáveis/envolvidas na capacitação das instituições do estado (MMAS, PRM)

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3. LIGANDO AS ESTRATÉGIAS AOS RESULTADOS



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Annex 7. List of people met

	Name	Organisation / institution	Position
	Individual interviews in Denmark		
11.11.11	Connie Dupont	Masala Lda. (Ibis)	Consultant
17.11.11	Briefing with involved DPs		
	Anders Bitch Karlsen	Danish Embassy Maputo	Head of Cooperation
	Maja Tjernström	Swedish Embassy Maputo	Head of Governance
	Laura Leyser	Austrian Development Cooperation	Attaché / Programme Officer
	Sirkku Kristina Hellsten	Finnish Embassy Maputo	Counselor
19.11.11	Interviews in Maputo		
	Teresinha da Silva	Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA)	Executive Director
	Maj-Lis Foller	Gothenburg University	Researcher
21.11.11	Josefa Langa	Ministry of Women and Social Affairs (MMAS)	National Director / Coordinator of CGC
	Alicia Calane	KWEST Consultores	Independent gender consultant
	Carvalho Cumbe	Sociedade Aberta	Program Officer
	Pires Capece Zingombe	ACREMO	Director
	Elísio de Melo	ACREMO	Focal Point
	Cacilda Cossa	ACREMO	Focal Point
	Salomão Zitha	ACREMO	Focal Point
	César Zimba	ACREMO	Focal Point
22.11.11	Rafa Valente Machava	MULEIDE	Executive Director
	Graca Julio	Fórum Mulher	Coordinator of Gender Violence Program
	Shaista Araújo	UN Women	Program Officer
	Francisco Baessa	Ibis	Program Director, COCIM
	Paulo Gentil	AMODE	Executive Director
	Josefa Langa	MMAS	National Director
23.11.11	Xai-Xai, Gaza Province		
	Fórum de Organizações Não-governamentais de Gaza (FONGA)		
	Sr. Matavel	FONGA	Coordinator
	Elinda Nhatave	FONGA	
	Bernardo Vasco Rui	FONGA	
	Sonia Delfina Tembe	FONGA	
	Egelina Alberta Manhique	FONGA	
	Andre Constantino	FONGA	
	Jaime F. Paluane	FONGA	
	Mauricio Malanjane	FONGA	
	Rebeca David M.	FONGA	
	Inácio Mucavele	FONGA	
	Filipe Domingos Moiane	FONGA	
	Luis B. Cossa	Acosade	
	DPPF Gaza		

	Name	Organisation / institution	Position
	Alipio Vaz Pereira	DPPF/PNPFD	Advisor
	Romao Antonio Cossa	DPPF/DPO	Technician
	DPMAS Gaza		
	Maria João Baptista Mathe	DPMAS	Gender & Development
	Isabel Vasco Langa Mpupa	DPMASG	Women & Family
	Filomena Carlos Buque	DPMAS	Women & Gender
	Gab. de Atendimento de Violência Domestica		
	Arlete Fancisco Jamaio	DAMC-Gaza	
	Flora António Simango	DAMC-Gaza	
	Anastacio Machava	DAMC-Gaza	
24.11.11	Guija District		
	Argentina Manhique	District Government	Permanent Secretary
	ArturMarcelino Ctiuge	PRM	Chief of Operation
	Loresco Massinga	Associação 7 de Abril	President
	Elias Macuácue	Concelho Consultivo	Secretary
	Leandro Jamine	World Vision	Supervisor
	Basilio Fernando Muianga	SDSMAS-Guija	Medical Doctor
	Mariana Rufino	Save The Children	Program Officer
	Justino Mugabé	Concelho Consultivo	Member
	Alberto Massingue	Community Court	President
	Sebastião M.Macamo	Samora Machel Tomanine Ass.	President of Association
	Alice Mário Conjo	M.C.C.D.	Spokesman
	Aventina Albino Jamine	GGCD	Member
	Martinho F. Manhique	Samaritania's Purse	Program Officer
	Costa Manuel Siteo	PRM	Police Officer
	Gerson Norte	Radio Vembe	Manager
	Jossias Novela	Accsociacao Amparo,Chokwe	Member
25.11.11	Moamba District		
	Sebastião Gabriel Muchanga	Government of Moamba	Permanent Secretary
	Stélio Guambe	District Secretariat Moamba	Member of ETD
	Rafael S. Ussivans	District Secretariat Moamba	Assistant Secretary
	Ernesto Besnardo	Association	Secretary
	Hermelinda Vembane	M.C.C Distrital	
	Anastacio dos Santos	M.A.P	
	Valecina Eugamo		Secretary of Bairro
	António Paulo Saínda	M.C.S.P.A	
	Caetano Alberto Jalane	M.C.C. District	Secretary of Bairro South
	Abel Jorge Dabula	C.C. Districtal	Spokesman
	Gabriela Manjate	Gov. Districtal de Moamba	Secretary Chief
	Filipa Ganje	DMAS	Medical Doctor

	Name	Organisation / institution	Position
	Arão Vilanculos	Red Cross CVM	District Technician
28.11.11	Individual interviews in Maputo		
	John Barnes	MPD / UNDP	Adviser
	Fernanda Farinha		Consultant
	Aly Bachir Macassar	Ministry of Justice	Human Rights Director
	Custódio Duma Vasco	Danish Embassy	Program Officer Justice Sector
	Denise Namburete	N'WETI	Executive Diretor
	Manuel Q. Dos Santos Jr.	ADELMA, Manica	Executive Diretor
	Lourino Dava	CIP	Budget Monitoring Program Coordinator
	Joaquim Oliveira	MAGARIRO, Manica	Director
29.11.11	INGOs – Focus Groups interview		
	José Jocitala	3F	Official Progr.
	Ritva Parvianen	KEPA	Representative
	Simão Simbine	SASK	
	René Celaya	CARE International	
	Individual interviews		
	Karin Fueg	Helvetas	Program Director
	Ilídio Nhantumbo	Helvetas	National Program Officer
	Boaventura Veja	Faith Based Organisation	Governance Monitoring Project Manager
	Vivaldino Banze	AMA, Cabo Delgado	Executive Diretor
	Floriberto Fernandes	TVM	Journalist
	Benilde Nhalivilo	FORCOM	Executive Diretor
	Ana Loforte	WLSA	President of Board
	Achia	LIMUSSICA, Manica	General Coordinator
30.12.11	Salvador Cadete Forquilha	SDC & IESE	Decentralisation Program / Researcher
	Armando Ali	Facilidade, Nampula	Coordinator
	Inez Hackenberg	NOVOB, Holland	Program Officer
1.12.11	Verification Workshop – District Planning and Budget Makng		
	Neila Momade	CIP	Social Coordinator
	Nilza Chipe	G-20	Manager
	José Cassamo	PNDFFD/MPD	
	Jonas Fernando Pohlman	Dutch Embassy	
	Solomão Muchanga	Juvenile Parliament	
	Quitéria Anícia G.	Juvenile Parliament	
	Olivia Gervasoni	European Union	
	Christian Kappensteiner	GIZ	
	Verification Workshop – Domestic Violence		
	Iraé Baptista Lundin	Diakonia / CEEI-ISRI	
	Conseicao Osorio	WLSA	
	Arminda Vombe	Parliament Working Group on Gender CASGA	

	Name	Organisation / institution	Position
	Suzumi Sónia de Conceicao	AMMCJ	Communication
	Josefa Lopes Langa	MMAS DNM	
	Albino Francisco	FDC	
	Anders Karlsen	Danish Embassy	
	Graca Julio	Forum Mullher	
5.12.11	Individual interviews		
	Joao Pereira	MASC	Executive Director
	Debriefing		
	Anders Karlsen	Danish Embassy	
	Maja Tjenstrom	Swedish Embassy	
	Chloé Baudry	Canada / CIDA	
	Bram Naidoo	Swedish Embassy	
	Mogens Pedersen	Danish Embassy	
	Sirkku Hellsten	Embassy of Finland	
	Eva Kohl	Austrian Development Agency	
6.12.11	Individual interviews		
	Nathalie Grimoud	WWF	Technical Assistance Civil Society
	Francesca Bruschi	Italian Cooperation	Decentralisation Working Group

Annex 8. Documentation of case studies

This annex includes detailed documentation of case studies:

- ⇒ Civil society timeline
- ⇒ Verification workshops on District Planning, 01.12.2011, PP-presentation
- ⇒ Verification workshop on Legislation on Domestic Violence, 01.12.2011, PP-presentation
- ⇒ Documentation of results-matrices (below)
- ⇒ Enabling and disabling conditions for CSO engagement in policy dialogue-matrices

Civil society timeline

Period	Critical event
1975	National Independence. Frelimo forms a “party state” with a strong influence in all walks of economic, social and political life of the country, i.e. all productive enterprises were being run by the State (or rather by the Frelimo Party). No local middle class existed at Independence.
1984-85	Economic reforms. First moves towards economic reforms.
1986 - 92	Civil war. Dissatisfaction with Frelimo’s handling of Independence mandate. Resistance led by Renamo and heavily supported by the South African apartheid regime.
1987	Economic Rehabilitation Programme (ERP). Many formerly state enterprises during the ERP period were privatised mostly to the Frelimo political elite which led to the emerging of a party affiliated small middle class.
1990	Multi-party constitution. The single-party parliament enacted the first multi-party Constitution, including legislation on associations.
1992	General Peace Agreement. The general Peace Agreement was signed in Rome on October 4, 1992, putting an end to the 16 years of civil war.
1994 and 1999	Multi-party elections. Frelimo wins both elections with marginal (and questionable) gaps over Renamo. The low level of voters’ participation demonstrated that a significant portion of population did not identify itself with the political institutions. (Paper presented by Luis de Brito, on 13 December 2011, at the workshop on civil society in Mozambique, held at the Danish Embassy).
1998 - 2002	Decentralisation. Beginning of the test implementation of the Decentralised Planning and Finance Programme in Nampula. The programme had an important influence in the decentralised participatory planning. The role of the international NGOs (SNV and Concern) was critical in the establishment of the first Local Development Committees (CDL) that engage and inform the government in planning. The 2001/2 expansion phase of the Program for Decentralized Planning and Finance (PPDF) for Cabo Delgado, which became known as PPDF North.
2003	The experiences of PPDF North informed the preparation and approval of LOLE, which formalises the establishment of community consultation and participation institutions. This reinforces the idea of the importance of civil society engagement in the process of governance. The establishment of the Poverty Observatory. A space for policy dialogue between government, international partners and civil society was established. The G-20 civil society platform was a result of the process of openness to political dialogue. Civil society earns a critical role in its relationship with the State after the years of mistrust and accusations of operating as political opposition.
2004	New Constitution which guarantees the rights of association and organisation adopted.
2005	The replication of the model of Poverty Observatory begins in the Provinces. The role played by the civil society was critical for the constitution of this mechanism at the level of consultation at provincial level. Emergence of more civil society platforms at provincial level. Adoption of the Paris Declaration. International partners start to disburse direct funds to State

	<p>budget. And therefore, the group of direct budget support partners is formed.</p> <p>Development partners mobilise to respond to the concern of more transparency. And one way will be the strengthening of civil society.</p>
2006	<p>A National Anti-corruption Forum is established, and subsequently abolished in 2007 for being unconstitutional.</p>
2008	<p>The Accra Agenda for Action. Strengthens awareness on the necessity for donors to support civil society.</p> <p>The joint DFID / Irish Aid – funded Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC) is established.</p> <p>A Governance Monitoring Forum (a civil society platform that aims to monitor the implementation of PESOD at District level and the Annual Plans and Activities of Municipalities) is established.</p> <p>The availability of funds for the field of governance has increased the number of organisations that seek to work in matters of governance monitoring and advocacy.</p>
2010	<p>The Swedish Embassy launches the “Actions for an Inclusive and Accountable Governance - AGIR” Programme for support to civil society with a focus on general issues of governance.</p> <p>Establishment of the Budget Monitoring Forum, a platform focused on the monitoring of the implementation of the State Budget and comprising of four CSOs, namely FDC, CIP, CESC and GMD.</p>

Documentation of results (for each policy area) (please use Checklist 2 in the Concept Paper!)

Indicators	Evidence found	Data sources
<p>Process outcomes: How CSOs became more effective in policy dialogue e.g.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthened organisational capacity ▪ Strengthened alliances ▪ Strengthened base of support 	<p>Platforms of CS in few provinces are structured in thematic groups with the objective to strengthen the capacity of the understanding and interpretation policy issues.</p> <p>Single organisation like IESE, FDC, CIP, LDH have developed there organisational capacity due to direct support on their agenda by donors.</p> <p>Linkages with international organisations (CIP and LDH), and partnership between local organisation (CIP with local organisation at provincial level), also the well structured platforms.</p> <p>There's no much evidence of base support to civil society in Mozambique. Although the recognition that most of their intervention are in line with the preoccupation of the society.</p>	<p>Reports (ACS 2010, OSISA 2010, Francisco & Matter 2007), telephone interviews with members of NGOs in Manica and Nampula</p>
<p>Inputs into policy dialogue:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Direct inputs ▪ Indirect inputs 	<p>Media intervention</p> <p>Research studies on budget monitoring and public expenditure tracking</p> <p>Support from DPs in the issues of governance</p>	<p>Reports and interviews</p>
<p>Change outcomes: What CSOs achieved as a result:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Policy changes ▪ Shifts in norms and perceptions 	<p>Elaboration of the Strategic Plan for Development of Manica Province.</p> <p>Aproval of the Local Law and the IPCCs Guideline (Ministerial Diploma 67/2009).</p> <p>The approval of the methodology for management of the Fundo de Desenvolvimento Distrital (7 millions) the Ministry of Planning and Development.</p> <p>Improved the understanding of civil society as partners by the government instead of being considered as acting as opposition.</p>	<p>Interview with Director of Magariro and ADELMA, Coordinator of Facilidade, Forquila (2010)</p> <p>ACS (2010)</p> <p>Verification Meeting (held in 01.12.2011)</p>

	<p>The documents produced within the scope of budget monitoring both by CIP and by the Budget Monitoring Forum are being considered as important document for both the Administrative Tribunal and Assembly of the Republic.</p> <p>The designing of the Strategic Plan for Manica Province, which was formally presented in December 2011, was a process completely conducted by the civil society, as a result of the pressure by civil society in their expressed need to develop it.</p> <p>Members of government or government sector officials have been working in the scope of the civil society platforms side-by side with civil society teams. This was a unique experience that shows a break with the hostile practices of the past.</p>	
<p>Other results:</p>	<p>Government has become more concerned on the issues of anticorruption as a result of massive debate promoted by civil society mostly by CIP</p> <p>Government more concerned on the problematic of mineral resources and the need to review contracts with mega projects, issues raised frequently by IESE</p>	<p>Interview with Salvador Forquilha, from SDC; and Armando Ali from FACILIDADE</p>

Documentation of results – Domestic Violence Draft

Indicators	Evidence found	Data sources
<p>Process outcomes: How CSOs became more effective in policy dialogue e.g.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthened alliances ▪ Diverse activities (research evidence, media and communication, legal expertise, events etc) 	<p>The combination of the organisations that generated a unique and strong alliance, from research organisations, advocacy, community mobilization and communication. This same group is now concentrated to advocate for a law on the rights of women to abortion</p>	<p>Individual interviews with CSOs, government institutions, community representatives and key informants</p> <p>Documents and websites</p>

<p>Inputs into policy dialogue:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Direct inputs ▪ Contacts with MPs and influential individuals 	<p>The women's movement drafted the law that was later approved in parliament. There some changes in the law approved, but the draft was a civil society proposal</p>	<p>individual interviews with CSOs, government institutions, community representatives and key informants</p> <p>Verification workshop with selected key informants from CSOs, government, academia and Parliament</p>
<p>Change outcomes: What CSOs achieved as a result:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ law on domestic violence approved by the parliament in 2009 ▪ National Plan to prevent and fight domestic violence against women approved by the council of Ministers in 2008 	<p>The Law was approved and published in the <i>Boletim da República</i></p> <p><i>The National was approved by the council Ministers in 2008</i></p>	<p>BR nr.38, de 29 de Setembro de 2009, 2º suplemento</p> <p>Individual interviews with CSOs, government institutions, community representatives and key informants</p> <p>Verification workshop with selected key informants from CSOs, government, academia and Parliament</p>
<p>Other results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ public awareness raised ▪ cases of domestic violence documented ▪ Domestic violence recognized as a problem of the 'public sphere' 	<p>-the campaign to pass the violence generated public debate in the country</p> <p>- there is an increase (progressive) involvement of the media (ex: news papers, media asking for capacity building)</p> <p>-institutions that assist victims were visited</p>	<p>individual interviews , verification workshops, direct observation</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Established institutions / spaces to assist the victims (PRM, MMAS, Health, OSC) ▪ 	<p>There is still a wide spread scepticism against the law, which is seen as indifferent to cultural and socio-economic practices</p>	
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Enabling and disabling conditions for CSO engagement in policy dialogue – Checklist for review

	What has helped or hindered CSO success in the past?	What are the enabling factors	What are the constraining factors
<p>Legal and judicial system (<i>assurance to settle conflicts involving CSOs</i>)</p>	<p>The civil society after the independency emerged as part of the ruling party.</p> <p>The approval of the multiparty constitution in 1990 and the law of association in 1991 stimulated the emergency of CSOs.</p> <p>Lack of trust on CSOs undermined their success to intervene in the policy arena</p>	<p>Existence of a specific legislation for civil society association (right for free association)</p> <p>The existence of press freedom and Media Law (Law 18/91).</p>	<p>Pressure on CSOs to be associated with government organs.</p> <p>Harmful bureaucratic mechanisms in registering CSOs.</p> <p>Law of association broadly applied to all types of CSOs without distinction between those oriented to service delivery to that on advocacy and politics.</p> <p>Lack of knowledge on laws and procedures among CSO, and public servants.</p> <p>Lack of specific law on access to information undermines the Media and public exercise of press freedom and right to information.</p>
<p>Democratic parliamentary system and opportunities for CSO to build alliances with members of parliament</p>	<p>There were no experiences of alliance between parliament and civil society in the past. Political system was closed</p>	<p>The new democratic system is open to civil society participation.</p> <p>The emergency of research advocacy</p>	<p>Barriers from political system of patronage and the historical path dependency of the one party system.</p>

	What has helped or hindered CSO success in the past?	What are the enabling factors	What are the constraining factors
	itself to party decision-making.	organisation together with the role of donors in support to civil society.	Lack of political socialization. Weak civil society
<i>Measures to promote philanthropy and corporate social responsibility</i>	The philanthropy nature of CSO is still weak and corporate social responsibility is not a matter of concern. Organisations emerged often encouraged by the opportunities for funding.	Informal CSOs in the community level have link on philanthropy nature of intervention.	CSOs lack of constituency
<i>Power relations and power dynamics between government and CSOs</i>	Government structure unable to deal with a critical constituency at lower level influenced intervention of NGOs focused on service delivery. Government relation with civil society based on distrust. Civil society accused to undermine government program or seen as opposition.	Institutions of citizen consultation and participation (such as ODs and IPCCs) help to repair broken links in the minimal representative policy process. Informal relation with political elite has been more efficient in terms of results achieved. Increasing recognition by government, of the role of CSOs.	Administrative and political institutions influenced in particular ways by historical inheritance that reproduces unstable political culture and low tolerance of a contesting behavior. Strong control of the space of dialogue by government
<i>Promotion and protection of human rights (including freedom of association, freedom of expression and access to information)</i>	Low technical capacity of intervention on the human right issues by CSOs, and the lack of substantive number of NGOs intervening in this arena of policies. Very limited tolerance of the government to NGOs working on human	The increasing of CSOs working in advocacy and policy dialogue. Pressure by CSOs working with human rights issues	Limitation of citizens and CSOs to be involved in political issues, due to constraints of social and psychological intimidation. Strong limitations in access to

	What has helped or hindered CSO success in the past?	What are the enabling factors	What are the constraining factors
	rights issues	Quality of the report and campaign about human rights	information. Culture of secrecy within State bodies and public servants.
<i>CSO specific legislation and taxation regulations</i>			Lack of information and knowledge by CSOs about taxes. Bureaucracy limits the CSOs to access to tax benefits.
<i>Regulations and norms promoting CSO transparency and accountability to their constituencies</i>	No specific regulation or norms focused on transparency and accountability of the CSO to their constituency	Donors effort to support CSOs in the base of its internal governance mechanisms	Emergency of CSOs based on existence of funding opportunity. Origin of CSOs non based on philanthropy nature.
<i>Access to funding (and role of donors)</i>	INGOs and donors have since funded local CSOs.	The emergency of new financial mechanisms with the aim to support CSOs (MASC & AGIR). More awareness among donors in regard to the need for strengthens civil society capacity. The freedom of CSOs to raise funds from different sources.	High dependency on foreign funding. Non-existence or very weak budget management system and monitoring. Donors funding conditionality limit the capacity of CSOs to set their own agenda.

Enabling and disabling conditions for CSO engagement in policy dialogue – Domestic Violence Process

	What has helped or hindered CSO success in the past?	What are the enabling factors	What are the constraining factors
Legal and judicial system (assurance to settle conflicts involving CSOs)	- <u>Inexistence of a legal framework</u> until the approval of law in 2009 -	<u>International instruments informed the initiative</u> , which Mozambique ratify most of them	- <u>Domestic violence against women not seen as problem</u> and seen as private domain issue within the public sphere, media, parliament and government -
Democratic parliamentary system and opportunities for CSO to build alliances with members of parliament	- The Government of Mozambique is constitutionally a presidential system, where the president is directly elected by popular vote obeying the rule of an absolute majority. In addition to the president, there is also a National Assembly where the members are elected by political parties obey the system of Proportional Representation. Mozambique follows a closed list system to elect members of parliament, so the citizen votes in a party and not know the applicant of his constituency. This contributes to the fact that Members of Parliament are more loyal to their parties and with little connection to their constituencies-	- <u>Charismatic and influential leaders associated in the movement</u> -in the process of lobbying for law on domestic violence against women, the women’s movement, approached the commission dealing with women affairs in parliament to have them as allies. They use, charismatic and influential leaders such as Graça Machel (former Education Minister and widow of Samora Machel) to lobby and link with women in parliament	- <u>social norms as major constraint</u> -women in parliament, at first instance, did not agree with the proposal from civil society. This was very influenced by social norms, that put women - <u>weak links between MPs and constituencies</u> : links did not come from the potential link between MPs and their constituencies
Measures to promote philanthropy and corporate social responsibility		
Power relations and power dynamics between government and CSOs			
Promotion and protection of human rights (including freedom of association, freedom of expression and access to information)	- The current association’s legislation (Lei 8/91) does not match the dynamics of the growing civil society in term of registration, types of CSOs and taxation. - Despite the fact that the right to information is guaranteed in the Constitution, Mozambique does not have a specific legislation on access to information.	-	<u>Citizens and CS Access to public information</u> is a major problem in Mozambique,

	What has helped or hindered CSO success in the past?	What are the enabling factors	What are the constraining factors
CSO specific legislation and taxation regulations			
Regulations and norms promoting CSO transparency and accountability to their constituencies	CSO don't have a code of conduct or a self-regulation instrument mechanism to promote its own transparency and accountability		
Access to funding (and role of donors)	-very concentrated in large NGOs -project funding perspective -	-sufficient donors that supported the CS initiative	<u>Changing donor priorities and the rigid application</u> is an inhibiting factor for long-term engagement in CS development (ex. Approval of law important, but implementation is the issue!)

Annex 9. Conceptual Framework

Evaluation of civil society engagement in policy dialogue - conceptual framework to guide case study approach and analysis

The purpose of this paper is to present the key conceptual elements for this evaluation, the linkages between them and how they will be approached through the case study. The paper will serve as guidance for country teams during the main study phase.

1. Overview


This evaluation evolves around three key questions:

- **CSO effectiveness:** What are the ways in which CSO engagement in (country) policy dialogue is most effective - and what does this mean for how this can be facilitated in the future?¹⁴⁹
- **Enabling and disabling conditions:** What are the enablers and barriers to CSO engagement (at country level) - and how could they be addressed?
- **DP policies and strategies:** How can DPs most effectively support and facilitate (directly and indirectly) increased civil society engagement at country level?

In order to answer these questions, the evaluation will have to develop an in-depth understanding of what CSO strategies for engagement in policy dialogue are, what outcomes they have achieved and what factors have contributed to their success or failure. In addition it has to review how DPs have supported CSO engagement in policy dialogue and how relevant and responsive their support of CSO was within the country context. In-depth analysis of policy processes and CSO engagement in them will be done through case studies.

The case studies will look at the links CSO effectiveness in policy dialogue, the enabling and disabling factors and the role that DP support has played. The three main conceptual elements for this evaluation and the specific concepts that will be used to analyse them are shown in the figure below.

Figure 6: Overview of key concepts and linkages for this evaluation



The key concepts that have been studied during inception include:

1. Types of CSO strategies to engage in policy dialogue;

¹⁴⁹ The term “CSO effectiveness” emphasises the effectiveness of CSOs as development actors (see OECD 2010), Civil society effectiveness).

2. Policy dialogue and what it means within a given context;
3. The enabling environment and how it defines the space for policy dialogue.

The key linkages which will be investigated through case studies during the main phase include:

- a) Key enabling and disabling factors and how they affect CSO choice of strategies
- b) Policy dialogue: How CSOs access and use the space for policy dialogue, and
- c) What entry points they use into policy cycle
- d) What are the successes and failures of CSO engagement in policy dialogue, and
- e) What are the (process) outcomes with regard to policy change.

In addition the figure contains several variables that influence CSO strategies and their outcomes on policy dialogue (indicated in grey). They will be an important part of the explanatory models describing how CSOs have influenced policy change (Theory of Change, see below).

Below we present the key concepts for this evaluation, and then explain how we will investigate the linkages between them through the case studies. Since most of the evidence for this evaluation will be collected through case studies of different policy areas set in the contexts of three different countries we will use checklists and standardised reporting formats to analyse and present the key concepts for this evaluation. This approach will support comparative analysis during the synthesis stage. We therefore developed detailed typologies and checklists for analysis of the key concepts which will help us to identify common features across case studies.

The evaluation will look at DP support from different angles: From a general perspective, whether DP policies and strategies (in principle) support effective CSO engagement in policy dialogue; and from a country perspective, whether DP support practices enable (or perhaps prevent) a more effective role of CSOs – thus becoming part of the enabling and disabling factors. The latter will be done as part of the case studies. Analysis of DP policies and strategies at HQ level will be done through an institutional assessment tool (7 Cs) which is presented separately.¹⁵⁰

2. Key concepts

2. 1. CSO strategies to engage in policy dialogue

Based on suggestions from CIDA during inception and other sources¹⁵¹ we have developed a typology of CSO engagement in policy dialogue. The typology contains a number of strategies, which CSOs use to – directly or indirectly – influence policy makers. This includes highly visible strategies, like advocacy, campaigning and demonstrations, but also less-visible strategies, such as networking and evidence-based studies. Policy dialogue is often perceived as direct engagement between CSO and government only, but there are other ways (particularly highlighted by Northern CSO consulted during inception) through which CSO contribute to policy processes, for example through training, education, community mobilisation and projects that are piloting innovative practices. Donors often tend to focus on the formalised dialogue, which is more visible to them, but country stakeholders emphasised that it is often the informal forms of dialogue that are effective. This evaluation understands that there are different ways of engaging in policy dialogue. In order to be able to assess the effectiveness we need to understand (and structure) the diversity. Checklist 1 thus shows the different forms of CSO engagement, clustered into four main types.

¹⁵⁰ The tool will also be used at the country level, but with a perspective of synthesising findings per donor at HQ level. The tool will focus on the six donors participating in this evaluation.

¹⁵¹ OECD 2010: CS effectiveness and adapted from ODI 2006. Policy engagement – How CS can be more effective;

Checklist 1: CSO strategies for engagement in policy dialogue

Types of CSO strategies in policy dialogue <i>(as used during scoping studies)</i>	Questions for case study analysis
<p>Direct & formalised dialogue</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocacy campaigns • Participation in sector or PRSP planning • Support social accountability • Evidence-based studies and research <p>Direct & informal dialogue</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ad-hoc communication at central level • Ad-hoc communication at local level • Insider lobbying • Protests and demonstrations • Policy analysis and debate <p>Indirect contribution to dialogue</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information, education and training • Projects piloting innovative practices • Community mobilisation for feedback and advocacy <p>No dialogue</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community mobilisation for policy implementation (no feedback mechanisms included) • Service delivery 	<p>How effective are these strategies on their own and in combination to achieve outcomes on policy change, given the existing enabling and disabling conditions?</p> <p>Relevant evaluation questions: EQ6, EQ11,</p>

The case studies will cover different types of dialogue, both formal and informal. We therefore used this typology to guide the selection of policy areas where different types of dialogue. For example, the Mozambique study selected “Budget Planning and Monitoring” as a policy area, where for direct and formal dialogue, and “Dissemination of the law on violence against women” as a case for direct and informal dialogue.

The case studies will revisit the typology in order to determine which strategies (on their own or in combination) have been effective in influencing policy dialogue, given the existing enabling and disabling conditions.

2.2. Policy dialogue


Policy dialogue is a broad concept which different stakeholders understand and interpret in different ways. For foreign governments and donors policy dialogue often refers to the (formal) dialogue at government level. For country stakeholders, policy dialogue both refers to dialogue between government and civil society and within civil society. The Uganda scoping study thus distinguishes between “vertical” and “horizontal” dialogue.

It is important to understand the process nature of policy dialogue. Policy dialogue involves ongoing negotiation of ideas, relations and power; thus, it is a process for establishing legitimacy (as pointed out

by the Uganda study), for mutual learning and for influencing. The process nature of policy dialogue also means that it extends beyond “policy making” into implementation, review and revision of policies. The TOR for this evaluation thus demand a study of policy dialogue throughout policy development *and* implementation.

In the context of this evaluation dialogue is understood as a way of influencing policy processes. In order to conceptualise how policy processes work and what the entry points for influencing are the evaluation uses the **policy cycle tool**. The policy cycle tool describes the phases of policy development and implementation at iterative process (see figure below). Effective CSO strategies use various entry points into the policy cycle to influence policy processes.

Figure 7: Possible CSO entry points into policy cycle tool




For “civil society to flourish it requires a favourable enabling environment, which depends upon the actions and policies of all development actors – donors, governments and CSOs themselves.”¹⁵² The scoping study have conducted a systematic review of dimensions the defining the enabling environment in the context of case study countries, based on documents review and using Checklist 2 below.

Checklist 23: Enabling environment¹⁵³

Elements of an enabling environment (as used for scoping studies)	Questions for analysis of case studies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal and judicial system and related mechanisms through which CSOs or their constituencies can seek legal recourse • Democratic parliamentary system and opportunities for CSO to build alliances with members of parliament • Power and power relations (between CSO and Government; relations between CSOs and citizens, CSOs and other CSOs and the private sector) • Measures to promote philanthropy and corporate social responsibility • Mechanisms to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights to expression, peaceful assembly and 	<p>Whether certain aspects of the enabling framework can explain the success or failure of CSO strategies. (EQ15)?</p> <p>How elements of the enabling framework define the space for policy dialogue.</p> <p>To what extent DP strategies address critical aspects of the enabling framework in order to support an effective CSO role in policy dialogue (EQ 16)?</p> <p>What other factors have influenced CSO engagement in policy dialogue (EQ 14, EQ</p>

¹⁵² OECD 2010: Civil society effectiveness

¹⁵³ Based on Advisory Group 2008, p 17-18; Jacqueline Wood & Real Lavergne. 2008 Civil Society and Aid effectiveness.



<p>association, and access to information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSO-specific policies such as CSO legislation and taxation regulations including charitable status provisions • Regulations and norms promoting CSO transparency and accountability to their constituencies • Access to funding (and role of donors); ability to mobilise resources (financial, skills, people, in kind contributions) • Ethnic and social issues, economic structures 	<p>15)</p>
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For the purpose of this evaluation we understand “enabling environment” as the formal conditions under which CSOs develop their strategies. More specifically, certain elements of the enabling environment will determine the space for CSOs to participate in policy dialogue. The **power cube** is useful to conceptualise the power relations that – as part of the enabling environment- define the space for policy dialogue. It can help to explain how CSOs have been able to access and use spaces for influence (and power), such as policy dialogue. The power cube distinguishes between invited, claimed and contested spaces for participation. The conceptual aspects (and terminology) of the power cube are useful to map the inclusiveness of spaces for CSO participation. But the nature of policy processes transcending several spaces is often difficult to capture within the categories suggested by the power cube.

2.4. Enabling and disabling conditions

After the scoping studies it was felt that the concept of enabling environment was somehow restricted to covering the formal conditions for policy dialogue only. The conclusion was that a wider concept was needed to also cover the informal conditions that facilitate or restrain CSO engagement in policy dialogue. It was suggested to use the concept of enabling and disabling conditions instead which would cover a wider range of factors, including those relating to DP support and CSO internal factors. Checklist 3 (below) provides a selection of factors which have been identified during the inception phase.

The practical way of broadening the analysis beyond the concept of environment will be to look back at the contextual factors (both formal and informal) that have shaped CSO strategies and outcomes as part of the case studies. The case studies will revisit the analysis of the enabling environment prepared during the scoping studies in order to identify the formal factors that have determined the space for engagement in policy dialogue (using Checklist 2). Furthermore, the case studies will identify any additional factors that have affected CSO strategies and outcomes (using Checklist 3).

The identification of factors that have affected CSO engagement in policy dialogue will be a major element of the case study analysis. Naturally, this part of the analysis will be done in conjunction with the analysis of CSO strategies and outcomes. Key factors will be identified through CSO focus group discussions, using participatory tools, such as SWOT or force field analysis. Based on our initial understanding from documents review and scoping studies we have identified key factors explaining CSO effectiveness in policy dialogue. Our preliminary understanding is that CSO effectiveness is determined by a number of factors, some of them are external, and others are internal. Checklist 3 presents key

factors for consideration during the case studies, some of them directly linked to the “enabling conditions” (space, government attitude); others are CSO-related factors (CSO legitimacy, capacity and networks). The case studies will use these (and any additional factors identified during the study) to identify which factors are key for CSO effectiveness and integrate them into the theory of change for a given policy area.

Checklist 3: Factors explaining effective CSO engagement in policy dialogue¹⁵⁴

Factors affecting CSO engagement in policy dialogue	Questions for case study analysis
<p>Factors relating to the enabling conditions:</p> <p>Spaces for policy dialogue</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transparent, accessible and inclusive space • Regular and systematic opportunities for participation, covering all stages of policy process • Shared principles, including recognition of the value of each stakeholder group’s voice, mutual respect, inclusiveness, accessibility, clarity, transparency, responsibility, and accountability <p>Government</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attitudes and behaviour • Capacities, skills and knowledge 	
<p>Factors relating to the policy process itself:</p> <p>Policy issue and process:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nature of the policy issue (e.g. how controversial) • Timing of policy process • Access to information 	
<p>CSO internal factors:</p> <p>CSO legitimacy, capacity and networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSO strategic clarity and focus on opportunities • CSO capacities, funds and knowledge • CSO Strategic alliances and networks • CSO sound evidence and analysis • CSO legitimacy 	

3. Establishing linkages through case studies

3.1. Towards a “practical” theory of change for case studies

The scoping studies have established the main conceptual building blocks; in the following, the main study will interrogate the linkages between CSO strategies on policy dialogue and policy change outcomes through a case study approach.


The purpose of the case studies will be to provide an in-depth analysis of how CSO strategies have contributed to policy outcomes. One challenge in measuring influence through policy dialogue is that organisations often claim to be influential (also to justify the support they receive) and that the evidence

¹⁵⁴ Adapted from *Jacqueline Wood and Real Lavergne. 2008. Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness – An exploration of Experiences and Good practice, p. 11; ODI 2006. Policy engagement – How CS can be more effective, p. 15-16.*

to support these claims often relates to low-level outcomes or even outputs. Furthermore the very nature of policy work, involving multiple interventions by numerous actors and a wide range of external factors, complicates the analysis of causality and attribution. It will therefore be critical to establish **plausible links between CSO strategies and policy change**. This will be done through a “practical” theory of change for each policy area, which we will develop through a participatory process involving various stakeholders and sources to enable crosschecking and verification.

The theory of change is a technique to structure our understanding how CSO strategies have contributed to policy outcomes. As a visual tool the theory of change depicts the pathways that lead from specific activities of individual CSOs to wider policy changes, thus establishing causal linkages through interactive stakeholder analysis.

Figure 8: Linking strategies to outcomes through a “practical” theory of change



A major aspect in developing the theory of change is to test the plausibility of perceptions (and claims) around policy dialogue outcomes, using a two-way approach:

- Working forwards **from strategy to outcomes**: We review CSOs and their achievements vis-à-vis objectives and any evidence on outcomes achieved. This will be done through meta-analysis of the available data in CSO reports, using the checklist on outcome indicators above (see Checklist 2). Claims about outcomes and impacts made in the documentation can be cross-checked through interviews and focus group discussions. However, where documentation is limited, the use of other techniques, such as Appreciative Inquiry, can be used to inquire into the aspiration of CSOs and pathways towards achieving those. To triangulate CSO self-perceptions with other sources, we will conduct short “reality checks” by visiting other organisations, communities etc. as feasible and appropriate. Through participatory analysis the team will assess what issues led to identified policy changes by a process of tracing and uncovering the steps through which outcomes have been generated, exploring how and why decisions or practices were executed and what the role of the different stakeholders were in that process. This will be done through the process analysis tool.
- Working backwards **from impact to outcomes**: This means we identify key policy changes (impacts) and identify the role that CSOs have played in it. As a first step we will review the available literature (studies, evaluations etc.) to establish wider policy changes. We will then interrogate any linkages between those changes and the outcomes that CSOs have achieved through group discussions, which involves a wider range of (CSO and non CSO) stakeholders, including representatives from government, think tanks etc. Force field analysis will be a useful tool to understand the dynamics of change and the role different actors have played in it through a process of interactive analysis.

3.2. Outcomes of policy dialogue

For the case studies it is important to break down the concept of influence into (intermediate) outcomes from specific CSO strategies that can already be observed and long-term policy changes. Intermediate (process) outcomes are important to trace CSO influence in policy dialogue. In some cases it may be possible to link policy changes, like the adoption of new policies or the implementation of policies, directly linked to CSO inputs, e.g. through provision of policy papers or proposals that have been taken up. In other cases, CSOs only had an indirect influence, e.g. through framing issues or raising awareness through media campaigns. However, in most cases it may only be possible to measure the intermediate (process) outcomes of CSO strategies that will eventually lead to more effective engagement in policy dialogue. Intermediate outcomes leading to more effective engagement of CSOs in policy dialogue include strengthened organisational capacity, strengthened alliances and strengthened base of support. The checklist below will serve as guidance for the identification of (intermediate and policy change) outcomes through the case studies.

Checklist 2: Measuring influence – Possible outcomes of CO engagement in policy dialogue¹⁵⁵

CSO intermediate (process) outcomes	CSO inputs into policy dialogue	Change outcomes
<p>Strengthened organisational capacity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved management including transparency and accountability Improved capacity to communicate messages Increased voice and demands for accountability Increased participation in civil society-state space <p>Strengthened alliances</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased number of partner supporting an issue Improved level of collaboration Improved harmonisation of efforts Increased number of strategic alliances <p>Strengthened base of support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased public involvement in an issue Changes in voter behaviour Increased media coverage Increased awareness of messages among specific groups Increased visibility 	<p>Direct Inputs into policy dialogue</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Research “White papers” Policy proposals Lessons from pilots projects Policy briefings Watchdog function 	<p>Policy changes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy development Policy adoption Policy implementation Policy enforcement
	<p>Indirect inputs into policy dialogue</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Setting an agenda Framing issues Media campaign 	<p>Shift in social norms</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Changes in awareness of an issue Changes in perceptions Changes in attitudes and values

¹⁵⁵ Adapted from Jane Reisman et al. *A guide to Measuring advocacy and policy*, Organisational Research Services, 2007.

4. The case study approach


4.1. Process for case studies

The advantage of using case studies for this evaluation is that they will enable an in-depth and contextualised analysis of complex concepts and linkages surrounding CSO engagement in policy dialogue by focussing on a specific policy area. Case studies tend to take a more open approach which allows factors and issues that are not anticipated or well understood at this stage to be explored. The evaluation will conduct 2-3 case studies in each country. The case study approach needs to be flexible and adaptive, based on the conceptual framework outlined above.

The case studies will make use of existing documentation to the extent possible; however, we expect that the linkages will mainly be assessed on the basis of information derived from stakeholder interviews and focus groups. Analysis therefore needs to be systematic and involve steps for crosschecking and verification.

The case study process will used nine basic steps which are illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 9: Process for case studies



4.2. Principles for data collections

Triangulation: Time and resources for the country studies are limited. The teams will need to focus their efforts on capturing a variety of data sources on each topic and triangulate findings between different resources and perspectives to the extent possible. The main data sources that will be consulted include the following:

- CSOs working within the policy areas: The selection of CSOs for case studies will include different types of CSOs (national, local, networks, CBOs etc.) and CSO strategies (as identified through the typology above). CSO own documents and reports will provide evidence on their strategies, the activities conducted and any results achieved. Gaps within the written documentation will need to be filled in through CSO oral accounts. Focus groups with CSOs selected as case studies will help to identify the key enabling and disabling factors that have led to their success or failure. These findings must be crosschecked through consultation of other sources, such as those listed in the following.
- Other civil society actors engaged in the policy area: Representatives from movements, associations, self-help groups, campaigns etc. will be a valuable source for gaining additional insights on how the existing space for policy dialogue has been used by other organisations. These sources should be used to the extent possible to triangulate findings from case studies, in particular with regard to the enabling and disabling conditions. In addition, journalists and parliamentarians with a good knowledge of the policy area should be consulted as source of information and for verification of findings.
- Members of CSO constituencies should be consulted where possible to clarify issues around case study CSO strategies, in particular with regard to questions around CSO accountability and legitimacy.
- Independent think-tanks and experts with a specific knowledge of the policy can provide analysis into what has been achieved (outcomes) and what the key barriers have been. They may also have (independent) views on what the achievements of different types of CSOs have been. The team will identify academics and/or consultants as resources persons.
- Government departments at central and local level with specific responsibilities within the policy area can provide (written and oral) information to verify outcomes on policy changes (e.g. budgets that have been revised; decisions that have been taken; plans that have been developed through a consultative process). The team should in particular look out for those in charge of innovative government initiatives that are likely to spearhead future policy change. In addition visits to government department might be required to cross-check CSO information on barriers resulting from government action. (Government laws and regulations contributing to the enabling and disabling conditions have already been reviewed as part of the scoping studies, but the team might identify additional documents in relation to the selected policy process.)
- Donors and International NGOs will be consulted not only as stakeholders for this evaluation, but also as a source of information. They may have undertaken previous analysis on certain policy issues already and they probably have a good overview of who the main actors are, which can guide the selection of CSOs for case studies.
- Media reports and websites are also an important source to consult during the preparation of case studies.
- Any additional sources will be identified for specific policy areas as part of the case study preparation.

Selectivity: Because of the limited time and resources available the team needs to be selective in the way it uses different sources. Selectivity means that the team has to be conscious what the minimum amount of sources is to allow qualified findings. The implication of this is that the quality and utility of individual sources must be critically assessed and potential biases be addressed.

Spread: What the available sources are will depend on the country and policy issues. Whatever the sources are, it is important to ensure a good spread across a variety of sources, geographical, social, economic and political. Within the short time available a good spread can be achieved through careful selection of informants (during preparation), use of online communication tools (skype) or phone interviews and use of focus groups.

Innovation: The teams should be innovative in their approach to data collection, look outside those data sources that have been well covered by previous studies and consult people, organisations and initiatives that may bring in a fresh perspective and add new insights.

Labour division: For each team, team members will spread out to cover different policy areas. There will be similar issues cutting across several policy areas (such as the enabling and disabling conditions) where team members will be able to collect data from different sources. cross-check their findings.

4.3. Analysis, crosschecking and verification

The final analysis will bring together the various elements of the case studies, establishing a plausible link between CSO strategies, policy dialogue and outcomes. As part of the final analysis the evaluators will use analytical tools, such as power cube and policy cycle tool, to analyse the various elements that contribute to CSO effectiveness. The power cube will be used to analyse the inclusiveness of spaces for policy dialogue; the policy cycle tool to determine which entry points CSOs have used to influence policy dialogue. The analysis will be shared and further deepened during the final verification workshops, which will include a wider range of stakeholders, including representatives from government, media, INGOs, parliamentarians and academics. During the final verification and feedback workshops the team will also present their theories of change for the selected policy areas for verification by a wider group of stakeholders.

Annex 10. Timeline

Year	Critical event	Comment
1975	National Independence	Frelimo forms a “party state” with a strong influence in all walks of economic, social and political life of the country, i.e. all productive enterprises were being run by the State (or rather by the Frelimo Party). No local middle class existed at Independence.
1984/5	Economic reforms	First moves towards economic reforms.
1986-92	Civil war	Dissatisfaction with Frelimo’s handling of Independence mandate. Resistance led by Renamo and heavily supported by the South African apartheid regime.
1987	Economic Rehabilitation Programme (ERP)	Many formerly state enterprises during the ERP period were privatised mostly to the Frelimo political elite which led to the emerging of a party affiliated small middle class
1998-2000	Decentralization	Beginning of the test implementation of the Decentralised Planning and Finance Programme in Nampula. The programme had an important influence in the decentralised participatory planning. The role of the international NGOs (SNV and Concern) was critical in the establishment of the first Local Development Committees (CDL) that engage and inform the government in planning. The 2001/2 expansion phase of the PPDF for Cabo Delgado, which became known as PPDF North.
1990	Multi-party Constitution	The single-party parliament enacted the first multi-party Constitution, including legislation on associations. The first Multi-party Constitution provided for the freedom of expression and of association as a citizens’ right, which are defined in the 2004 Constitution as fundamental principles.
1992	General Peace Agreement	The general Peace Agreement was signed in Rome on October 4, 1992, putting an end to the 16 years of civil war.
1994 and 1999	Multi-party elections	Frelimo wins both elections with marginal (and questionable) gaps over Renamo. The low level of voters’ participation demonstrated that a significant portion of population did not identify itself with the political institutions.(Presentation by Luis de Brito, 13.12.11 at CS workshop held by Danish Embassy in Mozambique.)
2003	Local Government Law (LOLE)	Legislation on Local State Bodies approved and enacted.
	Poverty Observatory	The establishment of the Poverty Observatory. The civil society won a space for policy dialogue with the government and international partners. Civil society earns a critical role in its relationship with the State after the years of mistrust and accusations of operating as political opposition. The experiences of PPDF North inform the preparation and approval of LOLE, which formalises the establishment of community consultation and participation institutions. This reinforces the idea of the importance of civil society engagement in the process of governance. Establishment of the G20 civil society platform as a result of the process of openness to political dialogue.
2004	New Constitution	Guarantees rights of association and organization.
2005	CS at provincial level	The replication of the model of Poverty Observatory begins in the Provinces. The role played by the civil society was critical for the constitution of this mechanism at the level of consultation at provincial level. Emergence of more civil society platforms at provincial level.

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	Paris Declaration	<p>Adoption of the Paris Declaration. International partners start to disburse direct funds to State budget. And therefore, the group of direct budget support partners is formed.</p> <p>Development partners mobilise to respond to the concern of more transparency. And one way will be the strengthening of civil society.</p>
2006	Anti-corruption	A National Anti-corruption Forum is established, and subsequently abolished in 2007 for being unconstitutional.
2008	Accra Declaration	The Accra Declaration. Strengthens awareness on the necessity for donors to support civil society.
	CS initiatives	<p>A Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC) is established in a joint effort between DFID and Irish Aid.</p> <p>A Governance Monitoring Forum (a civil society platform that aims to monitor the implementation of PESOD at District level and the Annual Plans and Activities of Municipalities) is established.</p> <p>The availability of funds for the field of governance has increased the number of organisations that seek to work in matters of governance monitoring and advocacy.</p>
2010	New CS initiatives	<p>The Swedish Embassy launches the “Actions for an Inclusive and Accountable Governance - AGIR” Programme for support to civil society with a focus on general issues of governance.</p> <p>Establishment of the Budget Monitoring Forum, a platform focused on the monitoring of the implementation of the State Budget and comprising of four civil society organisations, namely FDC, CIP, CESC and GMD.</p>